Turks and Saudis Are Fighting The Wrong War

On 6^th August, Saudi Arabia suffered another massive Shia mosque bombing, which left 17 dead. Claimed by Islamic State, this bombing is the latest on in a series of slow burns, the ISIS is inflicting on the Arab power’s heartland. Similarly, Turkey’s military strategy is failing to contain sporadic attacks by ISIS.Turkey and Saudi Arabia are both fighting the wrong war, and are themselves mostly responsible for the mess they are creating.

First, an analysis of the Turkish situation. Turkish officials made it clear to Washington, with regards to ISIS in Kobane that they understood fully well, once Kobane fell, Islamic State will target Suruc. The identification and threat assessment in that situation was fully clear. However, Turkey then was playing a game of political gamesmanship. The strategy of the Turks was three fold. Firstly, it was trying to be a good global citizen, and giving refuge to thousands of Syrian refugees, without directly and actively getting involved in a war with ISIS. By doing that it was gaining sympathies from the global order, and successfully playing the victim card inside NATO. Secondly, Turks were loath to be an active belligerent in a multi-pronged conflict, where battlelines are not defined, and forces are shadowy.  Also, Turkey hoped to let Assad, and Kurds fight ISIS for as long as they could, while it stayed in the sidelines(as none of these are allies of the Turkish government) and strict Realism dictates states to facilitate enemies to fight each other. Thirdly, Turkey wanted to piggyback American led efforts and banked on the US to provide security cover in its southern border.

Now, the three pronged strategy has failed. Firstly, Turkey didn’t expect ISIS would chase Kurds inside Suruc, even after the Caliphate lost the control of Kobane. Turkey’s calculation was an “expansionary war” on part of ISIS to Suruc, but never a revenge bombing, which resulted in the subsequent domestic pressure inside Turkey. Also, Turkey didn’t take into consideration the American reluctance to commit to more security coverage of Turkey’s southern border, even in the face of growing ISIS hostility. Thirdly, Turkey’s biggest calculation mistake is that it thought it could contain the war against ISIS and simultaneously use the platform to wage another war against the perpetual enemy - the Kurds in Iraq and Syria. It was a naïve strategy, as one cannot hope to “contain” a war, and play according to civilized rules against a religiously motivated and apocalyptic group like ISIS. Nor can one fight a two-front war against two non-state actors practicing guerrilla warfare, at the same time; two equally motivated and solid fighting militias like ISIS and PKK.  Since the Suruc bombing, 19 Turkish soldiers died in various attacks. As Ian Bremmer mentioned in an interview in Business Insider recently, Turkey just lit a match in a dry ground, without knowing what will happen next.

With regards to Saudi Arabia, one might see a similar development. Saudi Arabia miscalculated the Iranian hand in Yemen. The Saudi regime, a Sunni powerhouse in Middle East, was understandably worried about Iran, a Shia hegemon. It was also skeptical about the United States approaching a détente with the Iranian regime and a nuclear deal which in Saudi opinion, would legitimize and bolster Iranian power. These calculations, instigated the Sauds to overestimate Iranian resolve and reach in Yemen, and misconstrue a spontaneous Shiite Houthi rebellion, as a plot to destabilize the Arab heartland by Iran. Without any prior experience of a military intervention, and with no defined goal, no clear strategy and foreseeable exit plan, Saudi Arabia is now stuck in a quagmire. Assuming the logical goal is defeating the Houthis, the Saudis will have to commit ground forces and that too for a long time to stabilize Yemen, as the Houthis will change tactic to guerrilla warfare.  The Saudis and their Arab allies do not want that. On the other hand, the Saudis are facing increasing IS attacks on the Shias inside their country, destabilizing their social cohesion, as a direct result of Houthi attacks on Sunnis. Finally, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia are slowly realizing the limits of using Air power alone, in anti-insurgency warfare.

The biggest shadow is dropping on the United States. As a global hegemon, and the foremost security ally of both Turkey and the Sauds, Americans were in a unique position to compel them to stop the wrong war, and channelize their forces towards the greater enemy, the Islamic state. But lately it has been observed thatTurkey and Sauds both share a certain trust deficiency with the Americans and are unwilling to follow American lead or give in to US influence. The reluctance and election fatigue of the last years of Barak Obama's administration also means that the US is now focused inwards. It is understandable that Turks and Saudis would both combat against their respective regional adversaries, Kurds or Houthis, while bandwagoning in the war against ISIS but it is also myopic and destabilising. Most importantly, it appears that it will only continue to bring untold misery to a vast majority of people in the region.