Principles of Justice and India�s Position in Indo-Pak Strategic Competition

Justice over the years has various dimensions (Gendler 2011)[1] - it is consequentialist, deontological, reparative or distributive. Consequentialist justice was given by Jeremy Bentham through his thesis of utilitarianism (Gendler 2011). It is best encapsulated in the statement “Greatest good for the greatest number”. It says that as long as bad outcomes can be avoided, an act is just and therefore rational.  The view of deontology as given by Kant is that the act is just if you would do to others as others would unto you. According to Kant, an act has to be just in itself. That he says can only come from  goodwill.  Now both these principles are well debated in social sciences for e.g. in the case of cosmopolitanism v Westphalia, Individual v Social rights; and neither are conclusive, but the debate illuminates the central issues in initiating a strategy. The third perspective is procedural justice where in an act is just and rational if it follows the ‘due process principle’. Rationality here would be to weigh every situation according to these principles and come toa prudent solution. In some cases, the three formulations will be fundamentally opposed to others. Then the onus falls on the strategist as to how well he frames the problem to himself and to the other actors, bearing in mind these different principles. Rationality still forms the primary tool of devising a strategy but knowledge of these debates and principles will help in minimizing the damage a particular context can do (Millican 2009)[2].

Hobbes, Rawls and Nozik

Similarly, the debate around social structures revolves around the views of Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls and Robert Nozick.  Hobbes says people escape the state of nature (characterized by anarchy) and come together to form a state with a monopoly of force so they don’t have to deal with the business of security themselves and pursue higher goals and forms of living. Rawls (2009)[3] says there are certain inviolable rights of human beings which are life, liberty, equality, pursuit of happiness and consent of the governed. The only way to achieve this is every citizen looks at every issue through a ‘veil of ignorance’- i.e. objectively, without his own perspective, standing or stake in the issue involved. Nozick[4] 1974 argues for a minimal state which only provides for the security of citizens and enforcement of contracts. For him, the process of justice is more important than justice as outcome. He says Liberty of an individual is the highest virtue in a society. There are problems with each conception- An overtly Hobbesian state can become a militaristic state, an ideal Rawlsian state is difficult to achieve without constraining some liberties and an overtly minimal state of Nozick may lead to anarchy still and violation of certain natural rights e.g. tragedy of commons and public goods.

The reason all these debates are relevant to strategic studies is because strategy in international politics does not occur in a vacuum. Armed forces have to be in synergy with governance for them to succeed. A rational Grand strategy articulated by a government can help armed forces integrate their operations in the larger strategic environment. This is most relevant in issues of war and internal security. For example, India’s stand in Kashmir and its further tackling of the insurgency is an example of debates about justice, social structures and strategy coming together. India argues that a Unified India was partitioned by the British due to the extraordinary situations of violence prevalent at the time at the behest of the Muslim’s league call for Direct action in relation to the unconditional demand for a sovereign Pakistan. Partition was agreed to by the Indians due to a consequentialist notion of justice to prevent further violence in the country as a large majority of Muslims at the time, not all of them, wanted a state of their own. India agreed to it not on the basis of the two nation theory of two states for two different religions but rather as a reaction to the large scale riots which had made Indian resistance costs to partition extremely high. This was followed by the understanding that all the princely states were free to join either union through legal instruments of accession. Kashmir signed the instrument of accession to India. Pakistan meanwhile, claimed that they were defending a deontological position that the Islamic identity of the Kashmiri people deemed their actions just in trying to integrate the region to Pakistan. They claimed that their actions were just in themselves because they were acting out of good will. India on the other hand, maintained the deontological position that the secular identity of all Indians, hindus or muslims, was the primary factor and she herself was acting in good will in defending the integrity of its nation. The resultant outcome was a conflictual stalemate that persists to the day. This eventually led to five wars among the two nations. Now rationality here suggested that India maintain the status quo by keeping Kashmir within a Rawlsian view of distribution of goods and responsibilities while maintaining the monopoly of force of the Indian state equal to other regions in the country. This means granting to Kashmiri citizens all the inviolable rights that Rawls deemed inviolable under a proper social contract according to the consent of the Kashmiri citizens. To paraphrase Rawls, one way to achieve this is if each Indian citizen puts himself under ‘a veil of ignorance’(Rawls 2009) i.e. he doesn’t know what is his/her status under the Indian state is and then decide the rights and duties of all citizens in the Indian Union including the Kashmiris. Rawls maintained that you need the monopoly of force of the state to enforce any social contract as outlined in his ‘difference principle’ where he says resources of a state have to be aligned to the benefit of the least advantaged but the resultant state should then respect the principle of equality of all citizens. This objective of the Indian government was further complicated by the Hobbesian view of the Indian state as interpreted by the Pakistanis and certain Kashmiris who took up arms against the state. They do not recognize the monopoly of force of the Indian state (obvious in Pakistani case) which then manifests itself through cross border terrorism and violent insurgency. This then leads to certain sections of Indian establishment justifiably going away from a Rawlsian to a more Hobbesian state in their handling of this situation. The same can be said of the erstwhile insurgencies in north-east, Punjab and now the Naxal areas. A prudent strategy for the Indian state under these circumstances is to gradually move from the Hobbesian form imposed on it due to the challenge to its monopoly of force to a more Rawlsian form which would be a desirable for both the Kashmiris and the Indian state. An overreaction towards a more Hobbesian form towards the Kashmiris is a sub-optimal and a detrimental strategy for India.

The presence of Pakistan is the crucial factor. Unless both India and Pakistan realize that their deontological views of Justice with respect to Kashmir are fundamentally contradictory, it is not prudent to plan for peace. Talking for the sake of talking is sub-optimal for both countries unless a framework like the 4-point plan can be agreed and committed to. The only way peace can be achieved between the two states in this core issue is either through the principle of reparative justice or a more consequentialist notion of justice. If the Pakistani or the Indians stick to their deontological positions, conflictual strategies will automatically take precedence. However, if consequentialist or reparative notions are employed by both states, aimed at preventing future violence, negotiations or non-force strategies are possible. India, meanwhile, despite major friction, should look to continuously introduce Rawlsian features of governance in the state of Kashmir. Despite deep seated problems to the same, it is the only viable outcome for the Indian state; private investment, education, designated areas of protest, free and fair election and intensive public relations strategies. The same holds true for other insurgencies as well. Comprehensive rationality of maintaining the territorial integrity of the state has to be supplemented by the more bounded rationality of achieving a long term integrated Kashmiri state. This may require a more decisive action on the issue of cross border interference where Pakistanis are dismissive of any consequentialist solution. Kashmiris do not have as strong a deontological conflict of justice as Pakistan does with respect to India. Indian strategy has to gradually move towards a more Rawlsian notion in tackling this situation. Rationality is usually given a narrower form of self-interest by scholars but by introducing other variables to the environment it can account for context and deontological factors as well. For e.g.,consider aprisoner’s dilemma that leads to different rational outcomes, in the context of normal prisoners as compared to the prisoners who are part of a mafia group who know they will be killed if they get out of jail.  Therefore, rational choice is flexible enough to include more variables without being strait jacketed or losing relevance. India therefore, is well poised for long term strategic competition and attrition owing to its political system, professional apolitical status of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies and basic structure of the Indian constitution which has worked better in introducing checks and balances compared to the Pakistani state of governance.