Breakfast in Kabul, Lunch in Lahore, Dinner in Delhi- Alternate Grand Strategies

Grand Strategies can revolve around reason or historical context. Rational grand strategies have to be backed by evidence to protect them against contextual critiques. Grand Strategies based purely on historical context often change rapidly with time making them very difficult to be actionable in the long term. Reason has to incorporate context but context without reason changes every second.

PM Modi was the first PM since 2004 to make a bilateral visit to Pakistan this Friday. A similar[1] phrase was invoked by Dr. Manmohan Singh while describing his own grand strategy towards India’s Western frontier. However, the two leaders have used the phrase in two completely different meanings. For Dr. Singh, the phrase entailed a long term end-state where citizens of all three countries could avail free movement in the three countries after resolution of the terrorism and Kashmir disputes. His strategy towards Pakistan was arduous back-channel negotiations on core issues with a clear framework of the four-point plan, the end result of which would be the ability of the PM of India to visit all three capitals during the course of one day. His strategy towards Afghanistan, however, was roughly similar to that of PM Modi because cordial Indo-Afghan relations agree with both history and reason barring a brief Taliban rule in Kabul.

PM Modi on the other hand is using the phrase as a beginning. He believes in a top-heavy grand strategy whereby the momentum generated by summit visits by him during the course of a day would materialize into goodwill and strengthening of the incumbent civilian governments in Pakistan and Afghanistan which would give them the catalytic impetus for cooperation with India. He seems to be capitalizing on the politics of the region since the focus of all the stakeholders in the region including the US, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan lies in forcing a political settlement with the Taliban operating both inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition to that, China has invested $46 billion[2] dollars in the region and would prefer a peaceful eastern border of Pakistan in the near future. The increasing influence of General Sharif indicated by unilateral visits to US and Saudi Arabia has put PM Sharif on the defensive, and with prospects of commercial cooperation and increased domestic political weightage, he has reached out to PM Modi.

The Indian PM on his part is cognizant of US and Chinese influence in South Asia and has reached out to the unity government in Afghanistan with a clear appraisal of friendship in the Afghan parliament backed by sale of Russian made helicopters to the Afghan forces. A deal, this would not have been possible without Russian consent. Indo-Afghan relations seem to be back on track but the question still remains- whether it is due to Pakistani acquiescence or independent of India-Pakistan relations.

This brings us back to the Lahore visit which has been advertised as an impromptu goodwill visit in the vein of the improvisational style of the PM. It is being hailed as a bold and decisive move capturing the political mood of the region. While the move might be beneficial to both PMs politically, the strategic significance of the visit is still under question. A summit meeting of this nature is usually backed by concrete back channel negotiations with rough agreements on a framework already in place. In India’s and Pakistan’s cases, they straightforwardly concern issues of terrorism and Kashmir.

The Grand strategy of Dr. Singh was based on the abdication of force with a complete reliance on rational diplomacy. He was open to American assistance in international isolation of Pakistan but constrained by a lack of a response policy to cross-border terrorism.  He was open to negotiations with Pakistan subject to a stoppage of terrorism. He transcended history in his Grand strategy and came close to a rational concrete peace plan[3]. PM Modi on the other hand has invoked history, both in Afghanistan and in Lahore, shaping his new Pakistani policy framework. History though is against the side of peace in Indo-Pak relations as also indicated by the early phase of PM Modi’s own Pakistan policy. His aggressive stance on the border was validated by most security experts[4] to be justifiable on account of Pakistan’s refusal to convict and stop sub-conventional proxy warfare. The reliance on historical reasoning carries with it alternate outcomes as well. History is different things to different people. A Grand strategy based on history is prudent but carries more risks for the executive than the academic. Consequently, it carries more incentives as well if leaders draw same lessons from the shared view of history. The question in the present scenario is whether both PMs have a shared view of history where they realize that continued disengagement will only play out to existing balance of power in the region resulting in more self-fulfilling prophecies for both countries following the now consistent stop-start historical narrative. The bigger question however is whether General Sharif shares the historical view of PM Modi and PM Sharif.

In my opinion, General Sharif has a differing rational view of strategy currently, demonstrated by a willingness to force Taliban into a political settlement and recently going hard at those not willing to negotiate, helping in smooth transition of the unity government in Kabul until the US drawdown and keeping the eastern border with India quiet in confluence with Chinese interests presently. General Raheel Sharif held wide-ranging talks with Afghanistan’s top leadership[5] on ways to revive stalled peace talks with the Taliban and agreed to hold a quadrilateral meeting between Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US in January 2016 on a comprehensive road map for “meaningful peace”.If he had a historical view of grand strategy, he would not agree to a comprehensive dialogue with India as his views on history[6]of Kashmir being the ‘unfinished agenda of partition’ and ‘inseparable from Pakistan’ have been well documented over the last few years.

Indian strategy has to rest on reason. Reason suggests India needs a stable unity government in Afghanistan, a substantial decrease in the activities and influence of radicals in Af-Pak and favourable relations with great powers in the coming decade. India’s grand strategic goal remains that of national transformation of the country through peace, stability, development and redistribution. Therefore, symbolism has to be eschewed for tangibles. The overt move to PM Sharif is a welcome step but only if it is backed by a constructive process rather than just the assumption of the common view of history. As a leader given a strong mandate, PM Modi has shown initiative in visiting Lahore but it has to be backed by arduous negotiations and a concrete framework of peace. The revival of the 4-point plan is one such alternative but the prerogative obviously lies with both the governments to channel the new found optimism and symbolism for constructive negotiations.

Finally, a failure to back the bonhomie will cost both leaders politically. The loss will be bigger for the Indian counterpart as the leader of the status quo power but so would be the reward if the dialogue succeeds. Furthermore, any terrorist attack on the territory of India carries with it the risk of a bigger blowback for Pakistan at worst and international isolation at best. The temporal dimension is of the essence here. Long-term strategies based on reason are in constant struggle with short term contextual strategy under the influence of history. The need for dialogue is important but the phrase “Breakfast in Kabul, Lunch in Lahore and Dinner in Delhi’ carries extreme gravitas for the three countries and their grand strategies and is anything but merely symbolic.

Views expressed by the Author are personal.