American drones and the Domino Effect

In the ongoing war against terrorism being waged on Pakistan’s western border, the relationship between cause and effect has started impacting the course of events. On 23 June, the funeral of a Pakistani Taliban commander, Khwaz Wali, in South Waziristan came under fire from US drones in the hope of nailing the Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. Instead, up to 70 people, mostly non-combatants were killed and scores injured. There was no prominent militant commander among those killed in the missile strikes. Most were aged tribesman and children. According to tribal journalist, Nur Behram, who visited the Lattaka village, where the funeral prayer was attacked, “the villagers were critical of the Pakistan government for allowing the US to target their funeral prayers, where neither militant commanders were present nor the funeral was being offered at any training centre”.

The Americans blithely use the term ‘collateral damage’, when pursuing operational objectives in third world countries and have no compunction in targeting civilians if their intelligence inputs indicate some sort of terrorist presence in the target area. They would, however, be loathe to use similar tactics in their own homeland. For instance, if terrorists were holed up in a building with a score or more of hostages in New York, the American police would not bomb the building in the hope of killing a top terrorist, especially if that action would result in civilian casualties. The rules of engagement are apparently different when battling away from their homeland! While American action in the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets is inexcusable, Pakistan’s acquiescence in the matter is a matter of national shame. It is not for us to advise the security forces in Pakistan how to conduct their counter terrorism campaign. However, the indiscriminate use of drones has set off a domino effect which will seriously affect ground operations.

The military campaign in South Waziristan, called ‘Rah-e Nijaat’ (Path to Salvation), appears to be a more calibrated strategy than that employed in the past. Militarily, the Army aims to minimise its vulnerabilities in a challenging theatre of combat through a ‘softening up’ process before ground troops move in.  This involves targeting of leaders of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), blocking entry and exit routes to the area and subjecting the TTP cadre to aerial and artillery bombardment. Politically, there has been an effort to isolate Baitullah Mehsud from other militant groups in the area. However, the fallout of the drone attacks has changed the script to a large extent.

Pakistan’s efforts to set up Qari Zainuddin, a key tribal rival of Baitullah Mehsud as a challenger suffered a setback when the former drew first blood and had him assassinated. But of more serious significance is the incident in North Waziristan where the peace deal struck by the Government with the tribal leaders has been unhinged as a consequence of US drone attacks. On 28 June, as many as 150 militants linked to Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur ambushed a military convoy in Madakhel area of North Waziristan Agency killing 20 soldiers and injuring 35. Among the dead was a colonel, a major and a captain. To add insult to injury, the Taliban made off with vehicles, weapons and equipment from the slain soldiers. Gul Bahadur was supposedly an ally of the government and had signed a peace accord on 17 February 2008, but has turned away from the government after the drone attack. This is the first of the domino effects.

The Army high command is now caught in a bind. The military cannot ignore the deadly ambush on the 250-member convoy in which a significant number of soldiers were killed and injured. Such attacks could demoralise the troops if punitive measures aren’t undertaken. However, opening a new front when the armed forces are fighting on a number of fronts including Swat, Buner, Dir Lower, Bajaur, Mohmand, Darra Adamkhel, Orakzai and South Waziristan would over-stretch the military and confuse its priorities.

In another incident following the drone attacks,  two soldiers were killed and three others injured in the first-ever suicide attack on security forces in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, (POK) when a suicide bomber ripped through an Army vehicle near Shaukat Lines, Muzaffarabad on 26 June 2008. This is the second of the domino effects.

Till now, POK had not been caught up in the bitter war between militants and the military being fought in Pakistan. The attack on an army vehicle has dangerous implications for Pakistan as POK has a sizeable military presence, given its disputed status with India. The potential for further attacks is immense and to that extent the security paradigm in POK will undergo a radical change with a larger number of troops being sucked in for internal security duties. Such a development could also bring extremist forces still based in Kashmir into the conflict and thus make for a headier cocktail. The expansion of the war is something Pakistan must avoid at all costs but a continuation of drone attacks on the hapless citizens of NWFP and FATA is likely to further exacerbate the situation.

On a wider canvas, the indiscriminate use of drones has in a sense brought together the warring militant groups in NWFP and FATA, who have come out to defend their turf against the military action by Pakistan and US forces. This is the third of the domino effects.

This will further compound problems of the Pakistan military in their ongoing operations against terrorism and will keep the focus of the world very firmly on North Western Pakistan and Afghanistan, relegating the Kashmir issue in importance. Shifting the focus away from Kashmir is detrimental to the Pakistan military establishment whose very raison d’être is dependent on keeping the Kashmir issue alive. We can thus expect to see an escalation of violence in Jammu and Kashmir, fanned and aided by Pakistan, albeit in a covert manner. To some extent, we are witnessing the same in the civil unrest currently underway in the Kashmir Valley following the alleged rape and killing of two girls in Shopian. The situation would require firm but delicate handling. Outside J&K, the Pakistan security establishment would be loathe to encourage incidents such as the Mumbai massacre, but the possibility of such incidents occurring and being supported by rogue elements within the Pakistan ISI and military establishment cannot be ruled out.

An indirect result of the drone attacks could give a fillip to the long term insurgency in Baluchistan, as a consequence of the escalating conflict in NWFP and FATA. Many in the Pakistani establishment view the violence in Baluchistan as a creation of India’s R&AW, operating from our consulates in Afghanistan. While this perception needs to be corrected, we can expect Pakistan to continue putting pressure on the USA to reduce India’s role in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Any escalation in violence in Baluchistan will be attributed to Indian intelligence agencies regardless of the fact that the state has systematically eliminated many Baluch leaders in what can at best be described as cold blooded murder.

It would also not be out of order to mention here that tens of thousands of displaced Uyghur’s have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi. Uyghur’s have been displaced from Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10 per cent in 1949 to 41 per cent in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uyghur’s has declined from 90 per cent in 1949 to 47 per cent in 2004. Tension has surfaced earlier over the issue of Chinese Uyghur separatists receiving sanctuary and training on Pakistani territory and the kidnapping and killing of Chinese personnel by fundamentalists. Could the recent unrest in Urumqi be a creation of the Taliban as perhaps another response to the drone attacks to create friction between Pakistan and its closest ally China? The possibility is not as far fetched as it seems.

Even after two months of combat, the Pakistan army is still embroiled in Swat. We can but imagine what the going will be like when the war spreads in earnest to North and South Waziristan. Over a hundred years earlier, Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India, stated, “No patchwork scheme will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steamroller has passed over the country from end to end will there be peace. But I don't want to be the person to start that machine.” A century down the line, the Pakistan military machine has started rolling and we can but await the final outcome. In the meantime, India must continue to be very sensitive to the situation developing in J&K and ensure that the militants and their sympathisers do not derail the present popularly elected Government. India must also ensure a strong presence in Afghanistan, regardless of Pakistani protestations to the contrary.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).