The War in Swat and future Implications for India

On 19 April 2009, the Pakistan National Assembly was informed that 1,842 incidents of terrorist violence had taken place in the preceding fourteen months claiming 1,395 lives. Of these, 1,692 terrorist incidents took place in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 122 in Balochistan, 12 in Punjab, 9 in Sindh and 7 in Islamabad. While the level of violence is clearly concentrated in NWFP, the gradual spread of terrorist activity to other parts of Pakistan points to the growing power of the Taliban. In the first 100 days of 2009 itself, there have been 20 suicide attacks killing 332 people; a chilling reminder of that power.

A recent report by BBC Urdu correspondents based on an analysis carried out over the last eighteen months brings to light some worrying statistics the Taliban’s resurgence in Pakistan. The report covers the 24 districts of NWFP, seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions of the Federally Administerd Tribal Areas (FATA) and represents an analysis of reports by BBC over the last 18 months. It says that Taliban commanders have taken over administrative control in 24 per cent of the region. In another 38 per cent of the region the Taliban were said to have established a permanent presence, set up bases and were limiting government activity and often compromising the functioning of the local administration. In three districts of FATA and 11 of NWFP the Taliban had repeatedly displayed an ability to strike at will, attacking both girls and boys schools, music shops, police stations and other government buildings. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, on his recent visit to London dismissed these reports as an incorrect survey. Ground reports, however point to the contrary.

With the collapse of the peace treaty of 16 February brokered by Sufi Muhammad – a senior Taliban leader and head of the outlawed Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (The Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law) – the Pakistan Government finally declared war on the Taliban. The security forces have achieved successes in combating the Taliban in Dir and Buner and other parts of Malakand. The battle is now on for the town of Mingora in Swat. However, bold statements made both by the Pakistan Army and the government stating that terrorism from these areas would be crushed in a short period of time through military action, are misplaced. Tanks, artillery and even aerial strikes have been used against the Taliban in order to wrest the initiative, but such tactics are short-lived and are more likely to alienate the population. The use of overwhelming fire-power may at best get the militants out of their fixed strongholds but the insurgents can simply melt into the hills and reappear elsewhere. It is not possible to fight an insurgency on the lines of a conventional war.

There is also a very serious humanitarian angle to the conflict raging in Swat. The present operations have already led to the displacement of close to fifteen lakh people from their homes and collateral damage to the civil population has been unacceptably high. The inevitable fallout will be greater resentment amongst the local population against the security forces and this could in turn influence more young men to opt for the Taliban. It has been reported that Taliban sympathisers have followed the refugees and are all over the camps.

In the above war, the ideological battle lines have been firmly drawn. The government and the security forces view the war as a battle between obscurantism and enlightenment, bigotry and tolerance and extremism versus moderation. The Taliban view it as a fight for Islam and the right to be ruled by Sharia law. The appeal of Sharia and Islamic justice gives the Taliban an unparalleled ideological motivation in the NWFP, FATA and many other areas of Pakistan. As the Persian saying goes, “ham khorma wa, ham sawab ast”, which translated means that there are rewards both in this world and the next. Which poor peasant can resist the appeal of 72 “houris” in the afterlife when the present one offers nothing but misery? In a sense, the Taliban have shrewdly exploited the vast disparities in wealth in Pakistan and the failure of the state to provide justice, jobs and essential services. In some areas landless tenants have been pitted against wealthy landlords, some of whom have been forced to flee. If the movement gains momentum, it will acquire its own uncontrollable dynamic. As Joseph de Maistre, a French political philosopher wrote in 1796, “it is not men who lead revolutions, but it is the revolution which employs men”. It is this combination of revolutionary and religious zeal which makes the Taliban such a formidable force. It is not the first time, though, that a religious movement has acquired the character of a socio-economic upheaval.

For Pakistan, the road ahead is a long and wearisome one. Taliban cannot be defeated militarily easily since, as an ideology, it has taken root in large parts of the tribal population. They will have to put in more boots on the ground and hold the area physically with troops. Anything up to five to six divisions may have to be employed, perhaps for years, if peace is to be restored. Simultaneously, reforming the madrassas, good governance, employment generation and an effective justice delivery system will have to go hand in hand if the spread of the Taliban is to be first controlled and then rolled back. If Talibanisation takes root in the Punjab and Sindh provinces, the state will not have the means to counter it and Pakistan will fall to fundamentalist forces.

What then is the prognosis for India?

Firstly, a conventional military threat from Pakistan in the short to medium term is all but over. We need to rethink our strategy on how to handle Pakistan, especially in case of another strike on India on the lines of 26/11. To retaliate against the Pakistani state will be playing into the hands of the Taliban. Not doing anything will be unacceptable to Indian public opinion. The best course therefore would be prevention which in turn would require foolproof intelligence and well institutionalised response mechanisms.

Secondly, should the Taliban presence become even partially effective in Punjab and Sindh, it would lead to a human exodus in the millions. We would have to ensure that our borders are sealed or else we will be faced with very serious security concerns.

Lastly, we have our own home grown insurgent movement straddling a vast area all the way from West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh, forming a red corridor where the writ of the state is weak. This needs to be addressed on priority otherwise we too will soon be having a full blown insurgency on our hands.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).