Countering Hybrid Warfare

 "Achieve victory not by numbers, but by knowing how"

-Alexander Suvorov

Introduction

Hybrid warfare is a term which came  to describe the approach used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. It blends the conventional and unconventional resources and packs a potent one- two punch in the ‘shadow’ wars.

Thucydides, the author of “History of the Peloponnesian War”, gives the first mention of hybrid warfare in his writings. In 428 BC the town of Mytilene in the Ionic district attempted to unify the island of Lesbos by rising up against Athenian Empire. They sent ambassadors to seek clandestine support from Sparta as well as negotiate a settlement with Athens at the same time¹. The result notwithstanding, the insurgent activity in conjunction with conventional Spartan support gave the earliest hints of hybrid warfare.

Hybrid warfare germinates from the insurgency of the mind, which is to craft public uncertainty and subsequent disillusionment to target the governing capacity and consequently give rise to an internal opposition. In fact, hybrid employment has in many ways proved more effectual in menacing the enemy than either conventional or unconventional forces fighting independently as evident by a host of hybrid encounters from French vs. Viet Minh (1946-54), Afghanistan(1979-89) and Lebanon(2006).  Wars in both Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2015) indicate to effectiveness and maturing of hybrid warfare strategy by achieving decisive results in rather quick time. The US Army Special Operations Command white paper on Counter Unconventional Warfare (CUW),while analyzing capabilities of Russia, Iran and China, defines hybrid warfare as combination of conventional, irregular, and asymmetric means, to include the constant manipulation of political and ideological conflict.²

Ends- Ways- Means of Hybrid Conflicts

‘Means’ of Hybrid warfare can include operations from both conventional to irregular combat. The strategic coordination of regular and irregular forces enables their employment either simultaneously or sequentially.Coordinated forces may be at times separated geographically yet be integrated/fused operationally and tactically.

The “ways” mostly include either of engineering of public dissent,sponsorship of political protests, economic coercionand/or intimidation and,almost unfailingly, a powerful information campaign. Within the information campaign, information denial becomes an operational constraint. The invisible armies in such shadow wars have exploited their adversaries’rather painful gaps in situational awareness.At one end hybrid combat signifies ‘orderly flexibility’ in employment of combat resources in order to deliver military victories while at the other end, it aims to create a crippling and destabilising effect on the opponent’s existing order by confusing the state apparatus. The injection of so large an amount of uncertainty prevents a clear and visual evidence of war and thus invariably achieves pulling off a strategic surprise. The strategic surprise also stems from the fact that the ‘threats’ wage the war in an intentional mode by minimizing the relative importance of fighting to the accomplishment of their goals. In defining the characteristic of the hybrid experience, it may be accurate to propose that uncertainty is the only certainty.

Having been already paralyzed by the strategic chaos, confusion and internal inability to accept and recognise the nature of threats that exist,the “end” implication for the state can at the least be catastrophic.

The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and The Russian Experience

Execution of hybrid warfare hinges on spatial permeation (invariably by intervention/infiltration)in conjunction with a cover up (Hyper camouflage or Maskirovka). Hyper camouflageis in effect pretending to be what you’re not, and in doing so fighting the enemy with the weapon he lacks, thus exposing his vulnerabilities. General Gerasimov, in his now famous 2013 article on “Value of Science in Prediction/Forecasting”, articulated the fusion of internal opposition and special operation forces to spawn a complex hybrid environment where the outcome is globally perceived as a democratic expression of popular will rather than an act of war. Drawing lessons of the Arab Spring,Russia's Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov describes them as acts of war. He argues that the revolutions used ‘protest potential’ of the population as an instrument of war to ultimately achieve military objectives. This paradigm according to him is the"new generation warfare"³.

Compared to other players,the Russian forces have proved their efficiency better when ‘fighting dirty’in ‘turbulent’ environments.Both in Georgia as well as Crimea, the doctrine of hybrid warfare has been efficiently executed as part of the overall Russian military strategy.Russia has showcased skillful use of non-military elements besides an array of innovative warfare methods. The effective use of use of non-military means to shatter states by destroying their capacity to govern with frightening ease is not only in sync with the Gerasimov doctrine but also signals the maturing of the doctrinal idea with the Russian experiences.

Going from the Russian experience in Crimea, it is prudent to suggest that, while initiating a hybrid environment, it pays to have a low signature state involvement. In addition, experiences from the Eastern Ukraine and Crimean campaigns suggest the following operational ingredientsof Russia’s Hybrid Operations (also unofficially called the Gerasimov doctrine):-

• Strategic significant informational actions by deploying information shaping tools through formal and social media.
• Seek acceptance in the scheme of conflict by projecting engagement as an ‘interested player’ rather than an ‘influencing power’.
• Escalate existing internal dissent in order to enlarge internal fractures in the enemy state.
• Execute denial and deception operations (Maskirovka) to conceal the presence of conventional forces.
• Use Special Operations Forces to create a seamless operating front in the enemy state.
• Demonstrate non-confrontational yet aggressive conventional military competence.
• Obfuscate terminal goals and objectives in the conflict in order to project them as ultimately acceptable.

Response Dilemma

In fighting a hybrid threat, the question will always arise as how to structure and position the forces in response to the threat. The predicament of the nature of response being conventional, irregular or hybrid will always intrigue the best of military minds. The challenge of prioritising between being dispersed in order to protect the lines of communication against hostile irregular forces and being concentrated to defend against conventional forces poses an additional predicament.

In addition, the response to hybrid challenge becomes difficult as it is complex to categorise the enemy being faced. Overlapping conflicts create complex problems that can’t be solved but at best only managed. One such problem is the battle of narratives or the information warfare. Hybrid war, by virtue of involving the population, only magnifies the importance of perceptions.

Finally, quality training for irregular threats does not exist in the conventional training of militaries around the world, apparent from Israel’s failure in the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006.The Israeli strategic defeat predominantly arose from the flawed fundamental understanding of the Hezbollah threat in addition to faulty intelligence as outlined in the Winograd report.⁴

Counter Hybrid Warfare (CHW)

Counter Hybrid Operations (CHO) have a marked difference from Counter Insurgency operations (CI Ops) and Counter Terrorist Operations (CTO). While CI ops are designed to contain and defeat an insurgency and often have a tendency to generate a very large footprint, CHO on the other hand can be executed by a smaller force and hence project a smaller footprint. Being specifically designed to deny an adversary the ability to use proxy war as a path to strategic success, CHO are narrowly scoped with a low signature. Unlike CTO which tend to be short-term, time-sensitive operations with instant visible results, CHO by contrast are visualised to become prolonged and proactive.CTO and CHO are both intelligence-lead (reactive) operations.

In CHW, while negotiating a hybrid environment it pays to have a prolonged, high-end direct state involvement coupled with precise intelligence as is being played out by involvement of Russian forces in Syria.The failure of NATO to respond with conventional forces in Ukraine,probably with the apprehension of a prolonged engagement, contributed immensely to the success of Russian-backed forces. The success of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in Lebanon, in spite of a heavy conventional footprint, was hampered by the failure to utilise available intelligence in support of strategic military decisions. The IDF military goals were not set clearly, were over-ambitious and presented a disconnect with the political aims.⁵

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) white paper titled “Counter-Unconventional Warfare” (Counter-UW) in 2014 fittingly argues that the United States requires, but does not have, a credible strategic-level ability to detect, interdict and roll back external sponsorships of insurgent and separatist movements. It also draws out implications and the desired counter-capabilities required for effectively operating against hybrid threats. The lessons learnt from the NATO inaction in the Ukraine conflict seem to have compelled United States to deploy Special Operations Forces in Syria much to the distaste of the Obama policy⁶.

Post declaration of Russian engagement in Syria, following key points of Russian Counter Hybrid Operations Strategy emerge:-

• Deploy information tools to counter hybrid propaganda.
• Projecting engagement as an ‘influencing power’ to restore parity of roles.
• Clarity of terminal goals and objectives.
• Execute aggressive conventional military operations against the irregular component of hybrid threat to exploit fragile links between sponsor state(s), regular and/or irregular forces.
• Use Special Operations Forces (low footprint deployment) to initially enhance recognition and finally restore credibility of host nation’s conventional forces.

Conclusion

There is no debate that adversaries in past and present have developed and experimented innovative uses of the “full-spectrum” of warfare, including the use of conventional and irregular forces and innovative tactics.Unlike IDF’s failure in the Israel-Hezbollah 2006 war to utilize intelligence at the strategic and operational level, intelligence-focused Russian precision strikes in Syria seem to have halted the advance of rebel groups and given a boost to the Assad regime besides pushing the US, Turkey and a host of irregular opposing forces on the defensive. However, the intervention by Russian conventional forces in Syria is likely to test the staying power of Russia. This in turn should further generate an uncomplicated version of the Gerosimov doctrine which will consequently offer a better understanding of CHW. 

Views expressed by the Author are personal.