No Need for NSG Hubs and NIA

The only unintended positive ramification of the long-stretched Mumbai operation was that the nation, courtesy the media, realised the havoc a handful of terrorists could inflict on a large country like India. Otherwise, to have lost 12 hours between the commencement of the terrorist attack and the deployment of NSG and Marine Commandos was criminal. This long gap could have been drastically reduced, if the capabilities of the readily available resources were utilised and maximised. 

 

One such resource was the Infantry Battalion of the Indian Army based in Mumbai. An Infantry Battalion comprising of about 850 personnel and four Rifle Companies (120 personnel each) could have neutralised the situation speedily and with lesser causalities, as terrorists are most unsettled, tentative and vulnerable in the initial period. Even if 25 percent personnel were on leave and other duties, the balance 600 personnel would have been enough to undertake the task. One Company could have been used for cordoning off the area, two for clearing the buildings under siege, and another kept as reserve. The balance elements of the remaining battalion (Headquarter Company and Support Company) could have been utilised for mobile patrolling (30-40 vehicles) for ‘area stabilisation’ of the entire Mumbai city. The Companies tasked for clearing the buildings, especially the Taj Hotel, could have inserted their men through multiple entry points, created by firing anti-tank rounds of 84mm Rocket Launcher at selected points. Thus, a Company of more than 100 personnel could have swamped the entire building and overwhelmed the few terrorists psychologically and physically. 

 

Certainly the terrorists would have used weapons in retaliation, which they still did. There also would have been causalities, but perhaps fewer than the eventual numbers. Infantry personnel are trained for such roles in Urban Insurgency and FIBUA (Fighting In Built-Up Areas). For them, the Mumbai operation would have been only a variation of the role performed in parts of Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Northeast and Sri Lanka. In fact, the said battalion had just returned from Kashmir after a highly successful tenure and earned citation from the Army Chief. 

The authorities, thus, failed to employ a precious and readily available resource and under-utilised it for merely putting up the ‘outer cordon’. In earlier days this would have been construed as a professional affront. The primary reason for this omission was that military authorities are not appropriately included in the decision-making loop in the ‘war against terror’, except in difficult, harsh and volatile border regions. 

 

Infantry Battalions are located in all metros of India. They only need to be equipped with certain specialised equipment like night-vision devices, bulletproof jackets, role-specific small arms, etc. They may not be available for short periods of time, as they have operational responsibilities in sectors along the border, for which they need to carry out annual exercises and operational rehearsals. To overcome this, in each of the metros, battalions of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) could be re-located by moving them from J&K, where the situation has vastly improved.

 

Therefore the government’s decision to raise NSG hubs in the metros is an avoidable exercise, and in fact, a knee-jerk reaction. As it is, the NSG also overwhelmingly draws its personnel from the Army. 

The creation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) too is a superfluous endeavour, as its role can be well performed by existing agencies like the RAW and the IB, given requisite complements and investigating powers. The NIA is to draw mostly from the same IPS pool, whose inadequacies (exceptions notwithstanding) in dealing with the emerging forms of terror are proven. Several hundred crores of rupees will be spent on raising the NSG hubs and the NIA, at the expense of the taxpayer. Instead, a fraction of that money spent on equipping the Infantry Battalions in metros to tackle Mumbai type scenarios would serve a better purpose. 

 

Our propensity to create additional organisations and battalions of para-military forces after every major terrorist incident amounts to pandering to Pakistan’s avowed intention of bleeding India economically and physically through a thousand cuts. Moreover, reactive and unbridled expansion of the police and the paramilitary forces, at the cost of modernising the existing forces, is transforming India into a ‘Police State’, which is contrary to the liberal ethos of a democracy. 

The solution lies in revamping and revitalising existing resources. The selection and training process of police personnel needs a major overhaul. The staffing pattern of our IPS dominated agencies, especially the RAW, needs to be changed.

 

The IPS is far from a versatile service, which can handle internal and external security, internal, external and technical intelligence, aviation as well as maritime problems, Special Forces, foreign policy and strategic issues — all at the same time. 

 

It was felt that the high profile terrorist attack in Mumbai would induce our policy-makers to carry out a cogent overhaul of our intelligence agencies and paramilitary forces. The selection of a police officer who was adviser to the Home Ministry on internal security at the time of the Mumbai incident, as the next RAW chief over some deserving and experienced in-house contenders, has belied all hopes. A major portion of the RAW work relates to providing foreign policy inputs for which a global and strategic vision is imperative. Assessment of the strategic reach and military capabilities of target countries is an important determinant of foreign policy. The job requires people with specific grooming, training and experience.

 

Therefore, the new appointment will only perpetuate the inadequacies and internal rivalries. The Mumbai attack would after all have made no difference. 

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)