The usage of information technology as a force multiplier in warfare stems from the belief that information advantage leads to information superiority eventually enhancing combat effectiveness. This is executed by close “networking” between sensors, decision-makers, and shooting platforms, therefore creating shared awareness, speed of command, high-tempo manoeuvre, close coordination and synchronisation during operations leading to greater lethality, and increased survivability of own forces. The primary objective of applying modern information technology is to enhance battle-space awareness between operational and command elements.
Given the fact that India has emerged as an IT hub and research centre for the developed world, all the three services but particularly the Indian Army has launched an ambitious programme for transforming the Indian Army (IA) into the NCW paradigm. The Indian Army has over a period evolved doctrine for integrating various components of C4I2 (command, control, communication, computers, information and intelligence) together with a Information Warfare (IW) doctrine, given the growing nature of threat in the neighbourhood. However since these two components on their own do not create NCW transformational thinking, particularly in the absence of integrated doctrines and inter-service synergy, it is now in the process of developing a comprehensive net centric warfare doctrine, that aims to close the loop between sensors that pick up information, decision-makers and shooting platform that aim to reduce what is generally called ‘sensor to shooter’ time in other words much speedier engagements and enhancement of tempo of operations.
The fulcrum of net-centricity being developed by the Indian Army is actually what can be called the Tac C3I System (Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information System). Under the overall rubric of Tac C3I, sub-systems like the CIDSS (Command Information Decision Support System), ACCCS (Artillery Command, Control & Communication System), BSS (Battlefield Surveillance System), ADC&RS (Air Defence Control & Reporting System), BMS (Battlefield Management System) are in various stages of development and implementation.
Whereas the development of the TacC3I is well under way and sub- systems are being tested and fielded under test bed conditions in various formations of the Army, frequent hiccups do occur owing to perception differences, lack of conceptual and technological understanding. As former Director General Systems, Lt Gen PC Katoch (Retd) highlights in a recent article in the Army Day Issue of Force “we need to learn from the Chinese model, where systematic institutionalised technological training is mandatory before General Officers get posted to certain specific appointments”.
The Indian Army is following what can be termed as the bottom up approach for developing NCW capability, rather than an evolutionary model adopted by both the Americans and more recently the Chinese. There are two important reasons for this. In the absence of integrated and synergistic oversight that could only happen if there is a Chief of Defence Staff or Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee there is little tri-service integration with each service evolving their own path with a working perspective of their eventual integration. Lack of top down evolutionary approach has serious ramifications, Lt Gen Katoch argues in the above quoted article giving example of DCN (Defence Communications Network); “while this is being developed, virtually nothing is happening on how to achieve the Services hand-shake that would ride the DCN”.
A vital requirement in a networked system is not only interoperability of the system under development but also facilitation of information sharing among systems that were not originally designed to talk to each other. For inter-Services interoperability, there is requirement of a comprehensive and well documented tri-service model which forms the basis for reference at the conceptual and development stage. Finalisation and adoption of standards and protocols, mutually compatible database structures, development/deployment of interfaces between systems using disparate platforms and commonality of hardware are challenges which need to be overcome. Harmonising standards and protocols for the three Services is a gigantic task.
Despite the above systemic problems, the Army is closely looking at various software components of the stem which are vital to its functional efficacy which include; policy on data handling and data storage, policy and responsibly for cyber security together with plans to set up Army Information Assurance Agency under the Director General Systems. Areas where the Army has yet to draft credible policy perspectives include; policy on simulation and war-gaming, enunciation of bandwidth requirements in sync with increasing net-centricity. Understandably these shortcomings and at times turf battles have resulted in inordinate delay in developing the Tactical Communications System (TCS).
Another important component of the Indian Army’s transformational perspective is developing capacities for “cyber warfare”. It is a potent instrument of war with means to weaken enemy capabilities even before battle is joined. Security of information and assets is vital to a military where networked infrastructure involves country-wide WANs and numerous smaller networks in a network of networks concept. The endeavour to prevent an attack or contain it and effect swift recovery is important aspects of cyber warfare. Malware penetrating the systems or embedded at manufacturing stage can be disastrous in military networks. Hence there is a requirement of foolproof mechanisms to check our system for malware, particularly so as all computer parts and some software are imported including mostly from a country notorious for its “botnets”. The US military concerned by repeated Chinese hacking and venomous attacks is raising a Cyber Command, it may be prudent for India to create a similar organisation and make cyber supremacy an essential component of our war doctrine.
(Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd), PhD, is Consultant, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi)
Courtsey: The Indian Express, 15 January 2010
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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