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March 09, 2015 | ![]() | By Shreyas Deshmukh | ||||||||||||||||||||
In November 2014, an Afghan Taliban delegation led by Qari-din-Mohammad visited Beijing. Since the new government came to power in Afghanistan in September 2014, efforts towards building the peace process have intensified. This new attempt to bring stability and security in Afghanistan by the nascent government is showing results. The CEO of Afghanistan’s National Unity Government Abdullah Abdullah has said that the Taliban is ready to negotiate; hence the Taliban office has been re-opened in Qatar’s capital Doha. Pakistan’s role in these talks has been very pivotal. It is a well-known fact that majority of the Taliban leadership is based in Pakistan and that they have maintained close ties with ISI for the last two decades. The Karzai government had always been keen to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table and it had initiated the process by establishing the High Peace Council. However, the Karzai’s efforts had been neutralized by Pakistan in the past, because of its hold on the proxies for so called ‘National interests’. There are high hopes with the initiation of this new endeavor by President Asharaf Ghani, with Pakistan too involved in a constructive role in the negotiations. The peace talks which the Americans initiated in 2013 failed because of the exclusion of the then Afghan government; this time around the ongoing negations are “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” with support of Pakistan and China. The question is what has changed in the last one year- is it the demeanor of Pakistan which has changed its traditional approach and outlook towards the Peace reconciliation process in Afghanistan? This paper tries to find the raison d'être behind the revolutionary behavioural change in Pakistan with respect to the Afghan peace process. Withdrawal of ISAF forces Pakistan is going through a severe financial crisis. Most of the financial resources have been diverted towards the fight against homegrown terrorism and securing energy supply. According to a survey conducted by Pakistan’s department of finance, the effect of the US war on terror in Afghanistan cost Pakistan $102 billion by end 2014, which included losses in exports, infrastructure, investment and tax collection. The factors considered in the survey, though, are debatable. The report published by the US Congressional Research Services indicates that Pakistan has received $31.055 billion until FY 2015, as given below. In addition Pakistan receives funds from IMF, ADB and EU/US too as compensation. Withdrawal of ISAF forces will result in the reductionof flow of such funds; hence Pakistan cannot bear the cost of handling the Afghan Taliban as the simple cost-benefit analyses indicates. An adverse effect of war economy is visible in Afghanistan, the same way it is affecting Pakistan, which may have resulted into its giving a green light to peace talks. Direct Overt US Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-16
Source: Congressional Research Service, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf Stable Afghan government The National Unity Government of Afghanistan is a product of intense negotiations between political rivals Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah and the exceptional diplomatic skills of John Kerry. After five months, the new Afghan government appeared to be stable and productive. It has reduced the probability of political instability in the country thus limiting the interference of regional actors like Pakistan. Further it reduced the influence of proxies in the policy making, though they will continue to remain the major factor of concern for the policy makers. Weakened Taliban Asharaf Ghani in a recent interview stated that ‘Attacks on civilians are a sign of weakness, they are not a sign of strength’, indicating that factionalism has weakened the Afghan Taliban. Further he has attempted to explain the increased number of attacks by the Taliban by saying “Prior to reaching peace, there has been an upswing (in violence), because it is about negotiating space. It's about demonstrating relevance.” It appears that the fragile Afghan Taliban is less and less of use to Pakistan as a pugilist proxy. Homegrown terrorism With the major attacks like the one on Peshawar Army School, the frequency of attacks on individuals has drastically increased all over Pakistan.[i] Political violence, sectarian killings and TTP led attacks have engaged security agencies intensely. Ongoing targeted military operations in the country are draining out the state’s resources. Pakistan claims most of the attacks are carried out by the Afghanistan-based TTP leaders whereas Afghanistan holds Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban responsible for the attacks in its soil. It appears that, for the first time, Afghanistan is on a better position with Pakistan in the negotiations. Rise of ISIS in Af-Pak region Rise of ultra extremist ideology in the form of ISIS in Af-Pak region is the new threat to Pakistan and the region as a whole. These ideas are beyond the manipulative reach of the ISI and have the dangerous effect of drawing many jihadists from other factions of TTP and Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban needs to be neutralized or mainstreamed before they collaborate with ISIS, something Pakistan will surely not want. Increased Chinese pressure The increased number of attacks by the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in the Chinese Xinxiang province and its relations with Al-Qaeda and Taliban is the matter of concern for China. TTP and other terrorist groups residing in the North Waziristan Area of Pakistan gave sanctuaries to the ETIM leadership, when operation Zerb-e-Azb started by Pakistan army targeted this leadership and some of them have fled to Afghanistan. The links between Taliban and ETIM and their presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan is one of the reasons behind increasing pressure on both the countries by China and its interest in the negotiation process. Indo-Afghan relations Thriving Indo-US relations can affect the US policies in Afghanistan in favour of India. During the tenure of the Karazi government, India developed very good relations with Afghanistan; however with the new government in power the relations seem to have gone dormant. President Ghani primarily reached out to Pakistan to resolve the issues between the two states. This move has created a positive environment for Pakistan and by bringing the Taliban to a power sharing deal with the Afghan government Pakistan can re-acquire space it lost to India in Afghanistan. Strong Afghan National Army The 3.5 Lakh strong Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is the main concern for Pakistan. From 2003 to 2014, 16 major incidences have taken place along the Durand line between the two forces. To contain the ANSF within the state, the best way is to influence the internal policies of the state. As has been said initially, Pakistan is the deal broker between Taliban and Afghan government, and if the deal succeeds, Pakistan will hold significant power in meddling in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Conclusion Changing regional dynamics with the rise of radical extremist forces and a weakened economy has brought Pakistan to the negotiation table with Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban now appears to be a factionalised force and it remains unclear as to how much control the Taliban leadership enjoys over its cadres. Criminalization of Taliban ranks has already resulted in its losing public support in Afghanistan. Before the significance of Taliban diminishes further, Pakistan will try to bring the insurgents into the political mainstream. For the stability of Afghanistan, negotiations are important. But it is even more important to bring the large number of Pashtun insurgents into the main stream before they joins the ultra radicals. The author is Research Assistant at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
References
[i] Pakistan Project Report, (2014), ‘Unending Violence in Pakistan: Analyzing the Trends ’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Shreyas Deshmukh |