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Neutralising Violence in Sri Lanka


The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that was once controlling over 15,000 square kilometres has now been confined to less than 20 square kilometres in the north-eastern part of Mullaithivu district. Although the last lap is difficult, sooner than later the government forces should be in a position to capture the remaining “uncleared” areas. The main hindrance for the advancing forces is the presence of about 100,000 civilians trapped in the crossfire. They are sitting ducks for indiscriminate shelling, firing and bombing from both the sides. The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) must make sure that there is no further collateral damage while the residual Tiger-controlled real estate changes hands.

The government has designated “safe zones” on the border areas for the trapped civilians to cross-over. But, these zones have not been really safe. While the GOSL intend to use these zones to filter out LTTE cadre from non-combatants, the Tigers wish to infiltrate into government-controlled areas through them. Fearing further loss of territory and attrition, the Tigers do not want that the civilians to move away from the “safe zones” to “cleared areas” and in turn expose them to advancing government forces. The standard query is: “When we are fighting your war, why should you desert us?” As a result of the entrenched interests of the combatants on both sides of the divide, the sanctity of the “safe zones” is lost. The Sri Lankan government is unwilling to allow aid agencies and media into “safe zones” citing safety. In reality, however, the government thinks that the presence of media personnel and aid agencies would hinder their military push.

The fact of the matter is that by just capturing the remaining “uncleared areas”, the three-decade-old ethnic violence may not end completely. Since the fourth phase of the Eelam War broke out in 2006, the LTTE has been following three broad military strategies – conventional, guerrilla and suicide attacks – against the Sri Lankan state. By physical capture of the Tiger-controlled territory the government may be in a position to neutralise the first strategy – conventional resistance – of the LTTE. However, the potential that the LTTE may employ the other two approaches remains, although in a limited manner.

Most of the Tigers have already spread themselves out in the north-east to carry on the resistance in guerrilla warfare mode. Sporadic attacks that are taking place in the eastern districts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai are evidence of implementation of such strategy. Familiar terrain and popular support, to an extent, are in favour of the LTTE. Terrain may not be changed, but the government can make conscious efforts to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the minority Tamils. Such efforts should include firstly treating those who are crossing over and those who are displaced with dignity. Aid agencies should be given free access to “safe zones” and IDP/transit camps to provide relief and medical help to the civilians. Harassments in the name of “screening” the displaced should come to a nought.

The LTTE ‘sleeper cells’ have infiltrated to the southern parts of the island including the capital Colombo with an aim to ambush and carry out terrorist attacks on vital military, political and economic targets. Fearing further infiltration by sections of scattering Tigers from the conflict zone, the government has stepped-up various security measures like intensifying the screening process at the transit/IDP camps and welfare centres, and registration of Tamil residents in southern Sri Lanka. Suspected people are detained and questioned for prolonged periods.

Such measures, however, are not without disturbing side-effects like harassment,  disappearances and abductions. It is important that the government of the day does not compromise on basic human rights standards and in turn alienate the minorities further. Such alienation will only perpetuate the cycle of violence in the island for an indefinite period of time. Without neutralising violence the government cannot move further successfully. The government needs to make conscious efforts to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the minority Tamils. Such efforts should include firstly treating those who are crossing over and those who are displaced with dignity. Aid agencies should be given free access to “safe zones” and IDP/transit camps to provide relief and medical help to the civilians. Harassment in the name of “screening” the displaced should be brought to a stop.
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)

 
 

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Dr. N Manoharan
Senior Fellow
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