Can India Surmount China's NSG Wall ?

Introduction

India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) club was discussed in the 16^th plenary meeting held in Seoul on 23-24 Jun 2016. Hectic lobbying and intense diplomatic initiatives in the last few months had given a glimmer of hope that India may be able to cross the finish line and enter the elite league.However, the primary resistance from China supported by another nine countries resulted in inconclusive deliberations and no decision was taken on India’s membership.

Though it is a blow to India’s concerted efforts, it was heartening to see that 38 of the 48 members nuclear cartel including four members of P-5 (less China) stood behind India; and despite China’s attempt to block any discussion on the issue, two rounds of discussions took place. Barring China, countries not out rightly supporting India viz New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, Turkey, Brazil, Switzerland, South Korea and South Africa mainly questioned the procedures and criteria for entry of non-NPT countries and were not opposed to India’s membership per se. Regrettably, the entry into NSG club is by consensus and not based on majority which gave China the stick to beat India with.

 Background

NSG, a 48-member multi-lateral grouping, was founded in response to India’s nuclear test in the year 1974. NSG deals with the control of nuclear materials and technology. They have a set of guidelines pertaining to items that are especially designed for nuclear use and the export of dual-use items (equipment or technology that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosives activity, but that also has non-nuclear uses). A potential new member of the NSG is evaluated on its proliferation record, membership to international non-proliferation treaties like Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and national export control practices.

In case of India, the US recognizes it as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. Its support for India’s prospective membership in this multi-lateral export control regime is a natural corollary to the US efforts to fully accommodate India in the global non-proliferation regime, a process that was initiated with the Indo-US nuclear deal. This is also indicative of the acknowledgement by the US that India is an important part of the global nuclear energy resurgence and cannot be forever artificially kept out of these strategic regimes due to inconsistencies like the NPT’s cut-off date (01 Jan 1967) for defining a nuclear  weapon state.

In contrast, China’s fig leaf for opposition to India’s entry was its non signing of NPT. China also tried to re-hyphenate India with Pakistan by asking Pakistan to apply for the NSG membership, and thus weaken India’s claim. Eventually, there were three countries whose membership claims were discussed first in Vienna and later in Seoul - India, Pakistan and Namibia. The nexus of China-Pakistan to pull all strings to prevent India’s entry was quite discernible as per the media reports. Pakistan seemed to be more interested in preventing India from joining the NSG club rather than lobbying for its own entry, and China played its role to the hilt in ensuring this ploy. The story of Pakistan President’s indebtedness to Chinese Premier for opposing India’s membership was splashed all over the media.

Some analysts felt that India had gone overboard and out stretched itself when PM Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Tashkent on the lines of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) on June 23-24 and requested him to view India’s membership objectively and not through the prism of  Pakistan. As per the critics, this grandstanding by the Indian PM and subsequent snubbing by China by stonewalling India’s efforts led to a diplomatic faux pas and left India red faced in the global diplomatic arena. On the contrary, the proponents of - India going ahead full steam to secure the membership - felt that in the given circumstances and owing to a number of reasons, India was left with no other choice than to put its full weight behind the efforts to gain an entry. Firstly, the Obama administration has been fully backing India and post US elections, the issue may not garner the same priority. Secondly, India’s entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) through a “silent entry” procedure, made the NSG entry supposedly marginally easier. Thirdly, the political situation in the country in terms of upcoming important elections in UP, Punjab may push the NSG plans on the back burner.

Importance of India Joining NSG

Some critics think that as India had already got a clean NSG waiver in 2008, all these efforts to gain entry into the club were a futile exercise as it would not make a material difference. However, it can be argued that a number of benefits would accrue by being in NSG rather than being on the sidelines. Firstly, it will help integrating India into global non-proliferation efforts, and will strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. This will de-facto recognize India as a responsible nuclear power state. Secondly, it will help India to further expand its nuclear cooperation agreements. The NSG membership will change attitude of a number of fence sitters like New Zealand to agree for supply of uranium and plutonium for nuclear power plants in India and reprocessing technology, despite India not having signed NPT. Thirdly, as part of the September 2008 NSG decision, India was given a non-binding consultative role within the NSG, which allows it to keep abreast of changes to guidelines but provides no real ability to influence the deliberations concerning such changes. On grant of membership, India will have a say in the group’s decisions. India could also play a more pro active and constructive role in blocking illegal nuclear trades between China, Pakistan, North Korea etc. Also, as part of NSG, India would become a nuclear supplier and be able to shape the rules of nuclear trade.

Road Ahead

The present setback can at most be described as “loss of one battle in the long drawn war”. India needs to take certain proactive measures to re-assert its entry into the NSG. Some of the actions mandated  are listed below.

Foremost, India should simultaneously approach the other two export control regimes viz Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group for its membership. As was the case in MTCR regime, where India got an entry without opposition due to absence of China (it not being a member state). Likewise, it would not be very difficult to influence an entry into these two regimes, owing to India’s clean track record; and absence of China as a stumbling block.

The stakeholders within the non-proliferation regime should be sensitised to recognise the fact whether the primary role of these groups is to force NPT adherence or to prevent the unauthorized spread of nuclear technologies.  If it is the latter, then from a realistic perspective, India’s inclusion in the group would almost certainly strengthen their ability to achieve the primary objective. These regimes will have to let go of the idea that NPT membership is the litmus test for countries to be able to join the NSG, and should be primed to look beyond the NPT framework.

India must further build on the theme that dwell on India’s “strong record” in dealing with the challenges of arms proliferation and its contribution to global non-proliferation and nuclear security efforts. India must demonstrate its readiness and resolute to achieve global nuclear non-proliferation goals and show a certain degree of transparency with its strategic weapons programmes, to bolster the case for its full membership in the multilateral non-proliferation groupings.

India should adhere to the global strategic non-proliferation regime guidelines regardless of the membership in the grouping and be a testimony of a responsible steward of its strategic weapons programmes. India must distinguish itself from countries like China, which continue to proliferate nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan and North Korea.

India must be proactive in taking steps to upgrade its export control systems. It can also improve the process of end-use monitoring and verification when exporting dual-use items. India must reiterate, that it will continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, unless specific events occur which may jeopardise its security. It may also enter the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to highlight its responsibility towards stopping the clandestine export of the sensitive technology. This will further reinforce its case for becoming a full-fledged member of the multilateral non-proliferation groupings.

India should also take a cue from history- it is a fact that the NSG was originally created in a manner so that France could join, even though it had not yet signed the NPT. France was able to join the NSG at the outset when nations possessing nuclear technology met in London in the wake of India’s first round of nuclear testing in 1974. The group focused on additional restrictions in order to slow further proliferation. Hence, important exporters of such technology (France and Japan), though not member of NPT at that time, were made members of the NSG. This could be emphatically projected in the deliberations.

Recent Accomplishments

If the news papers are to be believed, hours after the conclusion of the NSG plenary session in Seoul, the US has stated that “there is a path forward for India to become a full member of NSG, by the end of this year”. This has fortified India’s claim that the recently concluded plenary meeting was the part of an ongoing process; and India hitting the China wall was a temporary phase which is surmountable.The NSG has appointed an outgoing Argentinian ambassador, as a nuclear envoy, to work out a roadmap and act as a facilitator to bring countries like India into the NSG group.

Further, India may not have to wait till 2017 as there might be a special plenary session called in November 2016 year to discuss India’s case. Calling of special sessions at a short notice are within the ambit of the NSG rules.Reports suggest that it was Mexico which mooted the idea of nomination of a nuclear envoy which found favour with most of the members.

On the expected lines, India has also started making the right kind of noise to make it clear to the Chinese that ‘it was necessary to ensure mutual accommodation of interests, concerns and priorities of New Delhi to take the bilateral ties forward’. Now, with India already a member of MTCR regime and China’s request still pending since 2004, China may get a taste of its own medicine for enrty into MTCR.

Conclusion

Given India’s impeccable non-proliferation record, which stood it in good stead during the deliberations on NSG waiver, coupled with the suppor of the US and other countries, the moot question today is not whether India will become a NSG member or not , but how sooner it will happen. The NSG regime is expected to change its membership criteria to accommodate non-NPT countries, however, it remains to be seen whether it would be an India-specific criterion waiver or more general rules would be evolved, that would allow India as well as others to become members.

The Author is Senior Fellow at CLAWS.Views expressed are personal.