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April 21, 2009 |  | By Kanwal Sibal | ||
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Even though marred by sharp political controversy in both countries, the Indo-US nuclear deal was supposed to seal a new, transformed relationship between the two countries, free of past recriminations and mistrust. The US moved from a policy of sanctioning India for its nuclear policies by denying international cooperation in developing its civilian nuclear energy sector to permitting such cooperation by amending, exceptionally for India, the NSG guidelines. On our side, the enormous political capital the government invested in pushing the deal through- risking damage to its credibility by making inflated claims about it, and its very survival in a parliamentary vote of confidence- signified a determination to alter the nature of our ties with the US. The nuclear deal has been anchored in a “strategic relationship” between the two countries. Although the “strategic” content in all such cases is left undefined, what it means essentially is that India and the US have common long term interests, they will meet international challenges together, their relationship will be reinforced politically, economically and militarily, their dialogue will be broadened and intensified and their respective policies will be adapted to either support or not oppose each others’ legitimate interests. Talk of strategic partnership is more an expression of political will rather than acceptance of any precise commitment. A “strategic partnership” between a global power and a regional one is not easy to manage outside an alliance relationship. The US is the world’s pre-eminent power, with commanding influence over the global political, security and economic architecture. It already dominated the so-called “free world”, but after the Soviet Union’s collapse it saw the opportunity to build an extended global order that reflected its political, economic and social values. Assured of its own strength, and traumatized by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on its soil against the symbols of its power, it plunged into a unilateral remodelling of the international system, supported by new doctrines of intervention. That “neo-con” enterprise has not succeeded and Obama’s election reflects a reconsideration of that aggressive strategy and its replacement by a more dialogue-oriented, consultative one. US’s goal nevertheless remains one of preserving its dominant global status, maintaining its military and technological edge over its potential adversaries, accommodating others within a system that it would continue to seek to control through a combination of its hard and soft power, and not yielding to anyone else the responsibility to lead. The change that Obama speaks about should be understood in this perspective, not as a belated US concession to the idea of multipolarity. Is India ready to play a subordinate role and accept limits on the independence of its foreign policy in pursuit of a serious strategic partnership with the US?
Already there is a lowering of expectations in India about a strategic re-ordering of the Indo-US relationship after the nuclear deal. This could be anticipated as the gaps between Indian and US strategic interests, at both global and regional levels, are difficult to bridge. On Climate Change and the Doha Round, for example, our positions remain apart. The difficult discussions on these issues are not confined to the India-US bilateral context, but pit the interests of the developing world against those of the industrialized North and involve a re-balancing of global equations. The US is still not ready to support India’s inclusion in an expanded permanent membership of the Security Council, which contrasts with the French, British and Russian positions. Even on non-proliferation issues the slate is not yet clean, despite the nuclear deal. Sanctions on some Indian entities remain, the scope for transfer of dual-use technologies remains uncertain, enrichment and reprocessing technologies will not be transferred, negotiations on the right to reprocess spent fuel from imported reactors risk becoming arduous with the proposed appointment of a known opponent of the nuclear deal in a vital position in the State Department. On top of this, the solidity of the newly minted non-proliferation understandings between India and the US will be tested during the parleying on CTBT and FMCT.
Some ardent protagonists of the nuclear deal have claimed that it was intended to lift some strategic constraints on India so that it could play the role of balancing China in Asia more effectively. With the change in Washington, this is less evident. Hillary Clinton considers relationship with China as the US’s most important one. President Obama announced after meeting Hu Jintao at the G-20 summit in London that US and China will work for regional stability including in South Asia. This Clintonian endorsement of China’s positive role in our region, disregarding China’s territorial claims on us, its Tibet policy and its role in arming a failing, terrorist ridden state with nuclear and missile capability that seriously threatens our security and that of others, exposes the strategic mismatch between US and Indian thinking. Talk of a US-China dyarchy in global affairs, even if premature, indicates trends in global equations; for us it would be unwise to rely on US’s strategic goodwill in building our capacities against China.
On Pakistan, the past contradictions between US interests and those of India are resurfacing, even when we have shared interest in combating religious extremism and terrorism and bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan. When Pakistan was an ally in the jehad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US armed and aided Pakistan as recompense; now that it is suspected of collusion with jehadi elements targeting the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the US response still is to give it massive military and economic aid as an advance reward for dealing with these elements more robustly. This policy disregards the enhanced threat that arming of a still hostile Pakistan creates for our security. Instead of compelling Pakistan to cease supporting the activities of jehadi groups against us-to be expected if we are strategic partners- equal onus is being put on us to reduce tensions with Pakistan, ease its concerns on the eastern frontier and remove its apprehensions about our policies in Afghanistan through dialogue. American support for chastising Pakistan for its clear complicity in staging the Mumbai attack has been disappointing, underlining the limits of cooperation even in dealing with the common challenge of terrorism. Indeed, the statement of US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, during his most recent visit to Delhi that for the first time since partition US, India and Pakistan face a common threat from terrorism not only absolves Pakistan of its terrorist misdeeds against India but provides it advance political cover for any fresh terrorist attack that its officially promoted jehadi groups might be contemplating against us.
In sum, the already weak foundation of a strategic partnership between India and the US has been shaken by the Obama Administration’s positioning on issues of vital strategic importance to India. We should actually put aside the talk of a strategic relationship as it unnecessarily distracts us politically from the principal task of realizing the enormous untapped potential of a robust all-round relationship with the US in diverse fields.
Courtsey: Mail Today, New Delhi, 21 April 2009
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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Kanwal Sibal |
