Shifting Profile of Militancy in Kashmir Valley

On 11 August 17, 2015 two terrorists were killed by security forces in a fierce encounter near the Ratanpore village of Pulwama district in J&K. This was the second major encounter in the same area of south Kashmir in less than a week. The encounter lasted for almost 24 hours, having started a day prior, after an army patrol was fired upon by terrorists, leading to a major gunfight, as two terrorists who took shelter in a residential house started bringing down heavy fire on security forces patrol. The Army, in such situations has always been cautious while going ahead with encounters and fire fights; with an aim of inflicting ‘zero’ collateral damage which makes such operations go on for longer durations. Also, challenges for security forces in face of local dynamics are likely to increase, as was evident from local resistance to the Army efforts in form of stone pelting and protests. In addition, terrorist(s) can melt away and merge with the local population, increasing potential of inflicting collateral damage to innocent life. With its humane face and ethos of patience and morals in counter-terrorism operations, the Army has been handling such challenges in an expected manner and will continue to do so. Having noted that, it would do well to see why there has been a swelling in the ranks of local militants in J&K, in order to evolve a framework to meet the challenges.

After several years of relative peace, from the year 2013there has been an increase in terror-related incidents in the Valley, with majority of them occurring in South Kashmir and marked by participation of local youth. This trend of local youth joining terrorist ranks acquired vigour since 2013, ushering in a peculiar trend in the terror dynamics of Kashmir. As per a recent police census, presently, local terrorists outnumber foreign terrorist^[1]. Until now, north Kashmir was the traditional base of militants in the valley, owing to the feeder route of infiltration from Pakistan. However, presently, out of 33 youth who joined militancy till June 2015, 30 were from south and three from north, with none from central region of Kashmir. While the total number of militants is still the largest in north i.e. 69, only 25 of them are locals. The south, which has 60 militants, has only local presence.

This north to south shift tells the story of revival of homegrown militancy – with Pulwama, Shopian and Kulgam districts emerging as the strongholds. As per AS Dulat, former R&AW Chief and the Kashmir pointsman during the Vajpayee administration, the Valley today witnesses the pre 1996 era when the militancy had a predominantly a local colour. A renewed fascination with the gun among a section of youth could be one of the most worrying features of militancy dynamics in Valley, today. This emerging trend is charecterised by active participation of well-educated, even professionally qualified men in attacks over past two years. 

For, the new crop is unlike the old. Unlike his armed predecessor who worked “over the ground” — performing peripheral tasks such as transporting guns, for example — for “underground” foreign militants who would do the “core job of killing soldiers and policemen”, today’s Kashmiri militant, is mostly “underground” and would rather do the killing himself.

A newspaper report quotes, “These new militants on the block have also adopted a recruitment ploy not seen in the Valley before. Unlike the militant of old who would never reveal his face in public, today’s young Kashmiri militant is brazenly releasing his pictures and videos on social media — dressed in fatigues, walking about dense forests, toting a gun, cracking jokes and smiling broadly.” ^[2] This clearly shows the sense of defiance amongst these young guns with fear of state forces diminishing.

J&K Police trace this new trend back to the summer of 2010, that saw the peak of agitational form of separatism when young boys were involved in widespread stone pelting to express their anger over the ‘Machil fiasco’. The law enforcers’ response resulted in killing of over 110 youth. Since then, as per the Police, “the first signs of local boys joining the militant ranks began showing up. Many friends or relatives of a protester killed in 2010 developed close ties with militants or joined their ranks. Several boys who were picked up or charged with stone-pelting those days later took to the gun.” There is a need to understand the radicalisation of youth due to factors as above. As per the Army Commander, Northern Command, "Alienation and lack of opportunity were the main reasons for youths to take up the arms. There is lack of opportunity for youths and social media has become such a powerful medium that they get engaged in it and look towards terror as they have nothing to do rather pick up a gun."^[3]

However, factors responsible are much beyond ‘radicalisation’ and ‘unemployment’. It is largely the evolved psyche of those born during the 90s that is manifesting into the recent developments. The hurtful personal experiences, growing up in general environment of piquets & security checks and the perceived injustices by the government are disproportionately fuelled by various agencies, creating conditions for resorting to gun. The most crucial factor in the backdrop of collective aspirations is the longstanding political question of Kashmir.

What is happening in Kashmir now has to be seen in the context of what has been happening in the State over the past quarter of a century. The reasons for this are a complex set of factors ranging from the accumulated fallout of the separatist campaign, its massive humanitarian fallout in the form of thousands of the victims, widows and orphans, the prevailing separatist and mainstream politics that doesn’t address the grievances and aspirations of the people and the general lack of the employment and the opportunity. These factors can’t be addressed in isolation from one another^[4]. The Kashmir issue needs to be addressed by the central and state governments, in which Pakistan factor, though of value, cannot always be predominant.

Process of dialogue (with Pakistan and with sections of Kashmiris) will always be crucial towards long term resolution of the conflict. It has been felt time and again that whenever short term equations between India and Pakistan suffer a jolt, there creeps in a despair in the political firmament in the State .Inevitability of dialogues has to be supported in a bipartisan manner in the country, even in the face of provocations by Pakistan. Pakistan’s provocations should be seen as an attempt to lure India to call off the process, so as to remain on a moral high ground in front of the international community. As far as relevance of Hurriyat is concerned, it has been on the wane but cannot be totally written off. Surprisingly, many in the strategic community in India do not see any point in engaging Hurriyat, primarily due to the fact that next generation of terrorism will not be controlled by them. However, the current local element of militancy as it exists in today’s Kashmir does have an ear for Hurriyat, as could be made out from a graffiti on the residential walls of a militant (in Pulwama) that read,“(Syed Ali Shah) Geelani is our leader”^[5].

The potentials of revival of local militancy is too grave a threat to be ignored. The constituency of peace has not been capitalised upon and the political establishment has not recognised the transition from violence to non-violence. People in Kashmir have shown their dislike for violence, but the continued absence of political engagement has led to an atmosphere in which they feel betrayed. To neutralise the emerging trend of violence again, reopening the process of dialogue and reconciliation is a must. Otherwise, Kashmiri youth will repose their faith in violence irrespective of the results it throws up^[6]. The Indian Army, duly supported by other security agencies has done a commendable job to manage the conflict, so far. The onus of resolving the conflict is on the political masters, in Srinagar and New Delhi.