| #206 |  | 1846 |  |
June 15, 2009 |  | By Gen V P Malik (Retd) | ||
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This book is ably done, a smart juxtaposition of autobiography and biography. The autobiography part is the original, fairly voluminous, notes left by the late General S N Shrinagesh, preserved by the family. The biography part complements with the author’s exhaustive and painstakingly researched narration of events of the General’s personal and professional life. The author’s major advantage is that he belongs to the late General’s regiment – The Kumaon Regiment – and knows the family well. From a professional standpoint, the autobiographical part is fascinating. It throws light on the transition of the Indian Army from a colonial to a national army while actively engaged in its own division with Pakistan, providing aid to civil authorities in the pre and post-Partition holocaust, integrating Hyderabad and Junagarh with the Indian Union, and most importantly participating in 1947-48 war in Jammu & Kashmir. And all this happened when junior level Indian army officers were being quickly promoted to senior positions. General Srinagesh, who commanded a battalion in 1942-45, was Corps Commander in the war in J & K War. Some revealing impressions contained in his notes are given below. • Inspite of enormous disadvantages, I was determined that we should succeed (in the capture of Zoji La) and indicated my determination to the officers conducting the operation. The reaction of one of the senior officers was that even this attempt at breaking through the Zoji La pass had remote chance of succeeding. In order to break this form of negative thinking, I asked him to put his point of view in writing. This he hesitated to do and we were able to proceed with the operational discussion with positive plans. • Because of India’s strict adherence to this agreement, we were unable to use Indian Air Force in its primary role of isolating the battlefield by air attacks on enemy supply bases and lines of communications. Even aerial attacks on Pakistani installations on the Indian side of the border and inside Kashmir, like Muzaffarabad and Mirpur were not launched because of possible escalation. On the other hand, Pakistan made full use of the lull caused by the agreement, to build up its strength, and supplement its forces in such a manner that Poonch and Leh were systematically encircled. • For India, the military situation in Kashmir had been adversely influenced by political considerations. Pakistan had no legal or moral right to operate with its army in Kashmir against the expressed wishes of the people and the ruler of Kashmir, whereas India had. Still India referred the matter to the United Nations, which set up UN Commission on India and Pakistan, before which both parties came to an agreement to refrain from offensive action likely to aggravate the situation. • There had been a myth that Indian soldiers could only fight under British officers. This myth was exploded. When initial security problems of the nation had been tackled by the Army, the Government of India began to consider downsizing the Army and to make use of it as a labour force. When Shrinagesh took over as Chief in May 1957, the strength of the Army was about 450,000. The Government planned to bring it to 150,000, reducing 10,000 men per year. General Shrinagesh writes on that period: • Leaders of free India were busy impressing upon the world that we were a peace loving nation, with people wedded to the ideology of Ahimsa (non violence), and steeped in the belief that peaceful attitude was a sufficient safeguard against any thought of aggression. As a matter of policy, we hastily expressed our close friendship with Communist China, Nepal, Burma and Tibet. We felt certain that in spite of the necessity of Partition, and while deploring the communal frenzy that it evoked, the people of Pakistan and India were close kith and kin, and would never dream of taking an aggressive attitude to each other. • To me this kind of thinking seemed manifestly short sighted…..Dr Katju’s (then Defence Minister) and my arguments on Pakistan seemed to make some headway with Panditji (Nehru). He agreed that Pakistan was making military alliances, had been contemplating rearming with modern weapons, and had by no means forgotten Kashmir. But when it came to China – it drew a firm, “No”, because the Chinese were our trusted friends; and we (army commanders) were foolish, hot headed, and needlessly belligerent. Unfortunately, perhaps, China had not yet built the Aksai Chin Road, and we came away with the agreement to a 3,00,000 force, less than what we had contemplated, but still a force and a military one – not a labour corps! On Chinese intrusion in Ladakh in 1950s, the General’s notes state: Virtually, the intelligence organisation had not been reorganised to meet the requirements of an independent nation. In fact, when reports of the Chinese survey of the Aksai Chin Road in Ladakh were received, it was assumed that these parties had strayed into our territory by chance OR BY MISTAKE! Two years later, the road was an accomplished fact. General Shrinagesh’s most interesting comments, relevant even today, are on the subject of civil-military relations, joint defence strategy and the position of the Chief of Defence Staff. He wrote: • What is civil control? Surely not control by civil servants whose task is to provide a Secretariat to the Defence Minister. It means, necessarily, political control, which is fundamental to our democracy. Such political control must be that of the Minister, without the Defence Secretariat working as a sort of Controller General of the three Service Headquarters. • Our people have yet to be educated in the fact that the ex-servicemen’s welfare is a deserving cause not only to honour those to whom honour is due, but also to give an incentive to future recruitment. • The Army Chief has to think first of the performance and effectiveness of his own Service, in the competition for the limited funds available. As a result, coordinated defense strategy is rarely achieved……The proposal for an independent Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee was raised strongly by us and has since been mooted year after year and has had the support of certain Defence Ministers. But it has always been, and is still negated on political grounds, presumably because of the fear that an independent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee would become too strong, or because of the feeling that the work can be best carried out in the Secretariat, by bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry! His opinion on the role and tasks of a Governor: People expect that though politics and politicians may change, there is always someone outside the normal political hurly – burly who would have a stabilising influence on the body economic and politic; and perhaps this is the great contribution a governor can make. Many other notes of General Shrinagesh on issues such as the rift between the King’s and Indian Commissioned Officers, political effort to re-induct INA personnel in the Army, national discipline, training and quality of leadership in the Army give an insight into the events of those days and his own thinking. Two important conclusions can be drawn from General Shrinagesh’s notes. One! Lack of strategic consciousness and perceptions after independence, particularly on China. Two! Strong political leadership of the period which tended to ignore direct military advice and depended more on its own perceptions and bureaucratic advice. The reasons could be (a) Indian military and higher defence organisation before Independence was completely under British control. The British did not consult Indian leaders on strategic issues and real politic. Our own strategic resource pool of thought, talent and specialists was non existent. (b) Having been catapulted from tactical to strategic level, senior military officers had little education and experience of strategic issues. They performed well in the operations but were unable to influence politico-military decisions. General Shrinagesh emerges as a modest, humble and humane person, who went about his duties in a quiet and dignified manner, preferring to remain out of publicity and controversies. The human angle in the book is provided by the General’s family, particularly by Mrs Rajkumari Shrinagesh, who as a young educated Panjabi girl married a South Indian officer – a rare event in the social milieu of early 1930s. An important military history contribution; the book is worth reading!
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Gen V P Malik (Retd) |
