Thinking Beyond Conventional Diplomacy

While India has stepped up its diplomatic offensive against Pakistan on the issue of 26/11 terror attacks, not much has been achieved so far. Arguably, while Pakistan is dilly-dallying on the issue, Indian policy makers are busy buying arguments coming from the other side of Kashmir. 

Evidently, the perception is prevailing across the world in general and India in particular, that if Pakistan is pushed too hard, it might overreact. Such a reaction includes the possibility of Pakistan exercising the nuclear option. 

Nuclear strategists argue that nuclear war is a mind game, and it’s very crucial to understand the mindset of the adversary. For the past seventy-three days, India has been trying to do the same, often claiming that since Pakistan has become a ‘dysfunctional State’, the onus lies on India to take the rational stand.

There are many reasons to argue that such a conventional diplomatic stand on India’s part might not yield the desired outcomes: 

First, it is a fact that India has unmatchable conventional military capability vis-à-vis Pakistan.  This probably is the reason why Pakistan has been supporting terrorism against India for almost 18 years now. There is nothing new in the 26/11 attacks as most major cities, embassies and even the parliament has been attacked. Pakistan’s gameplan is more than evident: since conventional war is not possible, push India into a corner through unconventional means. India, till date, has not found an answer to this, and all the military might and nuclear stockpile is futile in saving the lives of its non-combatants.

Secondly, theoretically it seems good to argue that deterrence doesn’t work against an irrational adversary (read Pakistan). However, if one looks at the issue from Pakistan’s side, it is clear that nuclear weapons for Pakistan have proved to be a great success - diplomatically, politically and strategically. It gives Pakistan a diplomatic edge as the whole world including the US is concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their safety. Its nuclear arsenal as political weapons are serving the Pakistani cause well, even as India still has no option but to get Pakistan to sit across the table and discuss. It seems like a classic case of ‘Blackmailer's paradox’: it may be actually rational for a blackmailer to pretend to act irrationally. Pakistan since the 26/11 has committed itself credibly, and it is India which is now getting ‘rationally motivated’ to accept Pakistan’s stand on the issue. One possible way for India to break out of this strategic situation is committing itself credibly and calling the bluff of blackmailer (Pakistan): something the Indian establishment has failed to do so far.  Therefore, as far as Indian nuclear capability vis-à-vis Pakistan is concerned, it has become a liability rather than an asset.   

Thirdly, in a world driven by ‘national interest’ and ‘self help’, India is looking towards countries like the USA. USA might be thinking of roping India into an alliance to forestall China’s rise, but when it comes to war against terror, it has its own priorities. America’s war against the Taliban in Afghanistan is in a crucial stage and NATO’s supply chains are continuously being interrupted. This concern is clearly indicated by the new US administration which, after entering office, has held Pakistan responsible for the security in the border regions of Afghanistan, and has linked its performance in the fight against terrorism to financial aid. Washington’s pressure on Islamabad is not meant to help New Delhi in fighting terror but to handle the situation in Afghanistan. This is progressively being used as a bargaining chip by the US to make sure that Pakistan succumbs to pressure and helps the US. 

Fourthly, the whole world today is concerned about Pakistan.  Both international and Indian media are full of reports on the miserable state of the democratic culture in Pakistan. Attempts have also been made at ‘bringing Pakistan back to normalcy’.  But at what cost? Settling the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan whatever it costs! 

 A rejuvenated attempt on part of international community is highly likely in the changed scenario, which will not be good for India. Additionally, despite Pakistan’s incessant claims of not being involved in the 26/11 terror attack, it has successfully focussed the world’s attention on the Kashmir dispute. This objective, if fulfilled, will add to India’s diplomatic challenges in future.  

Fifthly, for the past many years, India has been trying to delink itself from Pakistan and pursue instead a more multi-dimensional foreign policy.  The East Asia Summit, the G-4, attempts at UNSC membership, and helping Afghanistan are some such examples. However, with the recent attacks on Mumbai, not only India’s Pakistan obsession is likely to get back, but also the apprehension that India will be back to the same loop i.e. the tiring deadlock with Pakistan and attempts to disentangle itself again!

India needs to get many acts together in its fight against terror. It has to stop looking for ‘The Others’ help in dealing with it. One way of doing it could be to declare that India is not ready to send its troops in any UN peace operation or anywhere else in fighting terror, unless its own territory is safe. Asking firmly the UNSC members to act tough on Pakistan, rather than preaching to India could be another option. Additionally, India should consider putting an end to all sorts of economic cooperation with Pakistan unless the 26/11 issue is settled.  India needs to take firm steps in order to put its house in order. Prompt communication and cooperation between the authorities needs immediate attention. This however, depends more on how Indian corridors of power look at the terrorism conundrum. Thinking and acting beyond conventional diplomacy is the need of the hour.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)