Russian Intervention In Syria And Its Reverberations In West Asia

The Russian air campaign targeting anti Assad forces brings a new entity to the Syria quagmire. The four and half years civil war in the country has caused 3,20,000 casualties^[1​], internally displaced 7.6 million people ^[2] andof the 3,96,500 refugees reaching Europe since January 2015, approximately 70% of which are Syrians.^[3] Thishas triggered panic among the European nations.

The article aims to analyse what could be the possible factors for the Russian intervention at this juncture, especially after the war has dragged on for these many years.Further it will try and differentiate the Russian operations from the US led coalition strike in Syria and also analyse the possible regional response to the intervention.

The Russian intervention: Why now?

• Ukraine Crisis:The interview of the German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen^[4] hinted at a tacit agreement which may have been stuck between the EU and Russia.Owing to the problems faced because of the refugees, EU may have agreed to put the Crimean issue to rest in return for Russian intervention in Syria aimed to stabilise the situation. The current calm on the Ukraine front may serve as an indicator.

• Limitations of the American Strategy: The American strategy in Syria was two pronged-

1) Support for ‘moderate’ factions fighting ISIS in Syria and

2) Airstrikes against ISIS targets, especially its leadership present in Syria.

Both the options have met with limited success as is evident from the White house declaration of closure of its ‘train and equip programme’ especially after the failure of the fighters to change the ground equation significantly and the current incident which witnessed the CIA trained fighters surrendering  arms and equipment to the Islamists for a safe passage.^[5]The fighters were also engaged by regime troops resulting in losses on both sides. The airstrikes have managed to kill some members of the ISIS leadership; however it has failed to stop the ISIS attacks.

Moreover with the conflict dragging on for years, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the ‘moderates’ from the ‘radicals’. The Al Nusra front has entered into an alliance with many of the rebel groups supported by Gulf States,enabling them to get access to advanced Western weaponry.In such a situation dealing with the existing government to engineer a transition of power seems easier and sensible than dealing with multiple rebel groups, none of which has emerged as a single powerful force and has also failed to form a consensus on the issues in the post Assad scenario. Assad’s survival at least in the short run thus seems essential. Keeping this in mind, Russia at least on paper, intends to bring about a political solution to the problem through coercion.

• Russian power projection: The current direct intervention is thus the first outside the former Soviet borders and indicative of the increasing assertiveness of the Russian state. Diplomatically, Russia has been deeply involved in the Syrian issue as has been evident from the success of its intervention which saw Assad giving up his stockpiles of chemical weapons in 2013.A success in Syria will exponentially add to Putin’s ‘charm offensive’ which has earned him  overwhelming support at home especially after the annexation of Crimea.
• Scope for Lucrative Arms deals: West Asia has been one of the biggest arms importing regions in the world with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries serving as the biggest markets for a plethora of Western military hardware.^[6] The current intervention in Syria provides a classic opportunity for Moscow to display its stateof the art equipment which is likely to appeal to the deep Arab pockets. Specific media attention enjoyed by the Russian hardware ranging from cruise missiles to the sophisticated electronic warfare systems and aircraft namely the Su 30 SM and Su 34’s thus serves as an ‘on-field arms expo’ for Russia.Russia has already sold defence equipment worth USD 3 Billion to Egypt.^[7]

How is it different?

At the political level, Russia has supported the regime throughout the course of the on-going conflict as it is opposed to regime change through external intervention. Keeping in mind the current quagmire, bringing the opposition to the negotiation table and engaging Assad is the ‘least-worst alternative’ available which can be done by militarily weakening all the opposition.

Militarily, Russia, at least in the next few months, will refrain from sending regular units into battle and rely on the Syrian Arab Army, militias loyal to the regime, Hezbollah and Iran-backed Shia fighters for ground assaults as well as holding the territory.The bombing pattern makes it clear that the primary targets will be regaining the strategic ground lost especially in the province of Homs, Hama and Aleppo while further strengthening its grip of Latakia and Taratus, and in the process targeting every opposition group be it the ISIS, Jabat Al Nusra or the Free Syrian Army. 

Russian air strikes are primarily aimed at providing close air support to the regime forces as well as destroying the immediate threats posed by militias to the regime, whereas the US is more focused on strategic strikes specifically targeting the ISIS leadership. The increased use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM’s) by the US than the Russians, who have primarily relied on cluster ammunition and dumb bombs, further reinforces the different nature of aerial missions.

Regional Implications

The increasing engagement between Russia and the dominant regional players namely Egypt, Israel, and Iran indicates that Moscow is ready to play an increasingly major role in the region. It remains to be seen how and to what extent the regional powers will be accommodative of Russia’s presence in the region. But in the short term it seems to be on good terms. However, an extended presence, especially in the Levant region, may not go down well.

Iran, which played a major role in Syria before the Russian intervention has taken a back seat making way for Russia to call the shots.The ground assaults however are primarily co-ordinated by the Iranians.In the long run, Tehran may not tolerate the long term ‘subordination’ to Russia in Syria, its ‘strategic neighbourhood’.Saudi Arabia also despises the Russian presence in Syria.

In the case of Israel, as long as Russia ensures prevention of advanced weaponry from falling into the hands of anti-Israel forces, especially the Hezbollah, it would not have any problems with a short-term heavy Russian presence in the region. The bonhomie between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Putin serves as an indicator for this.However a prolonged military presencemay upset Israel’s military superiority and hence may not be welcome.

The warm relation between Egyptian President Sisi and President Putin indicatesRussia’s attempts to revive its once strong alliance with Cairo.

Russia’s assertive and decisive leadership as opposed to the conciliatory and cautious American policy has appealed to the Arab regimes in the region. This has facilitated Moscow’s entry in the region. Moscow’s relaxed stance towards human rights issues also adds to its appeals to the regional regimes.

The Russian media has left no stone unturned to signal the arrival of Russia in the Middle East region as a counter to the ‘declining’ US presence. This by no means is true as the US is the dominant power in the region and will continue to be so in the next few decades.

Conclusion

The Russian intervention has indefinitely postponed Assad’s ouster from power. It is also clear that Assad is a short term option for Russia and it will play a crucial role in power transition by ensuring its interests in the Mediterranean will be safeguarded and respected by the successive government that will take power. The US change of strategy to arm rebel groups instead of its ‘train and equip’ programme and the boost to Saudi and Qatari proxies may serve as spoiler for Russia and prolong its engagement in the region ultimately worsening the situation further on ground. On the other hand it can be argued that, ifthe refugee crisis in Europe goes beyond control, it may force a consensus between the major players involved, namely the US, EU, Russia and the Gulf States bringing an end to the long drawn conflict in Syria.

Views expressed by the author are personal. Author is a Research assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies.