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April 21, 2016 | ![]() | By Prateek Kapil | ||
The term realist is often used to subsume the domain of reality. In truth, the term was historically coined to refer to scholars who were skeptical of the aims of idealist utopias. They were skeptical that failure to achieve utopias turns idealists into cynics complicating further the problems of order and security. Therefore, the coinage of the term realists needs to be traced to the father of classical realism- Hans Morgenthau. According to Morgenthau[1]:-
Scholars subscribing to such a conception of power, international system and behaviors of nation-states are referred to as Classical realists. The realist movement was actually a reaction to Wilsonian idealism between the inter-war years which proved to be insufficient in avoiding a second world war. Therefore, realism was not necessarily a true reflection of reality just like idealism was not necessarily beholden to absolute ideals at all times. Moderation in both was necessary to regulate international politics. The space between the two was then occupied by rationalist and contextual theories. In India’s approach to Pakistan as well; these cycles have been regular and contestations all too frequent. The recent announcement by the Pakistan High commissioner to freeze the dialogue process with India was one such culmination of an idealist cycle by the current government. Through Ufa, Lahore, Pathankot, Bangkok and spying allegations, hopes of fruitful dialogue with the civilian government of Pakistan have been laid to rest for the time being. The Pakistan Army has reasserted[2] their primacy in all matters India and Kashmir has seen a slight spike in protests last week due to a fabricated allegation. Such circumstances have elicited a realist response from India as has been the case now with talks of greater defence cooperation with US[3] having been confirmed and articulation of a new realism towards Chinese influence in South Asia being circulated in policy circles. While such measures would indeed help India in limiting international power politics to its Pakistan policy, the strategic issue of the Pakistan policy itself remains unanswered. An India-Pakistan conventional conflict is unlikely owing to larger Indian goals of economic transformation. The Pakistan deep state expectedly has again invoked sub-conventional warfare to nip a peace process in the bud although the earlier speculation of Pakistan army being onboard the peace process in Bangkok was found to have been extremely hopeful. The Pakistan army seems to have been emboldened by the F16 sales by the US and the huge Chinese investment of $46 billion for its 'one belt one road' initiative in PoK and Balochistan. The US for its part has insisted that hyphenation between India and Pakistan is history with the twin objectives of counter terrorism and limiting tactical nuclear weapons[4] being the centerpiece of her relationship with Pakistan. This is in stark contrast to DTTI being the centerpiece of her cooperation with India. Therefore, the India’s Pakistan policy has to emerge with these conditions in mind. The conventional realist response is to ignore talks and concentrate on larger strategic initiatives of ‘neighborhood first’ and ‘act east’. This may lead to a drift in Indo-Pakistan relations and might strengthen the hardliners in Pakistan. This will also avoid conservative political reaction and political fallout in India which have been frequent in the last year. The idealists though have argued that the only way forward short of war is to engage the Pakistan army directly in a sustained dialogue process. However scholars such as Christine Fair[5] have argued that the Pakistan army is an epistemic community, whose decision-making is shaped by inherited knowledge. For the Pakistan army, normalization with India is indeed an existential threat — because the battle against the bigger neighbor is a core part of its founding myth that casts it as the defender of an Islamic Pakistan. In any case, Pakistan army will look to avoid confrontation with India until the Afghan question and counter TTP operations reach some semblance of control. This oscillation between idealism and realism in India-Pakistan bilateral relations has proved that both countries are subservient to cultural persuasions and ‘culture’ by definition is a black box. The potential for selective bias, irrational projections and contrived objectives is high when it comes to cultural analysis. This is achieved by forming a closed epistemic community which only operates under inherited knowledge and avoids common language. Rationalists such as Nehru and Liaquat ali khan who used predominantly formal language and strived for common language of negotiation are distant history. Few observations however merit a mention. Pakistan army is critical to a sustained dialogue process as shown by the Musharraf-Manmohan dialogue process and therefore a miscalculation of their stake will elicit a suboptimal response for India like the Pathankot and JIT episodes. Cross-border terrorism will inadvertently always derail any peace process as it is the fundamental duty of a state to secure its citizens. The question therefore between idealism and realism in the India-Pakistan question is resolved in favor of a realist recalibration of Indian objectives as far as the goal of sustained peace with Pakistan is concerned. The onus and primacy for sustained peace does not lie with India currently, it lies with the Pakistan Army because the latter retains primacy in the Pakistani state and with the Pakistani people. USA and China are well equipped to control unintended consequences and fallouts of Pakistani state dysfunction. They need to evaluate the moral hazard of their policies of incentivizing risk-taking behavior by the Pakistani state. The civilian government of Pakistan can be an important partner for India in plucking low hanging fruit such as cultural relations, people to people contact and trade relations. The Author is an Associate Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal. | ||||||||
References
[1] https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm [2] http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-pakistan-talks-abdul-basit-india-pak-peace-in-fact-how-the-generals-nixed-india-pak-peace-once-again/ [3] http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/us-defence-secretary-ashton-carters-india-visit-opens-up-challenges-too/article8486679.ece [4] http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/white-house-clarifies-obama-stand-on-nuclear-south-asia/story-6koeY2OWeJkKXrKTTZFUVL.html [5] Ibid. | ||||||||
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