The Road to Reforms

Indian military is fourth largest in the world. It is known for its professionalism and has earned reputation that delivers as and when called for. However, are the Services structurally, financially, technologically and doctrinally sufficient enough to counter increasing security challenges, especially of the future? It is not. Reforms in the military sector, therefore, are imperative for India to leap from a regional to a leading global power; they are also vital to achieve the primary objective of securing the country from external and internal adversaries, who are increasing in numbers and intensity.

Structurally, Indian military has not adapted to the rapid changes. 21st century conflicts, which have now entered into Fifth Generation, demand integrated approach and interoperability. Indian military, however, is far from this. What is required is a Theatre Command System to achieve synergy in planning and operations. The System should also include new domains of conflict - Space and Cyberspace. Jointmanship is desired, but unfortunately not pursued with diligence. For this, the Services have to shed their “lone ranger” syndrome and turf driven differences. Institution of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) should be in a position to take care of, apart from interoperability, doctrinal development, budgeting, acquisitions, strategic assessment, force modernisation, and capacity building. It will also enable real time information sharing and speedy decision making on crucial defence matters. At the same time, each Service can look after its overall maintenance, logistics, recruitment and training. By this, identity and ethos of each arm is not compromised.

There need not be any fear of usurpation of political power by the military if combined under CDS. Indian military has always remained apolitical and will remain so. Presently, Indian military looks like an ‘attachment’ rather than part and parcel of the government. The Services are just consulted, but not co-opted in the decision making, especially on national security issues. Compared to their counterparts in other countries, they have, by and large, remained outside the policy formulation loop. A CDS could bridge this gap by being a single-point advisor to the government on all matters concerning defence.

Financially, there are two issues that require attention for reforms: allocation of resources and management of those resources. In recent decades, defence spending has not crossed 2.5 percent of the GDP when India’s adversaries have been allocating double that figure. The gap between needs assessed by the military and the final allocation has always been large. Unless this is bridged, Indian military cannot make strides.

Demarcated funds for defence do not get used fully, year after year. This is essentially a result of too much rigidity in the procurement procedures. It is, therefore, important to evolve a rapid but transparent decision-making system of procurement. A short-term 3-5 year procurement plan is appreciable. Such a plan should take into account needs matching threats and clearly prioritise procurements. It should also encourage domestic defence industry and in turn gradually scale down import dependence. Carry forward of unspent funds will discourage hasty spending at the last minute. There has to be a modernization strategy to guide overall spending. Procurement procedures could be more transparent. Without proper management mere increase of resources is futile. In defence acquisitions, the final and neutral arbiter should be a CDS and not Defence Secretary. The former will also take care of laying down inter-Service priorities of acquisitions in a most cost-effective manner.

Reforms also are required in doctrines and training methodologies of our forces. Appreciably, every Service has a doctrine. However, there is no single national defence doctrine. Our military doctrines require revisit ever 3-5 years. They should be flexible and capable enough to take care of unforeseen circumstances and threats. Institutions of higher learning exclusively dedicated to defence should be established. Proposed National Defence University, in this regard, has taken far too long to come up.

Technologically, Indian military has not kept pace with faster developments in the field. Our armed forces are in desperate need of modern equipment and increased firepower to meet existing and future challenges. The first rate military cannot afford to have second rate equipment with poor fire power. Technological prowess is important to project power over long distances and to fight wars in all six dimensions – space, cyber, air, land, sea and sub-surface. The DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) should work closely with the Services in assessing the exact needs of the latter. This should in fact be systematized. At the macro level, to encourage more private sector participation in defence production, the government should increase present FDI cap.

For these reforms to fructify, each organ of the military, bureaucracy and political leadership have to shed conservatism and parochialism and work towards a common objective – safeguarding the national security. One should not wait for a debacle to initiate the reforms process. The ‘strategic moment’ has already arrived to witness a transformed Indian military.

Courtsey: The Indian Express, 15 January 2010

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).