Future of Iranian Involvement in Syria: A Scenario-Based Analysis

Abstract: This paper aims to analyse the extent to which Iran will continue to be involved in the Syrian conflict keeping in mind the current losses suffered by Assad’s forces. It attempts to envisage a range of possible scenarios- from withdrawal of support to Assad, to overt intervention and analyse the probability of each of the alternatives and its likely implications.

The recent loss of the 52nd Brigade HQ, a huge military base near the town of Daraa in the South is one among the series of losses faced by the Syrian government forces to the rebel forces.[1]

Some of the primary factors that have greatly hampered the Syrian forces offensive capabilities are-

1. Convergence of Interests: The recent agreement between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to join forces and form a coalition[2] with the primary target being the Assad regime led to the formation of Jaish al- Fatah or the Army of Conquest comprising a conglomerate of the Al Nusra front and a few rebel factions. This saw significant rise in supply of arms and funds reaching the fighters of Jaish al- Fatah which put its resources to good use against the government forces on the ground.
2. War of attrition: The Syrian government forces engaged the ISIS in the north, Jaish al Fatah in the centre and the Free Syrian Army in the south, suffering many casualties. Each setback also had an impact on the morale of their troops. [3]Further, the mounting losses have also not been adequately replenished and the hosts of Afghan and Pakistani fighters, mostly Shia’s who have taken refuge in Iran over the years,[4] who have been funneled into Syria by the Iranians  are not well trained.
3. Dwindling sources of revenue and estrangement of local population: Many within the government held territory have avoided military conscription. Further some estimates suggest that only 8% of Syria’s oil and gas assets are under  government control,[5] significantly increasing Assad’s dependence on Tehran. The gas attacks and the barrel bombs have further alienated the local Syrians from the regime. This has greatly helped the rebels  replenish their losses as more people join the anti-government forces.

All the above factors combined have resulted in a limited resistance offered by the Syrian forces loyal to Assad, resulting in quick withdrawal and thus loss of territory. The situation has reached a critical level where lucrative incentives like special services in businesses and other areas have failed to deliver and local Syrians continue to avoid military conscription.[6]  This has forced Assad’s forces to adopt a more defensive approach and increasingly rely on foreign fighters, Hezbollah and Tehran. Iran, which has been supporting Assad since the start of the crisis is now actively contemplating a ‘Plan B’[7] in which it plans to  build solid defences around the capital and the Syrian North Western coastal strip, where most of the Alawite community is based. Given the current circumstances this approach is the best one at Iran’s and Assad’s disposal. Some of the possible scenarios that may emerge out of this in the mid to long run are as follows

1. Iran withdraws support for Assad: This will certainly result in Assad’s defensive line being breached and the government will cease to exist. Subsequent assaults especially on the coastal strip may result in sectarian clashes and genocide of unprecedented scale. This will further make the matters difficult, unleashing a long drawn conflict among the various factions with no scope for a diplomatic resolution or end to the conflict. Keeping in mind the current circumstances this is a less likely scenario as it will greatly hamper Iran’s image as a reliable partner as well as threaten the Hezbollah supply lines. But in the worst case scenario Iran will succeed in cultivating some support, which will ensure the safety of its supply routes to its proxies in the Levant andmay make it relatively easier for Iran to let go of Assad.
2. Status quo: Iran continues with its advisory role and supports Assad regime with funds and fighters who manage to hold off successive rebel attacks from the existing defensive lines along the coast and near the capital. This is a relatively economically viable option for Iran keeping in mind the current circumstances. The defensive line is not stretched making it difficult to dislodge the government forces from their dug-in defences. A status quo will provide the government forces the much needed time to re-arm and replenish for future engagements. For the scenario to materialize it is necessary that the Syrian forces do not lose more ground. Such a scenario seems possible especially after many Iraqi and Iranian fighters with combat experience have entered in Syria to support the government.
3. Divided Syria: A backstage understanding is reached between Assad and the rebel groups, allowing Assad to maintain a small portion of the Syrian territory, while the rebel forces retain the territory they have under their control resulting in a divided Syria and an end to conflict. The Syrian war may eventually end on such a note; however it is difficult to think of such a scenario in the immediate future.
4. Overt Iranian intervention: Though Iran has declined to send its regular forces for now, worsening of the security situation for Assad may result in an overt Iranian intervention in the conflict. There already exists a provision for such an eventuality as per the defence agreement between Iran and Syria. There are certain reports which hint at the fact that the Iranian military has taken charge of the control room from the Syrian officers and is gearing up to improve the situation in its favour. An overt Iranian involvement however has certain drawbacks.
   1. Popularity of war in Iran: Iran fighting the rebel forces on behalf of Assad may not go down well among the local Iranians who may consider Iranian intervention in  Syria’s internal affair  unwarranted. The intervention may further prolong the conflict and take a toll in terms of money, men and material. Iran, already  reeling under economic hardships from the sanctions imposed by the US, EU and UN, may find it difficult to sustain its presence. Even if sanctions are lifted, the War will seriously burden the Iranian economy.   
   2. Impact on Syrian troop morale: Even if it is assumed that Iran send its regular forces into battle, they will continue to depend on the local Syrian forces. An Iranian commander commanding Syrian troops may not go down well among the existing Syrian forces. This may hamper the command and control structure having an impact on battlefield maneuvers.
   3. International Response: Among others, Israel will consider Iranian regular troops close to its borders as an imminent threat to its security and may indulge in targeted strikes on the Iranian ground forces further escalating the conflict. Israel has targeted Iranian senior officers present near its borders before and may not hesitate to repeat its actions again. Iran in all likelihood may face international criticism and will do everything to prevent jeopardizing its nuclear deal that  may be hampered by its direct involvement in Syria.

Thus to conclude it can be said that at least for the next few months, Iran would prefer a status quo in which the Syrian forces do not lose any more territory and strengthen their defences around the existing strategic towns. Assad and Iran will continue to rely on foreign fighters and militias to engage the rebels.

In the long term, keeping in mind the nature of conflict, Iran, if deciding to intervene militarily, cannot simply restrict its engagement to limited military operations and sooner or later will find itself involved deeper in the conflict. This will not only result in the loss of men and material but also have an impact on the economy . Threat of escalation of conflict with its direct involvement and the international response might deter Iran further from directly engaging militarily in Syria.

Under such circumstances it will develop or cultivate channels from among the militias which it has helped to raise over the years in Syria and thus ensure its influence in the Levant in the event of Assad’s collapse.