Turmoil in Nepal: Receding Hope

The situation in Nepal is assuming alarming proportions with general strikes de rigueur with the fresh confrontation with the Maoists after Prachanda quit the Nepalese premiership. The Maoists have threatened that should the political impasse continue, they could well go the armed way once again, with weapons stashed away, undeclared to the UN.

Of late, Maoist supremo Prachanda has said that they will continue the revolution and would divert state funds intended for the upkeep of the disbanded guerrilla People’s Liberation Army to buy weapons. These reports also tend to resurrect the scepticism that had greeted the UN acceptance of the Maoist statement that they fought the 10-year ‘People’s War’ with about 3500 weapons.

The new government led by Marxist-Leninist party leader Madhav Nepal also faces a challenge from its coalition partner MJF led by Upendra Yadav, who pulled out of the three-week old government to express their displeasure at making dissident leader Vijay Gachhadar Deputy Prime Minister and his followers ministers.
A strong anti-India consensus is also being built up, primarily by the Maoist and supporting cadres. As a result major highways from India have been blocked with nearly 700 trucks laden with essential commodities stranded on the Indo-Nepal border. In case the blockade remains in force, it could result in Indian traders boycotting transporting goods. A recipe for hardship for Nepalese citizens.

Politically, even after three weeks of installation of the new government, the cabinet formation process not only remains incomplete but mired in controversy, with eleven minsters sworn in and efforts to resolve the MJF crisis come to naught. Infighting, both in the Nepalese Congress and Madhav Nepal’s CPN (UML) is exacerbating the situation, the Prime Minister seen as a vacillating leader incapable of managing the crisis. The Nepal Army is emerging as a political stabilizer, with talk of removal of COAS General Rookmangud Katawal forgotten, reports indicating that he, in collusion with the President being seen as a harbinger of stability and order in Nepal.

Under the prevailing circumstances it is not clear whether Madhav Nepal will be in a position to address two burning isssues that of constitution formation and integration of the PLA.

Essentially there are three contending positions pushing Nepal in different directions.

The Maoists see mainstream political parties conspiring with the Army and President to upstage them and prevent them from getting back to power. Prachanda as Dr. S Chandrasekharan says in his article in SAAG (South Asia Analysis Group), is like a person bound by three cages. The first, his own party hardliners led by Mohan Baidya want a ‘new People’s Republic’, launching a movement akin to the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’. The next ring, so as to say, are the political parties whose support he needs, the only binding factor, power. Finally, and the most important one, is the necessity of drafting a constitution that will ensure the broader Maoist socialist agenda, seen both as means to power and a way to placate the restive cadres.

In pushing for the dismissal of General Katawal, the Maoists made a major mistake in expecting to subvert both coalition partners and the Presidency using the dictum of civilian supremacy (over military) to depose an obstinate COAS. The integration of the PLA with the Nepal Army is largely a means to take control of the military instrument of state. Kanak Mani Dixit, the celebrated Nepali political analyst says: “At their large National Council conclave in the Kharipati outskirts of Kathmandu in late November 2008, the Maoists came to the conclusion that they were in government but did not control the state, for which the Nepal Army and the independent judiciary were found to be prime obstacles. It decided that the (Maoist) cantonments should not be disbanded until the new constitution is written.”

However, the Army-brass and other political parties are unlikely to allow integration that could destabilise the Nepal Army. They may be prepared to consider the integration of small numbers of the PLA into the Army, if found professionally suitable. Prachanda’s demand that Maoists who held officer-equivalent ranks in the PLA, be given appropriate ranks in the Army is unlikely to be accepted, leading to further alienation of these cadres. The political parties and more importantly the President is with the Army, who see in these demands an ulterior motive. There is also a perception among Maoists that given this fractious nature of mainstream political parties it is only a matter of time before they gain political salience.

However two factors are important. One is time; given the fact that the interim government has only two years to draft the constitution, it must ensure that the constitutional process is not hijacked by the so-called liberal democratic parties. Already there are differences between the Maoists and other mainstream parties.

The Maoists principally want a presidential form of government with federal units comprising the autonomous provinces and local sub-autonomous regions. They desire centralisation of power to the President who will be the executive head of the State together with space for “competitive” multi-party management.  The provinces are to be carved out based on ethnicity, linguistic dominance and continuity, cultural unity and closeness, historical and geographical familiarity, administrative accessibility and available economic resources. On the other hand the concept paper of the Nepali Congress seeks a Westminster type of system with slight variations.

Maoist leaders, certainly Prachanda and Bhhatarai realise they cannot indefinitely protest, as the people will tire of it. Secondly, with the political process rudderless and the peace process crumbling, the PLA’s integration or rehabilitation is getting complex by the day. Similarly there is little incentive on expediting the new constitution! There is no indication that the mild mannered Madhav Nepal will get the government moving. Nepal is headed for period of instability.

So, what could happen now?

Scenario 1: A serious political crisis with violent demonstrations by the Maoists leading to one more compromise, brokered perhaps by the Chinese and by invoking Indian support (?) or vice versa.  The Chinese will try their best to see that the Maoist-led government, which effectively put down Tibetan activity in Nepali territory, comes back to power.

Scenario 2: A violent public protest engineered by the Maoists with tacit support of other political parties, resulting in confrontation between the PLA and the Army. This could go two ways, a compromise with the present political coalition as also the Army as a tacit move by Prachanda to bide time or an out and out army coup, resulting in open confrontation between the Maoists and the Army, leading to civil war.

Both are dangerous and will undermine Indian interests.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).