The De-jure and De-facto Deal:4-Point Deal and the Problem of Counterfactuals

A recently released book by Dan Ephron by the name of Killing a King: The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the Remaking of Israel,  has stoked the counter factual debate again in Israel. The counter factual in question is whether the peace process would have eventually succeeded and Israel might now have been co-existing side by side, with a Palestinian state – had prime minister Rabin not been slain by Yigal Amir, an orthodox Jewish extremist on October 4, 1995. The question is of course unanswerable and that perhaps is the more intriguing question for a researcher.  Counter factual analysis is an important tool to explore alternative outcomes in standard decision-making procedure. Counterfactuals are usually single step changes in a decision tree which might have a significant effect on the eventual outcome. The more elaborate forms described in literature have been the butterfly effect, the domino effect and so on and so forth.  However, it has also been argued that counterfactuals are merely understanding and analytical tools and not explanatory tools. They are hypotheticals which are in no way falsifiable or verifiable. The chronology of events is most important but we cannot hypothetically replace one fact and extrapolate from the other since the eventual responses of various actors would also accordingly change in absence of a crucial event that indeed took place. This stream of thought led us to the question of the 4-point formula on Kashmir.

The counterfactual in question when it comes to an India-Pakistan deal on Kashmir is whether the deal would have gone through had President Musharraf not faced domestic problems of legitimacy following the Lal masjid episode and the lawyers’ protest. The prevailing argument is strong that there is alarge constituency in both countries which was skeptical of the deal holding even if the two leaders had succeeded in negotiating and institutionalizing the deal. The weight of history is too much for such a deal to hold considering fundamental emotive differences on the issue of Kashmir on both sides. Yet the job of leadership is not merely to use history instrumentally to justify what could not be achieved. The essential quality of statesmanship is to construct and arrive at a rational situation based on verifiability and conviction and proceed cautiously to slowly overcome and perhaps solve important historical questions. In that regard, both leaders at the time had made an admirable and relatively successful attempt at coming closest to a consensus. The deal envisaged an arrangement which accounted for Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri interests. It envisaged a de jure recognition of the status quo and de facto recognition of the dispute with incremental verifiable steps to institutionalize the consensus. The issue of trust of course was the last impediment but in fairness that could have only been achieved with time, time that wasn’t accorded to the 4-point initiative. Since then, relations deteriorated and conditions for such talks were not conducive in light of the focus coming back to terrorism as state policy and a revert back to traditional positions including by the separatists. Domestic politics also changed in both countries with the Military and BJP constituency in Pakistan and India earning primary political positions respectively.  The International community also resumed false equivalence between India and Pakistan and we are back to one of many historical stalemates characteristic of India-Pakistan relationship as the current situation stands.

The other interesting counterfactual is whether President Musharraf succeeded in passing on his learning of the 4-point experience to the successive Pakistani leadership and whether they are open-minded to the proposition.  The same holds true on the side of the Indian leadership which has often insisted it is open to dialogue under ‘right conditions’. Terrorism therefore, is an important impediment to the 4-point formula talks. It has also been widely reported that General Raheel Sharif is enjoying popularity with the Pakistani public and is widely respected across the Pakistani establishment. The problem he faces is that he remains a military head. Strategy is symbiotically linked with time. It takes time to conceptualize, execute and follow through. The then Prime Minister[1] Singh’s hand-picked envoy, Ambassador Satinder Lambah, and General Musharraf’s interlocutors, Riaz Muhammad Khan and Tariq Aziz, held over 200 hours of discussions on the draft agreement, during 30 meetings held in Dubai and Kathmandu. Key to the agreement[2], the Indian negotiator said, was an understanding that it would not require ratification by Parliament, or a Constitutional amendment. Thus, the two sides agreed to treat the Line of Control “like an international border”, with agreements to allow for the free movement of goods and people. Following cessation of “violence and terrorism”, the two sides were to draw down military forces on both sides of the Line of Control to a minimum though India was permitted to maintain full-scale defensive positions. The eventual outcome and lament, therefore, when we think of the 4-point plan and other such initiatives in Indo-Pak relationship are What if with both positive and negative connotations?

Counterfactuals are difficult propositions. But they contribute immensely to the academic study of decision-making process, its concept and strategy. They highlight what could have or could not have worked. We need to work with what eventually happened or occurred but if the counterfactual could have had empirical veracity, academic analysis of the same can have beneficial policy and practical alternatives for the real world.  It can help refine acceptable and unacceptable status quo and revisionist positions. If we consider the counterfactual of the 4-point agreement it seems that curbing terrorism can indeed find strategic rationale in the historical thinking of the Pakistani establishment. It is not beyond their mandate and political persuasions. It also points out that a strong military in Pakistan is not beyond compromise as far as the thinking goes. Like all actors, the problem lies in seeing the thinking through to its logical conclusion and practical implementation through the difficult warring constituencies.  The long term goal of liberalism and democracy taking root In Pakistan will be supplemented by short term liberal thinking in the Pakistani strategy viz a viz India. Classical Liberalism has precedence both in India and Pakistan in the form of Nehru, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali and albeit for a short term as the civilian head, with President Musharraf as well. However, its manifestations have remained in possible counterfactual debates. That is the historical reality of the Indo-Pak relationship but it need not be the central logic of this strategic relationship. Rationality suggests it will not happen if we go back by hitherto evidence of India-Pakistan relationship but History is also riddled with examples where deals have occurred against the tide of history if leaderships are convinced that their verifiability and allsubsequent future options can be ensured to remain open. The 4-point formula was one such instance but was cut short due to prescient events. It differed from other similar events because the death blow did not come from events fundamentally related to the relationship but external factors related to the Musharraf presidency concerning non-India issues.

Strategic rationale suggests that long-term national interests are not hostage to external events. There are different types of counterfactuals- those relating to events arising out of the strategic relationship, for example the Yitzhak Rabin case, and those that arise out of external factors like the 4-point case. It remains to be seen what the actual outcome would be if the 4-point dialogue can be started under ‘right conditions’.