Should the Army Fight Red Terror?

Left Wing Extremism (LWE) has been described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his government as ‘the greatest internal security threat faced by India’. While addressing the Chief Ministers conference on internal security In December 2009, the Prime Minister while stressing that the notion of a red corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh is exaggerated admitted that Naxal groups have succeeded in enlarging their base. The Home Minister Mr. Chidambaram in a candid observation stated in the Rajya Sabha on July 15, 2009…’for many years we did not assess the Left Wing Extremism challenge correctly. I think we underestimated the challenge and in the meanwhile they (Naxalites) extended their influence’.

Over the last five years, India has witnessed over 7000 incidents of Naxal violence in which about 3500 people have been killed. This translates into a staggering average of five incidents and two persons losing their lives every day in Naxal inspired violence. A cause of even greater concern is the fact that the Naxal movement is gaining momentum and has spread to both urban and rural areas, ranging across 160 districts of India. The Prime Minister has vowed ‘to cripple Naxalite forces with all the means at our command’ and added that ‘…we cannot rest in peace till we have eliminated this virus’.  Obviously such a commitment on the part of the Government raises the possibility of using the armed forces to restore the writ of the government in the Naxal infested region. But would such a step be advisable?

The armed forces in all probability would express their reservations if asked to combat LWE. Along with their current commitments in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East, getting involved here would take up a large number of troops which the Army certainly would like to avoid, considering the need to also maintain a reasonable deterrent on both our Western and Eastern borders. While the border with China is peaceful as of now, Chinese statements and claims on large parts of Indian territory need to be watched with circumspection and own areas guarded with the requisite degree of force. With respect to the Western border, while the current situation in Pakistan precludes a conventional military threat from that direction, it throws up a set of new and different challenges for the armed forces which have grave implications for the nation’s security.

Committing the army to combat LWE would also impact on the Army’s turnover system between its field and peace units to enable adequate rest and recuperation time in between being employed in counter insurgency tasks. But more importantly, unlike the situation prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East, the Naxal issue is deeply rooted in the social and economic disparities in the remote and tribal areas. The issue here is not one of secession but of attempting to obtain a more just and equitable social order. The CPI (Maoist), which is seen as the most active and strident front of Naxalism in the country aims to exploit the schisms thus created in society and capture state power through the barrel of a gun much as Mao Zedong did in China in 1949. According to their operating philosophy, ‘The central task of the revolution is seizure of political power through protracted People’s War’. To that end, Naxalites typically operate in the vacuum created by functional inadequacy of field level governance structures, espouse local demands, and take advantage of prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among the under privileged and remote segments of population.

Employing the army in such an environment may perhaps further aggravate the problem rather than lead to conflict resolution. Sometimes, using force becomes counter-productive and enhances any movement. What is required is a development led approach coupled with an effective justice delivery system to counter the appeal of the Naxal movement. We need to discriminate between
Naxalism- The idea and Naxalite- The foot soldier who has been led to the movement due to failure of governance. History has shown us that you can kill people but you can never kill ideas. For ideas live on, evolving, spreading, and taking root in new minds and bodies. Naxalism is one such idea… and it has to be defeated by throwing up to the people an alternate idea, encompassing a holistic development model where the rights and interests of the poorest and weakest elements of society are protected by the state.

In the final analysis, if the situation becomes critical for the Indian state, there may be no option but to use the armed Forces to restore the writ of the Government. But as of now, such a situation does not prevail. As the Defence Minister Mr. AK Antony has stated, ‘The army is the last resort in internal security measures and the government does not intend to use it against Maoist activities.’ Hopefully the need will never arise.

Courtsey: The Indian Express, 15 January 2010

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).