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Pakistan Army’s counter-militancy strategy has remained largely an enigma. For the past many years the Army has been reluctant to engage in classic counter-insurgency operations despite the spread of rebellion across vast tracts of territory in the Frontier and Tribal areas, Balochistan and spill over of terrorism in Punjab. The recent military operation launched by the Army in South Waziristan, Swat, Buner and Dir – has once again focused attention on Pakistan’s approach to counter-militancy. Thus a review of the same would be relevant.
There are two main components of Pakistan’s counter-militancy strategy, the military and the political. The military approach comprises of three main strands – kinetic operations, targeting leadership and inducing local lashkars to take on the Taliban. The Army uses high intensity kinetic operations for search and destroy missions as seen in Swat using fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy artillery and ground troops to target militant strong points, hideouts, ammunition and logistics dumps and command and control centres. The aim is to destroy the physical infrastructure of militancy and reclaim territory. This invariably generates stream of refugees running into millions, while the rebels manage to get away.
The Army has also professed targeting Taliban leaders as a part of its strategy. Thus huge rewards have been announced for the likes of Behtullah Mehsud and presumably intelligence operations have been launched to locate him and then strike with fighter aircraft and armed helicopters. Given that these leaders have a ring of loyal followers surrounding them and move their location almost every night, killing them would be a chance operation. For instance it is said that Mehsud has a large force under his command with unlimited funds. “Baitullah Mehsud is the top man in his own tribe... he must have around 15,000 to 20,000 hardcore elements or armed men under him,” Brigadier Mehmood Shah, a political analyst with experience of security in tribal areas was quoted by the Dawn.
The use of lashkars or tribal inimical to the Taliban is another arm of the strategy where local resentment against extremists has been used to advantage to nudge them into a confrontation. A number of such clashes were engineered in Upper Dir with some success but without any long term impact on the militancy.
On re-establishing control, the Army hands over such areas to the Frontier Corps or its poorer cousin, the Frontier Constabulary who lack arms, training, equipment and motivation to fight jihadi militancy with its emphasis on martyrdom. Thus invariably the Taliban reoccupy their old positions and target civilians who have acted against their interests, publicly beheading or assassinating them.
The Pakistan Army’s reluctance to put boots on the ground remains its greatest failing. Its refusal to directly engage with the citizens caught in the cleft of the Taliban and the military has resulted in thousands of refugees. In Fourth Generation warfare, the people and society are the centres of gravity, and by refusing to recognise this central facet, the Army’s approach has remained kinetic and will possibly continue to be so. Thus the Army’s military strategy is simple but results in complex outcomes.
On the other hand its political strategy is well manicured but also results in even more unpredictable consequences. This was evident in the Razmak Cadet College kidnapping incident recently. By placing its faith in the North Waziristan Taliban leader Gul Bahadur’s men to escort the Razmak cadets, lives of many were put at peril. The ransom at which the cadets were released is not clear but the Taliban would have certainly extracted many concessions. Yet the Army is perhaps willing to humour such groups regarded as “strategic assets” as long as they restrict their activities towards forces inimical to Pakistani interests. The Army does not seem to realise that this seriously undermines Pakistan’s role as an ally in any joint counter-militancy campaign with other countries.
The structure of governance in Pakistan’s tribal areas with the political agent, the Frontier Corps, the Army, the intelligence agency, tribal leadership and the Taliban is also manipulated to advantage through making peace deals and political contracts to relieve pressure whenever the Army finds itself in a corner. In May tribal leaders and some Muslim religious leaders engaged Baitullah Mehsud in peace talks when the Army launched operations in Swat, while President Asif Ali Zardari announced that the next objective was Waziristan. This ensured that Mehsud did not provide any support to Maulana Fazlullah in the North.
The Army also manipulates the Taliban and tribal leaders by splitting them from time to time. Thus the three main Taliban groupings in North and South Waziristan led by Behtullah Mehsud, Maulvi-Nazir of Wana and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan were successfully separated for some time, thereby avoiding a joint confrontation. But this remains a dubious approach for lately Gul Bahadur has annulled his agreement with the Army. He ambushed a convoy on 28 June, killing four soldiers. The Taliban is also quick in retribution on turncoats such as Qari Zainuddin who publicly denounced Baitullah and his violent tactics. Zainuddin was assassinated by his own guard on his way from Peshawar to Dera Ismail Khan.
Lack of surprise is another failing as announcement of operations were made in Swat as well as Waziristan much before these were actually launched. There are also doubts as to the number of Taliban killed and alleged inclusion of a large number of civilians in these numbers. Ultimately the Pakistan Army would have to come clean before these incidents are used by the Taliban as alternate means for propaganda.
From the above analysis it would be evident that the Army continues to remain ambivalent towards the role of the Taliban frequently mixing the “good” and the “bad” to tactical advantage. There is reluctance to put boots on the ground, establish a counter- insurgency grid and facilitate development and governance. Employment of kinetic operations is the attendant fallout of displacement. Grassroots political activity is substituted by manipulation and narrow parochial institutional interests undermine the larger good of the people as well as the state.
All this does not augur well for success of the counter-militancy campaign and denotes why the Pakistan Army has been successively failing in FATA since 2001. The people and not the Taliban have to be centre of gravity as the Americans have recognised most recently in Afghanistan. If Pakistan wants to reclaim sovereignty over tribal areas, reviewing the current strategy would be necessary else there is the omnipresent danger of, ‘Balkanisation’, for with each air strike the divide between the Pashtoon and the Punjabi is going to be widened.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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