Australia's Defence White Paper: Implications for Asian Security

Australia has released a new defence White Paper. The document, unveiled on 2  May, ‘Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030’ is of great significance to both Australia and the countries of Asia-Pacific. Australia today is a rising power with uncontested influence in the South-west Pacific region. As an active member of regional institutions like APEC, ARF and EAS (which involves member countries of ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India and New Zealand also), Australia’s foreign policy and security postures unquestionably affect Asian power dynamics.

With this White Paper, Australia has successfully managed to send a multitude of messages of strategic import across to countries of the region including India, at one go.

The defence White Paper is crucial for Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. It has been Rudd’s vision to make Australia “the maritime power of 21st century” by expanding and upgrading its military might. No wonder, the defence white paper sets out the most comprehensive and biggest defence agenda for Australia for the next two decades. The White Paper has set a target of 3 per cent real growth in defence budget by 2017-18 and 2.2 per cent between 2018 and 2030. More than $100 billion will be spent in procuring 12 new submarines and 3 airpower destroyers equipped with SM6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles, among other things. The paper also sets the target of having 57,800 strong active defence force by next decade; an increase of 4,700 personnel. However, the paper doesn’t mention the possibility of Australia going ‘nuclear’. This means that Australia will sharpen and strengthen its armed forces only in terms of conventional military capability. For nuclear security, it will continue to rely on the US.

This defence White Paper is all about naval modernisation; more than anything else. Prime Minister Rudd released the White Paper on the deck of HMAS Stuart at Garden Island. With naval modernisation lying at the core of white paper, Australia takes due note of the drift towards sea power in the evolving military dynamics of Asia. This becomes more evident by her concerns on China’s rising naval power and movements across the West Pacific region, Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean. This document is yet another indication that an increasingly assertive China will lead to instability in Asia-Pacific. The paper says, “The speed of China’s military build-up has the potential to cause regional concerns if it is not carefully explained.” Intriguingly, this doesn’t stand in conformity with previous White Papers and official statements where China was seen as a partner in ensuring the security of the region against common potential threats. Moreover, it is captivating to note that this official statement has come when Rudd is at the helm of affairs and is quite famous for his affection for China.

Thus, one might argue that Beijing’s military might is leading to a ‘security dilemma’ which is all set to transcend beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

The White Paper has put Australia’s self defence as the ‘top priority’. This is followed by security of the neighbourhood and stability in Asia. If Australia seeks aggressive ‘self reliance’ through armed forces modernisation; as it aims to do, it will lead to many countries opting for a comprehensive defence up-gradation. A threat from mainland China is more prominent for countries entangled in a territorial dispute with it. India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan and Singapore should be expected to endorse the trend set by Australia. It, then, could lead to  a difficult situation, leading to an arms race, uneasy peace and fragile stability in the region.

Australia is a part of an alliance which includes Japan, Australia and the US. Canberra’s China concerns will further embolden Tokyo which is straining to be released of the clutches of its self-imposed passive defence. One might argue that this will lead to rejuvenation of Shinzo Abe’s idea of ‘arc of democracy’ (manifested in the form of a quadrilateral alliance) by involving India again. It is interesting to note that Canberra vetoed New Delhi’s entry in a tri-lateral military exercise last year on the pretext that it doesn’t want to give any wrong signals to Beijing. Now, however, the probability of a future engagement with India gets substantiated in the light of the fact that the White Paper approves of India’s benign image. The paper notes, “The government’s judgement is that a strategic stability in the region is best underpinned by the continued presence of the United States through its network of alliances and security partnerships, including with Japan, the Republic of Korea, India and Australia.” Thus, it is highly likely that the four democracies come closer in coming years on the issue of Asian security and stability. This may not necessarily be an official anti-China forum, but will positively act as a stabiliser in the region ensuring a tranquil and stable Asia.

The White Paper has also emphasised upon building stronger relations with India, with an annual meeting of the defence ministers suggested. This could be the beginning of a more robust India-Australia defence partnership, as Australia is planning to make comprehensive attempts to hedge against China’s strategic rise.

Though India’s military prowess has been quite impressive, it still falls short of Chinese strength. Despite the fact that international system is run by ‘self help’, importance of ‘alliances’ in sharing the security burden cannot be overlooked. India is yet to come up with an ‘answer’ to the Chinese ‘string of pearls’, therefore it needs to reach out to countries like Australia to effectively deal with the new strategic challenges. It is the right time for India to look for a deeper and broader engagement with Australia, another major stakeholder in this region. It is vital in order to make sure that China’s rise doesn’t hamper India’s own security and economic interests and the foreseeable instability in the region is hedged against while there is time.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).