Violence in Bodo Areas: A Comprehensive Approach Required

Land, language and livelihood have been the major elements of Bodos’ grievances that caused the community to agitate. Desire for political power came later, although the aspiration was basically to realise their core socio-economic demands. The Bodo movement in its long history “has had several forms moving gradually towards the demand for a separate state” and even a sovereign “Bodoland”. Since independence, the Bodos strived to advance their socio-economic and political aspirations, but not without facing proportionate challenges in the form of resistance from other competing groups in the area, or lethargy of the state or even division within its own community. From the mid-1980s armed component to the movement took shape. Militant groups like Bodo Liberation Tigers and National Democratic Front of Bodoland came to the fore. Despite attempts to resolve the issue through the Bodo Autonomous Council Accord in 1993 and later through Bodo Territorial Council Accord of 2003, there have been concerted efforts made by the Bodos to “prove right of the autochthonous over the land” what they called “Bodoland”. They first turned to Adivashis and then to “illegal Bangladeshi immigrants”. The resultant violence and counter-violence led to large-scale killings and displacement.

 

The challenge in the way ahead is addressing the grievances of Bodos but without compromising the interests of other ethno-religious groups living in the Bodo areas. The answer lies in looking at the issue in a comprehensive, rather than segmented manner.

 

Analyzing all previous incidents of violence in the Bodo areas, it is clear that as and when the security apparatus missed taking note of symptoms of unrest and as and when failed taking appropriate proactive action, the situation got out of control. For instance, the state police and Intelligence should have woken up by March 2012 itself when Bodos started commemorating 25 years of their “struggle”. Similar symbolisms and assertions were bound to be displayed by non-Bodo groups, especially Muslims and Adivasis. The manifestation of such assertions by competing groups was always through violence. Signs of imminent clashes were simmering since May, but were not taken seriously by the government. Nipping the problem at the bud would have averted indiscriminate violence. Also, armed groups representing Bodos and non-Bodos have to be tackled through appropriate means, either that be political or military or a mix of both. As long as they remain armed and active, insecurity and the consequent trust deficit would linger. 

 

Despite demands, there is no point in going for a fresh accord. The failure of BAC Accord of 1993 and BTC Accord of 2003 clearly shows three problems:  ambiguities in demarcating ‘Bodo areas’, lack of control over transferred subjects and insufficient financial powers. It is vital, therefore, to fix the present BTC accord without any ambiguities and implement it in full. It was the ambiguities in the previous two Accords that led to lot of misunderstandings, opportunistic interpretations and confusions. The future amendment and implementation of the Accord should satisfy both Bodos and non-Bodos in unequivocal terms. It should be realised that any success of the Accord lies also in cooperation between Bodos and non-Bodos.

 

There is a significant gap between the present ground reality in the Bodo areas and the romance of Bodoland. It is important to bridge this gap. The political leadership should rise to the occasion in convincing the respective communities to see the things as they are and look ahead, instead of exploiting the situation to gain electoral mileage. Appropriate confidence-building measures and reconciliation among the concerned communities – Bodos, Mulsims, and Adivasis – are crucial.

 

Despite the enormity of the issue, the response in stemming the flow of illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh has been grossly inadequate. The entire stretch of 4,096-km India-Bangladesh border is heavily populated, making monitoring extremely difficult. Fencing has to a large extent been acting as an obstacle, but only 2,760.12 km has been fenced so far. The remaining stretch should be fenced at the earliest, complimented with floodlights and hi-tech surveillance devices. Most importantly, existing border has to be demarcated at the earliest to make them free of ‘enclaves’ and ‘adverse positions’; much of activities take place in these undemarcated areas. Although the Border Security Force has been doing its job creditably, the force levels are not sufficient to monitor the long and difficult border. Apart from raising new battalions, it is important not to divert the BSF for duties other than border management. They also have to be equipped legally to handle situations at borders that include not only illegal migration, but also smuggling, drug-trafficking, counterfeits, and militant movements. Apart from creating physical hurdles, it is also important to discourage illegal immigrants through suitable deterrent legislation. Till recently, illegal migrants in Assam were handled by Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, that was held as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005 as it was “coming to the advantage of such illegal migrants as any proceedings initiated against them almost entirely ends in their favour, enables them to have a document having official sanctity to the effect that they are not illegal migrants.” An exclusive refugee/migration law is long pending. It is also vital to hasten the present plan of issuing multi-purpose identity cards, at least to curb further illegal migration. At some pockets, issue Bangladeshis can be issued temporary work permits. At the diplomatic level, India should take up the issue with Bangladesh to address the problem at the source.

 

Relief camps housing all three categories of displaced communities – Bodos, Muslims, Adivasis – require due attention. Some of the camps have been in existence since 1993, as inmates could not return to their homes fearing violence. Because of overcrowding there is persistent lack of food, water, accommodation, medical attention, and sanitation. These concerns should be addressed urgently. Apart from making the living conditions of the internally displaced in relief camps better, the government should make sure that the displaced are rehabilitated at the earliest. Else relief camps would turn out into breeding grounds for new militants.

 

 

Views expressed are personal