The Devil�s Advocate - Hearts, Minds and Velvet Gloves

A recent book ‘Even if it Ain’t Broke-Do fix it’ by Col Vivek Chadha while analyzing Change lauds the counter insurgency (CI) policies of ‘Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove’ as well as the internationally accepted ‘Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) carried out by our army in J&K’[i]. However, we need to introspect in view of the time loop we are in J&K, where we have come full circle more than once, that is ‘Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove’ doublethink? ‘Doublethink’ is the act of simultaneously accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as correct[ii]. Can an iron fist in a velvet glove lessen the blow or does it make every blow ineffectual? Vivek Chadha has quoted the then COAS Gen JJ Singh who propounded this concept saying “This also implies the use of overwhelming force only against foreign terrorists and other hardcore inimical elements,[…..]”[iii]. Practically this is not possible because indigenous terrorists can be as hardcore as foreign terrorists as also impossible to differentiate while an encounter is on. Perhaps it is such confusion which has had many civilians asking why Burhan Wani should have been captured and not killed. ‘Iron Fist in Velvet Glove’ may have been good for perception management, but it is for consideration whether this concept is correct. Should not the army be restricted to the Iron Fist which is its forte; should not the Velvet Glove be in the realm of the civil administration. The latter is by training, expertise, ethos and charter better suited to apply it. An article by Maj Navdeep Singh in 2012 had stated with many examples that the army’s own internal administration in personnel policies is bad, because they lack “any understanding or training for administration”[iv]. If that be so then can it be expected that the army will do well in a sphere that requires expertise in civil administration.

Similar is the concept of WHAM in CI. The phrase was first used by the French in Indochina in 1885[v]. In CI literature it is supposed to have been achieved in Malaya though General Sir Gerald Templar’s efforts. However, it is also said that his usage was in the context of stating that, “Malayan patriotism cannot be imposed from without or from above; it must develop in the hearts and minds of the Malayans themselves”[vi]. The historical fact is that this concept failed in the French CI operations in Indochina and Algeria, US operations in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and in Indian operations in Kashmir as evidenced by the current cycle of unrest. Is this phrase doublespeak? Doublespeak is language that deliberately obscures, disguises, distorts, or reverses the meaning of words. Is this a cliché for perception management?  Such doublespeak confuses the soldier. He is best at being the ultimate defender of the nation. He should not be tasked to make the conditions favourable for the political and administrative authorities to win the hearts and minds. He should be tasked to win only the war and not to manage the peace. It is this dichotomy in tasking that raises the endless debate on AFSPA.

Politics is about trust. The NDA was voted to power because it won the trust of the majority of people that it would bring a brighter future. Presently, the challenge before the NDA is to retain that trust. If one was to state in one sentence as to what are we trying to achieve in the Kashmir Valley as far as the people of Kashmir are concerned, it is that we are ‘trying to gain their trust’. Removing the sources of coercion which forces the people to acquiesce, which is a manifestation of Pakistani proxy war, is one prong of winning the war in Kashmir, the other is winning trust.

Trust appears in the context of our actions. “The most important trait of action is its orientation towards the future”[vii]. Any action to win lost trust has its roots in the past, which cannot be undone; the results of execution lie in the future, which cannot be known. When we set out to win hearts and minds we need to keep in mind why we lost trust in the first place and plan our strategy accordingly. Many things in the world happen independent of our actions (e.g. floods, earthquakes, tides etc) but all things within a society happen as a consequence of our actions. When we forecast the consequence of using an iron fist in a velvet glove we cannot forecast it with certainty. The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann had stated “we cannot gain sufficient knowledge of the future [ even if we] generate it by means of our own decisions.[viii] To make the future more certain it is better to stop predicting it and try to control it. But here again why others cannot be fully controlled has to do with human consciousness. We may through coercion, control human bodies, but not their ‘thoughts, intentions, imagination and dreams”[ix].

There are three types of mental orientations that humans face their problems with. These are hope, confidence and trust. The first is purely passive based upon uncertainty (kismet[x]), the second is less passive as it is an “emotion of assured expectation”[xi]. The third is a more concrete orientation as it is not rooted only in our minds as compared to the other two, but  “[..] is a bet, about the future contingent action of others”[xii].

It is to win this trust that we resort to the WHAM strategy. We normally look at civic action in terms of material things only. These are medical camps, Sadbhavna tours[xiii], Goodwill Schools, Micro hydel projects disbursing gifts etc. In reality it covers any activity from basic military courtesy and discipline up to the above mentioned projects. In other words it includes all actions that the army can do to develop the bonds of respect, cooperation, and ultimately trust. It takes time for goodwill towards the army to be built up. At first such projects are viewed by the people as superficial ‘shows’. They will only trust it for what it is when firstly, they realize the selflessness of the effort and secondly, the advantages that accrue to them. The ultimate aim of any CI campaign is to restore the trust of the people in the government. The aim of any civic action programme should be to help in organising, guiding, and focusing the logistic effort of the civil administration as their knowledge of what the populace wants is much better. They also have continuity which the army cannot have as rotation is inevitable. Often a proactive officer or jawan who has the aptitude for it, would have won trust, which his successor cannot maintain. An essential requirement of convincing the populace of the honesty of intentions is to desist making it appear as a selfish act of aggrandizement. For example:

·            The inauguration of a school building by a senior army officer may make good copy for the Sainik Samachar, however the people may take it as self aggrandizement by the army.

·     The presentation of any item should be without the fanfare of photographs, especially by uniformed photographers. The people are savvy enough to make out that for whose benefit are the photos being taken. Presentations to a bunch of children of items such as a cricket ball and bat can as well be done by any jawan- he may as well be the sentry at the post of an army camp on the outskirts of a village whom the children see often. This needs to be done without any fanfare and without any speeches. For the children, a General or a Jawan are the same. In their eyes, they both signify the persona of the army.

Keeping the above in view, the final word of this Devil’s Advocate is that in J&K should not the army be its own self - the mailed fist of the government, the Ultima Ratio Regis? Should it not take off the Velvet Gloves and put them on the hands of the police forces and the civil administration and let them do the WHAM?