The True Dimensions of the Recent Truce

 

On 24 Sep 2008, the Pakistani newspaper ‘Dawn’ had carried a warning by the NWFP Governor, Owais Ghani, “Militants in the tribal areas of the NWFP have established firm networking in Southern Punjab and most fresh recruits for terrorist attacks are coming from there. Militant leaders and commanders are also coming from Punjab. The militants’ field commander in Swat, too, is from Punjab”. A day earlier, ‘News’ quoted the Punjab Governor Salman Taseer saying that the militants in FATA were from religious seminaries in southern Punjab, particularly Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan. He added that “battle hardened students from Southern Punjab were now spearheading the militant groups in FATA.”

 

Soon after the statement, newspapers quoted a call for Jihad against America by a person allegedly belonging to a Lahore based Jihadi organization. When people got scared and asked the caretaker of the mosque to stop that person from spreading such hatred he said “Under what law”? This is a fair commentary on the hold of the Jihadis in that area.

 

The above mentioned remarks made by leading government luminaries is an apt comment on the militants’ network on a national level, now being enacted in Swat. Southern Punjab has been a hotbed for militants from Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-i-Mohammad and Sipah-i-Mohammad. The phenomenon of suicide terrorism that engulfed Pakistan is owed to these terror groups.

 

The coalescence of minds and efforts of the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the indigenous militants from Punjab province resulted in a ‘Joint War’ against the US led war on terror, enabled in fits and starts by the Pakistan Government. This joint effort was prompted by the realization that it was beyond the capacity of the Pakistan Taliban alone to withstand the might of the Pakistan Army. Hence, battle hardened Chechen, Uzbek, Arala and Afghan terrorists spearheaded the fight against US forces and the Pakistan Army, including the frontier forces, and ably supported by Punjab militants and Pakistan Taliban. All militants are united in their hatred against the US, the NATO alliance and India. Their unity led to the situation in Swat, FATA and NWFP spiralling out of control for the US led war on terror. Collateral damage and civilian casualties caused by the US drone and missile attacks further fueled the hatred in the tribal region against such indiscriminate bombing.

 

After the Taliban seized power in Kabul in 1997, the various militant groups had set up camps in Afghanistan. Post the US-led invasion in 2001, they escaped across the Tora Bora and established camps in FATA and Swat. The coming together of the militants dates back to the Musharraf days, when the latter had clamped down on Kashmir based tanzeems. The embittered and disgruntled and dislodged militants walked into the arms of the Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban hiding in Swat and FATA. The attack on Lal Masjid in Islamabad by the Pakistan Army became the rallying point of this transit network. Around 300 students from Swat were killed in the Lal Masjid raid. It now became their single objective to undermine the Pakistani state. Over 100 Islamic militants captured in the Lal Masjid were released by Musharraf under media pressure and they went underground in FATA and Swat and have ever since been launching deadly attacks. Suicide attacks on an Army ordnance mess in Wah cantonment and on an Islamabad police station on the first anniversary of the Lal Masjid episode in July 2008, were a few such attacks against the state.

 

That Islamabad is reluctant to take action against ‘home grown militants’ even in Punjab is a well documented fact. It is neither interested in shutting down its supply lines and recruitment channels, nor in carrying out a re-appraisal of the ISI’s relationship with various militant groups. With the inability and reluctance of the Pakistan Army to fight in Swat, owing to a declining state of morale and large scale desertions and casualties among the Frontier Corps, and the immense death and destruction left behind by the militant attacks, the people have welcomed the peace deal and the coming of the Taliban as a measure of respite from all the fighting, ironically quite similar to how Taliban rule was first established in Afghanistan.

 

But, what should be of importance to our analysts and policy makers is to comprehend the import of this truce between Taliban and the Government of Pakistan – i.e. the truce also extends formally to all the indigenous groups like the LeT, etc, and the Afghan Taliban operating from Swat. Pakistan’s ambiguous stand on the war on terror stands effectively veiled, bar the semantics and the histrionics. At the same time, there can be little doubt that the Pakistan Army’s strategic view is based on two thoughts – one, the historical baggage of hostility towards India and its intentions in Afghanistan; and two, a suspicion of Iranian and Russian intentions in Afghanistan. If the truce is extended and translates into something more concrete, it will impact not only the US led global war on terror, but also have dangerous portents for India in the event that the ‘militants unity’ in Swat extends towards the Indian heartland or Jammu and Kashmir. It may be recalled that earlier in 1947 too, Afghan tribals, and more recently Afghan mercenaries, have participated alongside the Kashmiri and Pakistani militants. In the post Kargil period, the advent of ‘fidayeen’ or suicide attacks were attributed to them along with remnants of Al-Qaeda’s 055 brigade.

 

The above, coupled with Richard Holbrooke’s statement, “People who did 9/11 in the US, the people who attacked Mumbai and the people who seized Swat all come from the same routes and all are located in the same area”, is an ominous indicator of the aligning of Jihadi causes and networks, and its potential for causing havoc in the region.

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)