Non-Institutional liberalism of Pakistan and current strategic choices for India

“The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again; and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.”- Edmund Burke

This quotation of conservative thinker Edmund burke in a discussion of liberalism is ironic.But this quote best describes civil-military relations in Pakistan. The fundamental assumption of this article is that the people of India and Pakistan want peace and resolution of the Kashmir Dispute in the long term.Having said that, the latest in India- Pakistan relationship is that PM Sharif and PM Modi met on the sidelines of the Paris summit, talks that the former described as cordial and done in good spirit following which the NSAs held talks in Bangkok covering all issues including peace and security, terrorism, Jammu and Kashmir, and others, including tranquility over the Line of Control, Meanwhile, veteran Journalist Barkha Dutt[1] has claimed in her book that the two PMs held a secret meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC 2014 summit through a mutual friend. The secret meeting allowed PM Modi to reach out to PM Sharif in what was publicly claimed to be an innocuous call to wish each other’s teams well for the 2014 Cricket World cup. Clearly the civilian government in Pakistan is going through a difficult phase in Pakistan at the moment with General Raheel Sharif having consolidated political power. His recent trip to the US was indicative of a military leader confident of his organization’s and his country’s indispensability in the stabilization of the region. The US too seems to have acknowledged the primacy of the General over the PM in Pakistan. They do regard him as the one who can deliver[2]. That leaves one option for the civilian PM to boost his domestic prospects which is to reach out to India.

As British Strategist Lawrence Freedman[3] puts it, Strategy is the art of creating power. That power can be used for both optimal and sub-optimal outcomes. It remains to be seen whether the Pakistani PM is sincere in his intentions[4] to ‘hold a dialogue without pre-conditions’ or whether it’s a strategy to increase his power in the domestic political arena. Meanwhile, expectedly the Indian PM will stick to his policy of “Dialogue under right conditions”. For India, the choice is between doing business with either, however, it is not an easy choice. Niall Ferguson in his biography of Henry Kissinger[5]said that in Foreign policy the choice is mostly between two evils[6] and there is always the big problem of conjecture[7]. He describes the problem of conjecture in foreign policy as follows. He says that in foreign policy leaders are never credited for what they avoided but only for what they achieved. He says during the start of the 2^nd world war the problem was not whether Nazi Germany would eventually be a responsible state but the choice was whether it would be a nationalist or an extremely aggressive expansionary state. It was the latter and the cost turned out to be 50 million lives. Therefore, the choice for leaders is as follows: what is the costthey are ready to pay in order to find out the real intentions of a rising or falling adversary. The costs can result from both action and strategic inaction. In some case they wait and in other case they have to act quickly before the problem worsens. He elaborates that this choice can only be made through the analysis of applied History[8]. But here I argue that the same choice can also be made through rational analysis. I define rationality as merely an exercise of reason and not the narrow definition of exercise of reason for self-interest.

History would suggest that India needs to do business with whoever is in power in Pakistan because India has had equitably bad experiences with both  however, major events have occurred primarily when the security establishment in Pakistan has remained away from public spotlight under a relatively stronger civilian government. Therefore, the current spotlight on General Raheel Sharif could in fact make him more accountable to global audience. The liberalism that prevails in Pakistan is driven by scattered rational individuals. There have been leaders, civil society members and members of the public who have upheld the liberal agenda[9]. The problem of Pakistan is that unlike India, liberalism has remained non-institutional and will continue to do so.  Hence periodic jostling between Military and civilian establishments occur and India is left to consider or revise her strategy viz-a-viz Pakistani domestic politics.

I would argue that India’s long term interest lies with whichever party can ensure disruption of India centric terrorism and therefore India needs to focus on individuals committed to institutions in Pakistan rather than a standalone outside commitment to Pakistani institutions themselves which have been suffering from the problem of radicalization. The principle of sovereignty and relative balance of power suggest that India is no position to pick winners and losers in Pakistani domestic politics.  Therefore, rationality suggests India needs to be careful not to appease the current Pakistani leadership unless they stop India centric activities and remain committed to the dialogue process under right conditions. The civilian leadership in Pakistan has been unable to win the political influence and therefore, India needs to strategize with military primacy in mind. Thus, India can talk to the civilian government only to gauge the mood of the military establishment in Pakistan. Military to military talks are a core domain of General Sharif and he holds the prerogative in conveying his ideas for the bilateral security relationship to the Indian establishment. Domestic politics in India hold an important lesson as well. The recent intolerance debate in India and the Bihar election result would naturally strike a chord with the Kashmiris in a way that India continues to be a vibrant democracy. The PM’s conciliatory remarks to the opposition on the day of the constitution debate will also underline the fact that India has to remain committed to the liberal constitution of India to prevent domestic political instability of her own. The responses of the Kashmiri liberals and participation of Kashmiri conservatives are important in the larger national intolerance debate. The Pakistani military establishment will be cognizant of such developments and will have drawn lessons of its own.

Another important factor in India-Pakistan relationship is the great power politics. India and USA have only spoken of strategic alignment and not alliances. The question is whether policies of two states can simultaneously remain aligned and independent on Pakistan without serious strategic coordination between the two. Sino-Pak relationship follows close co-ordination. The US is a pro-active state willing to do business with whoever is in power in Pakistan. India is a status-quo state willing to do business with anyone who is willing to curb cross-border terrorism in India- Civilian or Military. Perhaps the common ground is to convince the Pakistani military to advance the liberal agenda even if it means continued primacy of the institution of the military. The larger political question of civil-military relations can only be resolved by Pakistani political actors and entities themselves. In the short term, foreigners can only work with individual Pakistani actors showing commitment to the institutions rather than an outside interventionist commitment to liberal institutions themselves. The agency does and will remain with the Pakistanis.

Pakistani liberalism has remained an enigma but there are individuals in both military and civilian leadership in Pakistan who can do their part in institutionalizing it in their domestic politics including both PM Sharif and General Sharif. Foreigners, Indians or Westerners will have to operate under information asymmetry with respect to civil-military relations in Pakistan. History points us to a more vigilant and non-engagement strategy for India.  However, rationality suggests that dialogue without pre-conditions and dialogue under right conditions show willingness for dialogue on both sides. The conditions can only be decided by civil-military relations in Pakistan and the success of the liberal project in Pakistan which is the only outcome that has the best chances to lead to a long term cessation of cross-border terrorism in India. In the current situation, absence of strategy in India is relatively less consequential than absence of a strategy for peace in Pakistan. Therefore, India needs to wait for a modicum of bi-partisanship to emerge between civil-military establishments in Pakistan before revising current strategy and proceeding to a sustained and fruitful dialogue.