Likely US- Pakistan Nuclear Deal : A Myth or a Blunder in Waiting

India-like Deal with Pakistan?

Print media¹ was abuzz with news of Washington exploring a possibility of a civilian nuclear deal with Pakistan, on lines similar to the Indian deal, ahead of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s forthcoming visit to US in end-October 2015. The justification put forth is that the US should be able to extract a number of commitments from Pakistan in exchange for the deal which would assist in achieving peace and stability in the region. Pakistan would be expected to “restrict its nuclear programme to weapon and delivery systems appropriate to its actual defence needs against India’s nuclear threat.”If reports are to be believed, Pakistan would be asked to restrict the deployment of its missiles to reach up to a certain range, in lieu of its case being taken up by the US for nuclear waiver with the 48-nation Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG).The connotation of this statement is that the US is acknowledging the fact that Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme is India centric and as long as it does not pose a threat tothe US and any of its  allies in the region viz Israel, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore etc, it is fine with them. This seemingly indifferent stance has definitely touched the raw nerve of India.

India’s Reaction to the Report 
 

Predictably, there has been a sharp criticism in the Indian circles. One of the analysts has cited the idea of this deal with Pakistan as “sheer madness wrapped in folly” owing to its reckless history of nuclear proliferation and home grown terrorism.It would be foolhardy to equate this deal with the Indo-US deal, as India inked the 123 Agreement with the US and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver due to its impeccable non-proliferation track record.On the other hand, Pakistan has been the epicenter of nuclear proliferation in Asia.

Nuclear Proliferation by Pakistan

In the mid-1970s, Pakistan took the uranium enrichment route to acquire a nuclear weapons capability under the direction of Pakistan’s nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility, and Khan would later assert that the country had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device as early as 1984.² Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins in their  writings have aptly highlighted the role of Khan in nuclear proliferation: AQ Khan was the mastermind of clandestine enterprise designed to obtain the technology and equipment to make atomic bombs – first for Pakistan and then later for highest bidder. He started down the nuclear path as a patriot, stealing secret European nuclear designs out of determination to protect his country from its arch rival, India. After playing a central role in developing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, he shifted course and employed his global network to sell those same nuclear secrets to some of the most regressive regimes in the world, transforming himself into a nuclear jihadist devoted to payback for real and imagined grievances suffered by muslims around the world. The Pakistani Scientist and his accomplices shattered the old proliferation model of state to state transfers, in which one government quietly shared nuclear secrets with an ally.³Hence, this Pakistani Scientist not only first helped Pakistan build the bomb but also had no qualms about spreading nuclear weapons to some of the most unstable regions in the world,viz, North Korea, Iran and Libya.

In order to gain access to nuclear technology surreptitiously,Pakistan had established science departments in her embassies in the important countries of the world.  Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai and smuggled Urenco technology to Engineering Research Laboratories,by stealing photographs and documents of the technology.The Urenco Group is a nuclear fuel company operating several centrifuge-based uranium enrichment plants in Germany, Netherlands, US and UK. It has supplied nuclear power stations in about 15 countries. By 1978, Khan’s efforts  paid off and made him  a national hero, and, in 1981, as a tribute, President Zia-ul-Haq,renamed the Engineering Research Laboratories  AQ Khan Research Laboratories.

During the period 1992-1994, Dr.Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. It was during this period that barter of the Dongfengseries of missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment  took place in exchange of nuclear centrifuges with North Korea.In 2003, Libya had admitted that it had acquired the nuclear weapons-related material including the centrifuges, known asPak-1, from Pakistan.

In 2004, Khan confessed that he was solely responsible for spreading nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, much against the wide-spread belief in the strategic affairs community that smuggling of bomb-making equipment and technology could not have taken place without the supervision and complicity of Pakistan's powerful military. Later in July 2008, he admitted that army had "complete knowledge" of the shipment of used P-1 centrifuges to North Korea and that it must have been sent with the consent of Musharraf, the thenarmy chief. "It was a North Korean plane, and the army had complete knowledge about it and the equipment," Khan said. "It must have gone with his (Musharraf’s) consent."⁴

Threat from Terrorists and Non State Actors (NSAs)

Proliferation is not the only cause of concern with respect to Pakistan. There is likelihood that nuclear weapons/fissile material could be acquired by terrorists and NSAs due to political instability and radicalisation of its organisations in Pakistan.An increase in terrorist attackson several heavilyguarded state installations -on Karachi international airport by Pakistan’sTehreek-e-Taliban(TTP) in Jun 2014⁵, on the Minhas airbase (possibly a nuclear weapons storage base), on the Peshawar airport in 2012,on the Mehran naval base in 2011, to name a few, have aggravated the challenges that Pakistan’s nuclear security structure faces and exposed the gaps in Pakistan’s security apparatus. Concerns of TTP militants being emboldened to target Pakistan’s nuclear weaponinstallations are not unfounded and could have globally catastrophic results.

The Wikileaks’ disclosures revealed similar concerns expressed by the former US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson about the possibility of subversion in the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Patterson, in a February 2009 briefing for special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, stated, ‘Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance that someone working in Government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.⁶The small quantities of smuggled material could  be used to make the Radioactive Dispersal Devices (RDD) or “dirty bombs.”

Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety Mechanism

Amidst growing concerns, Pakistan has claimed that the security mechanism for its nuclear weapons is under “strong, multi-layered, institutionalised decision-making organisation, administration, and command and control structures.” As per Pakistan,the physical security of all nuclear establishments in the country fall under Security Divisionof Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is responsible for the custody of all nuclear weapons, weapon-components and fissile material located at highly secret locations in military garrisons across the country. The measures include multi-layered guards and gates that provide site access control and extensive screening of employees to guard against a threat. A new division of the SPD comprising approx12,000 highly trained and dedicated personnel was created after the AQ Khan episode of proliferation. The National Development Complex (NDC), which is responsible for development of weapons, has been split and the areas dealing with nuclear and other strategic weapons have been separated and provided additional security. In July 2006,Pakistan instituted Nuclear  Security Action Plan (NSAP) to further tighten the existing security measures, encompassing management of radioactive sources, locating and securing Orphan radioactive sources and establishment of Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NuSECC), a specialised crises response unit similar to the US Nuclear Emergency Search Team.

Pakistan also claims to be following  well laid down procedures and guidelines to enhance security ofits nuclear assets. Foremost, the warheads are de-mated from their delivery systems ensuring against an accidental or unauthorised launch. The delivery systems, to be manned by military units of Army Strategic Forces Command(ASFC), are supposed to be kept apart from their nuclear warheads at all times till a high level of alert becomes necessary. The final mating of the system is to be withheld till just before the launch.The fissile material comprising the nuclear core of the weapons is reportedly kept physically separate from the rest of the warhead package, thereby ensuring that the core is stored separately under different custodial arrangements. Hence, any sabotage will require operations against multiple locations. Also,withthe US assistance, Pakistan is known to have incorporated Permissive Action Links (PALs) into the arming of nuclear weapons, which requires a 12 digit alpha-numeric code or combination to allow weapons to be activated. Thiswould ensure that a nuclear warhead cannot be used without the highest custodian’s approval. Thus, nuclear weapons would be in civil custody even if they were stored in military storage sites spread all over the country. 

As per the Director Generalof SPD, Pak follows a ‘Three-man rule’ for authentication of access codes for nuclear weapons use as against the ‘two-man’ rule normally followed in other countries, providing an added tier of security to nuclear weapons in Pakistan. It follows a Personnel ReliabilityProgramme (PRP) for screening of personnel involved in security, using extensive background checks,psychological profiling as well as monitoring of suspicious behaviour.

Situation at Ground Zero

In spite of a number of security measures instituted by Pakistanfor the protection of its nuclear arsenal, the moot point remains whether it can still prevent a determined terrorist/NSA from making an attempt to steal/destroy it, e.g. although a separate storage of fissile material core may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorised persons to remove the fissile material core,in an un-assembled state. Dispersal of the nuclear assets would create more potential access points and may increase the risk of pilferage.

Many analysts feel that radicalism has spread its tentacles so deep into organisations in Pakistan, that cracking of security codes to gain access to its strategic assets would be only a matter of time and decision. Another point of view is that safety mechanisms for security of nuclear assets in Pakistan seem to be bloated and more of an exercise on paper to satisfy the world community;and the seemingly impregnable systems may not be able to withstand the lethal onslaught of indoctrinated fundamentalists.

Conclusion

In the past, successive US administrations both under Presidents Bush and President Obama, have knocked down the idea of a deal for Pakistan like the one Washington arrived at with India, saying the background and circumstances surrounding the Indo -US civilian nuclear agreement was entirely different, and pointing to Pakistan's record of nuclear proliferation.However, this time, so far, there has been no official statement or rebuttal from the US on this issue.It can be argued that these news reports may have appeared at this juncture to gauge the mood and reactions of India and other countries on this issue, before the visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister to the US. Howevents will unfold, only time will tell.

Views expressed by the author are personal. Author is a Senior Research Fellow at Centre For Land Warfare Studies.