| #193 |  | 1028 |  |
May 25, 2009 |  | By Gen V P Malik (Retd) | ||
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In military operations, the sooner an intervening force arrives to influence the course of an event, the lesser is the chance of the conflict devolving into a firepower intensive, wasteful slugging match. Then why did the Pakistan Army delay operations against the Taliban when for so long it was evident to people within and outside Pakistan that the latter had become an unbearable transnational threat in the seven tribal agencies of Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) as well as several districts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) including Swat, Buner and Malakand. Whatever be the excuses- the ISI and Taliban nexus, lack of political direction, the military top brass unwilling or feeling incapable, a misperceived India threat, or wanting and waiting to strike a profitable deal with USA- the Pakistan Army will have to pay a heavy price for this delay. What can we expect from this delayed operation in which the Pakistan Army has now thrown over 15000 troops with tanks, artillery, gun ships and fighter jets against the heavily armed militants? Let me start with insurgents’ strength. Their number in Swat, Buner and Malakand, considered about 4000, is deceptive. Every fourth male tribal in these areas carries a rifle and takes great pride in marksmanship. The Taliban have considerable combat experience, advantage of a terrain which favors guerrilla operations, and tribal loyalty. The disloyal are threatened or eliminated, particularly those with kith and kin in the Pakistan Army or para military forces. There will be no problem of logistics except obtaining more arms and ammunition. On the Pakistan Army, there is a widespread perception that it has remained focused on potential conventional war with India, its nuclear deterrence, and the power and pelf that it has enjoyed for so long. Its counter-insurgency capabilities are almost non-existent. Currently, it is using war tactics with heavy ground and aerial weapons and ordering people to vacate cities and towns, which go against all accepted best-practices in counter-insurgency operations. Official claims keep rising daily but there is no way of independent verification or distinguishing between the dead fighters and collateral civilian casualties. Hereafter, the insurgents will avoid frontal clashes. They will breakup into smaller groups, withdraw into the mountains, step up small scale raids and suicide attacks, and wait for another opportunity. Pakistan Army, with heavy fire power support, will be able to enter cities, towns or villages. But it will take quite sometime before the civil administration and police are able to govern without Army presence. A heavy handed offensive and indiscriminate use of fire power will eliminate some rebels but is bound to alienate people. The collateral damage, including over 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDP) and large number of civilian casualties has already caused some protests in the Pakistan National Assembly. Body bags of security forces, civilians, even insurgents, tend to create revulsion very soon and affect public opinion. Pakistan will have to maintain IDP Camps for a long time, like we have done for the Kashmiri Pandits. Insurgencies tend to behave like a balloon: when squashed in one spot, it quickly inflates in another area. On 13 May, militants attacked two logistics terminals near Peshawar and destroyed several containers, lorries and power generators. Now there is greater likelihood of terror attacks in NWFP, Punjab and Sind. The Taliban have already started painting walls in Islamabad with threats, compelling the administration to erase the messages quickly. Pakistan Government has stated that it will bring the operation to an early end very soon. That is wishful thinking. The operation would have to be extended to the adjoining areas of FATA very soon. Its success or failure will also depend upon anti-Taliban operations across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. A Taliban setback in Swat may produce a reverse effect in the neighboring tribal areas and serve as a catalyst for binding together the loose confederation of militants operating in FATA and thus produce a more united fighting force. On the other hand, a Taliban victory in Swat, or even a stalemate, will be an unmitigated disaster for Pakistan. My experience is that such operations tend to suck-in troops. It takes years, sometimes decades, to bring about normalcy. Also, such insurgencies cannot be quashed through military operations alone. The people have to be convinced of its futility and the root causes -- social, economic, and political -- have to be tackled simultaneously. Pakistan Army is up not only against the armed Taliban but more importantly, the very idea of Taliban. There is no doubt that the operations against the Taliban are not only in Pakistan’s national interest but also of the region. India cannot afford to have Taliban as its neighbor, getting control of Pakistani nuclear weapons. If Pakistan Army moves some troops away from its border with India for this purpose, this move can be supported. But will it reduce Jihadi terrorists’ pressure on India? Our response and military posture in J & K and on the Pakistan border would have to depend upon the latter. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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Gen V P Malik (Retd) |
