Indo-US Nuclear Relations: Continuity or Change during the Obama Years?

The change in the Indo-US nuclear relationship that came about as a result of the unprecedented initiatives, perseverance and personal leadership of President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was nothing short of tectonic. The nuclear issue had been central to the Indo-US bilateral relationship and the effects of overcoming that estrangement today permeate the broader spectrum of engagement between the two countries.

However, the current preoccupation is how the change  in the White House would impact this nascent relationship? Will the nuclear engagement deepen or flounder at the altar of non proliferation that the Democrats claim greater love for? What are the issues that could trip the relationship?

Generally speaking, the Indo-US relationship will see continuity, of the trend set into motion by the last administration. Both sides do realise the import of the significant entente of recent years and this should keep the oars moving. The point, however, might be the pace of this continuity. This could be affected by generic factors such as the ongoing financial crisis, or the deepening quagmire in Af-Pak which will demand greater time and attention of the Obama administration, leaving it little will or inclination to address the pending nuclear cooperation issues. India too is in the throes of a national election and it will take until the second half of this year for the new government to pick up the threads.

However, there are some specific factors that would also determine the pace of the nuclear relationship. On nuclear energy, the US is more than familiar with the huge commercial benefits that it stands to reap from the buzzing Indian nuclear market. India has submitted a Letter of Intent to the US for purchase of American reactors for generation of 10,000 MW electricity.  Two pending issues, however, stand in the way. The first is the issue of liability since the US nuclear industry is unable to invest in the Indian nuclear energy sector unless India signs the International Nuclear Liability Convention. The process for this is currently under way. However, the Indian polls will affect its conclusion. The second issue pertains to the US granting reprocessing rights over US-origin spent fuel. This issue was left out of the 123 Agreement with both sides consenting to take it up later. Reprocessing is a critical process in India’s three-stage nuclear power programme and unless the country acquires the right to reprocess the spent fuel from nuclear reactors purchased from the US, it would make little sense to acquire them. Therefore, if this issue is not resolved, the US nuclear industry would be at a disadvantage and it will impinge on the bilateral relationship.

The second factor that will determine the fate of Indo-US nuclear engagement is the future nature and purpose of non proliferation. Several US official statements in recent times, including that of President Barack Obama, tend to indicate a desire to take India along in the resolution of contemporary proliferation challenges. However, Indian apprehensions arise on account of the two treaties, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that could impinge upon its strategic programme. The latter does not yet exist as a treaty, though India is committed to facilitating its early conclusion. This nevertheless provides India a chance to fashion the treaty to suit its interests. Also, the Indo-US interests on the scope and content of the treaty seem to converge. The issue of verification was a point of difference, but the Obama administration has now agreed to negotiate a verifiable FMCT, just as India desired.

The CTBT, meanwhile, evokes a more emotional response on account of India’s sense of betrayal at how it was passed through the UN General Assembly and its outrage at the ‘entry into force’ clause which was perceived as pressurising India into accepting a treaty it had rejected. During the domestic debate over the Indo-US nuclear deal, the issue of testing really tested the nerves on both sides. In order to secure support on the domestic front, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated India’s opposition to signing the CTBT, and in order to get the NSG waiver, the foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee reiterated the voluntary moratorium on testing.

In case the CTBT resurfaces today after its ratification by USA and China, India will be convulsed by a strong domestic debate. The US cannot assume that the Indo-US nuclear agreement will lead India to tamely accept the treaty. In fact, there are strategic analysts who question the credibility of India’s 1998 tests and argue for more. Without going into the merits, or mostly demerits, of this argument, it must be underscored that the government of the day will be hard pressed to seek public legitimacy for its decision.

The US could help in making this task easier in two ways. Firstly, they can offer greater clarity on the secret agreements that are alleged to have been made between the P-5 at the time of CTBT negotiations. Any whiff of discrimination will make it impossible for India to subscribe to the treaty, even if India may never conduct another round of testing unless provoked by a test by its adversaries. Secondly, a clear linkage with universal nuclear disarmament needs to be made. India considers the CTBT not as an end but as a means of reaching a stage where nuclear weapons become irrelevant. However, given the new found enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament in the US, it remains to be seen whether the US would be able to bring this about. 
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)