Taliban�s Strategic Signaling On India: An Interpretation

Interpreting strategic communication by Non State Actors as Taliban is a challenge. Given absence of regular contacts with such groups, translating their message into tangible policy particularly in such complex scenarios as Afghanistan is fraught with danger of over simplification missing opportunities for targeting the core political objectives for dissent. More over given extensive use of propaganda, statements by rebel groups defy linear logic of state on state discourse with which security analysts are familiar. However Non State Actors may be tactically fuzzy but are strategically rational and thus tend to give multiple messages in a single communication. Correct understanding of these signals may provide explicit policy choices. In the light of the above premise an interpretation of Taliban’s statement welcoming India’s autonomous Afghan policy posted on their website www.shahamat-english.com is attempted herein.

From the Indian perspective, one reading could be to identify this as a straw in the wind, as a statement by a maverick soft leader without support of the Majlis at large. This could well be true particularly given that not many hardliners are likely to have access to English web site of the rebels, thus possibility of some stray elements making these remarks and getting away without internal scrutiny cannot be ruled out. Another could be a strategic trap to lure more Indian commitment in Afghanistan. However a deeper reading of the article appearing in the Weekly Analysis section of the web site would provide a nuanced understanding of shift in at least a small group amongst the leadership. This can be harnessed in the future in India’s interest as also for peace and stability in Afghanistan, thus a broader perspective is necessary. 

The first conclusion that can be drawn is acceptance of India as an important player on the Afghan chess board, “No doubt that India is a significant country in the region,” says the web post. While the Karzai government had acknowledged the same signing the first strategic cooperation agreement with India which had surprised many, now the Taliban also seems to have recognized the economic and political clout enjoyed by New Delhi and long term benefits that could accrue despite apprehensions of what its patrons in Rawalpindi’s military and intelligence establishment may feel. The sage policy of spreading development across the country including in Kandahar, Taliban’s heartland has perhaps paid rich dividends. How far this confidence will be publicly sustained by the rebels given the likely chiding that it will receive from the Pakistani establishment remains to be seen?

Secondly the Taliban has made a distinction between the United States, seen by it as the main adversary and India despite proximate relationship developing between New Delhi and Washington. In this there is a far more sophisticated reading of Indo US relations by the Taliban than perhaps seen in other quarters with an innate understanding that New Delhi is pursuing its interests on multiple fronts without putting all eggs in the US basket. The independent policy line undertaken by India on Iran apart from other issues may have led the foreign policy, “establishment,” of the rebels to come to this conclusion. While this could also be seen as a move to create a wedge between India and the US at the tactical level, strategically the Taliban is possibly welcoming autonomous Indian policy on Afghanistan.

Thirdly the signal clearly goes to Pakistan, that it no longer can enforce an anti India dictat in Afghanistan which was the lynchpin of its policy hitherto fore. While this is not to say that this will reduce Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, but the rebels and the government in Kabul will be able to exercise greater choice. More over subtle implication of rejection of Pakistan’s truck with the US post 9/11 despite many fault lines which have been exacerbated recently would not be lost on the perceptive observer. The line, “It is totally illogical they should plunge their nation (India) into a calamity just for the American pleasure,” may be a hint to the Pakistani leadership of the fallacy of its policy.  There would be certainly some signals to assuage Pakistani ire over this shift in the days ahead but the larger message of a tilt towards India will remain clear.

Fourthly to the Afghan government, acceptability of partnership with India is a clear indicator that Mr Karzai would be more than happy with. This would certainly spur Kabul to sustain engagement with New Delhi and overcome some of the apprehensions. How the leadership of the National Front comprising of former members of the Northern Alliance with which India had a good understanding during the heyday of the Taliban in Afghanistan remains to be seen.

Fifthly and most importantly to varied groups within the Taliban fold this would be a strong signal of India’s acceptability, based on resistance to engagement with the United States  and commitment to grass roots development in the country. This is an important track for there are strong anti India elements within the Taliban such as the Haqqani Shura and the Mullah Dadullah Front, which are unlikely to accept the release as a dictat to go slow on anti India activities, never the less this should set off a debate of sorts in the top layer on acceptance of New Delhi’s role in a future Afghanistan.

India will no doubt like to see a follow up of the positive analysis on the ground in the form of greater safety and security of hundreds of Indian civilian workers and managers toiling to rebuild Afghanistan. Manifestation of differences on the pro India statement may in fact place the lives of some of these in danger for the Haqqani faction could well target Indians to send its own signal to rivals in the rebel camp. Thus in the near term lowering of guard may not be the answer. On the other hand the strategic trap theory is likely to remain a serious concern in New Delhi given past legacy. However by creatively working on positive vibes emanating from howsoever small a section of Taliban, a larger pro India lobby amongst the rebels in Afghanistan can emerge in the years ahead. 

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi

Views expressed are personal