Chinese Communist Party Announces Plenum for 13th Five-Year Plan

Political weather in China is beginning to heat up with official state-run and controlled Xinhua News Agency announcing on July 20, 2015 that the Central Committee of the CCP would hold its fifth plenary session in Beijing this October. The announcement was made following a meeting of the Political Bureau, where, topping the agenda was China’s 13^th Five-Year Plan of national development (2016-2020). The discourse in China on this subject often underscores the significance of the 13^th plan in that it forms the foundation of a “critical stage for building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects”. What is interesting and noteworthy, is the acceptance that while China’s economic development is well known and accepted, the nation is also facing “great strategic opportunities” amidst complicated and tough challenges. The blueprint will chart China’s development from 2016 to 2020, with the leadership’s strategy to stabilise economic growth and, in particular, boost domestic consumption, widely seen as the next major engine of growth.

Having drafted five-year plans since 1953 to map out strategies for overall economic and social development, and set growth targets by defining key development projects and policies, the latest statement appears much in sync with China’s official military strategy released a few weeks back, which largely was interpreted as a comment on China’s national security situation which delineates the “missions and strategic tasks” of the People’s Liberation Army elucidating upon the building and development of China’s armed forces in its “preparation for military struggle”.  The present statement by the CCP needs to be read as the political arm of that strategy, given that it asserts, “… we need to correctly perceive the fundamental changes and respond to risks and challenges more effectively…”

A facet that is becoming clearer with almost every official political and military document coming out of Beijing is the virtually absolute focus on the centrality of the CCP and it being the nerve centre of China’s political structuring. Earlier statements, repeatedlyand unambiguouslyreiterated, “… the Chinese armed forces will unswervingly adhere to the principle of the CCP’s absolute leadership, and work to build into a people’s military that follows the CCP’s commands…” The extent of interlinking firm maintenance of “social stability”, for it to remain a staunch force for “resolutely upholding the CCP’s ruling position” is a visible manifestation of the intent that seeks to suppress any/all speculation of a widening chasm between the CCP and the PLA. In fact, the statement outlines that the “CCP will strictly discipline itself and upgrade its capacity to govern”, with the current Party leadership determined to preserve the supremacy of the Party in China.

Coming back to the very vital phrase in the CCP’s statement wherein it acknowledges that China is “facing great strategic opportunities”; it comes across as validation of Xi Jinping’s signature “One Belt, One Road” initiative launched in 2013. This initiative primarily includes the twin Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Route, which are the most prominent feature of the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The land-based New Silk Road Belt will begin in Xi’an in central China finally meeting the Maritime Silk Route, whichis a proposed sea network of ports, coastal infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in Fujian province and ending in the northern Mediterranean Sea.

The political bureau of the CCP has very appropriately cited “great strategic opportunities” that China is presented with, in that, the One Road, One Belt initiative shall undoubtedly become the foundation for creating a Chinese sphere of economic, political and strategic influence throughout Asia. China will seemingly gain the strategically rich pathway to the Indian Ocean, eased access to the Gulf oil, thus reducing its dependence on passage through the Straits of Malacca, and most significantly, further enhance naval power projection capabilities. Not surprisingly, amidst this backdrop, the statement further avers for “better response to changes in international situations”. While “upholding socialism with Chinese characteristics” is often cited in most official Chinese publications, what China should not overlook is the expectation to come clean on internal strife if it really is committed to bringing the economic and social agenda to fruition.

Dr Monika Chansoria is Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed by the author are personal