Indo-Pak CBMs: Challenge of Multiple Intersections

India-Pakistan relations have moved on a positive trajectory in 2011. Starting with the Mohali spirit epitomized in the classic clash of regional titans in World Cup One Day Cricket semi final in March this extended to the Male SAARC summit in November. Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh’s now oft quoted remarks that his Pakistani counterpart Yusuf Raza Gillani was a, “man of peace,” epitomized the understanding established at the highest level.

Yet the final event of bilateral interaction in 2011, talks on nuclear and conventional CBMs perhaps underline the challenge of converting hope of a general understanding to concrete measures on the ground, in other words operationalising détente by establishing mechanisms acceptable to both the sides. This is not surprising given multiple intersections of conflict, structures and intent between the two countries which transcend goodwill at the level of the political leadership. A brief look at these divergences and a possible way ahead would be in order.

Indo-Pakistan CBMs need to follow three tracks, nuclear, conventional and terrorism. A sound relationship would require all three to move in tandem. The current meet was only about two, nuclear and conventional thus the third which was not discussed turned out to be a spoiler. As per media reports Pakistan’s proposal to India to pull back artillery guns from the Line of Control was rejected. It was obvious that New Delhi cannot envisage retraction of long range artillery from the Line of Control unless terrorist camps across are wound up.

Pakistan has shown no intention of doing so and statement by leaders as Fazlur Rehman on the very day that talks were being held that Pakistan should continue to support the Kashmir cause were possibly manipulated to queer the pitch. Public fulminations by the accused in Mumbai 26/11, Hafeez Saeed only add to sense of forebodings in India. Thus at best this could be a red herring by Islamabad. The fact that the talks were restricted to the first two, conventional and nuclear without taking the terrorism facet on board denote that the attendant conventional CBM was unlikely to gain traction.

In the nuclear domain, Pakistan came up with the familiar pitch for a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR). Without a proclaimed nuclear doctrine, evolving such a regime was possibly felt puerile by the Indian side which has also been highlighted to Islamabad from time to time. Thus unless restraint is defined by both sides, there is unlikely to be any progress on this issue. While India defines restraint through No First Use (NFU) and credible deterrence there is some dissonance with use of terms as massive retaliation and ambiguity on whether the response will be based purely on nuclear or also a possible biological or chemical strike.

In Pakistan’s case without a declared doctrine, we are forced to rely on personal statements by long standing nuclear satraps as retired Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai. It is common belief that till Kidwai remains in the nuclear loop there is hope for a rational approach which is all the more reason for institutionalizing the same through a doctrine. Given current civil military relations in the country which will remain strained until there is a change either in the political or military personalities involved evolution of such a doctrine is assumed unlikely. This situation is may prevail in the short to medium term thus the SRR may not fructify very soon.

The structural divergence in addressing the three issues is evident with dialogues being led by different sections of the diplomatic establishment on both sides. These are no doubt exploratory talks attempting to establish boundaries so that tractable issues can be taken up at the higher level, but the base line remains flawed. For instance while from the Indian side the Pakistan desk could be keen to push negotiations given Islamabad’s intransigent approach at the Conference on Disarmament on FMCT and CTBT, the disarmament head would naturally have a different agenda. Since there is only a director level official who mans the counter terrorism desk in South Block, this important facet in the CBM process may have got the short shrift.

On the Pakistan side while it is commonly believed that the military calls shots, given preoccupation with the Memogate case wherein both Chief of the Army Staff General Kiyani and the Inter Services Intelligence chief Shuja Pasha were actively engaged in responding to the Supreme Court and the Salalah incident of fratricide leading to a breach in relations with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the priority given to these talks is questionable.

Then Indo-Pakistan CBMs cannot be delinked from the China factor. Despite the stability in the nuclear dimension between India and China capability accretion will have to continue, thus restraint cannot be compartmentalized. On the other hand presence of Chinese uniformed personnel be it People’s Liberation Army or otherwise in Gilgit and Baltistan areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir under any garb is not conducive to confidence building between all the three, India, Pakistan and China.

This brings us to the issue of intent, both sides seem to suspect each other’s motive and there are sufficient grounds for the same as has been highlighted in the preceding paragraphs. Thus it was not surprising that Indo Pak CBM negotiations were restricted to reiteration of issues that have been already agreed upon between the two countries and were thankfully extended, notification on testing of ballistic missiles and avoidance of nuclear accidents.

For the CBMs to achieve tangible gains, there would be a need to address the fundamental issue of doctrinal convergence on all three fronts, nuclear, conventional and terrorism, this would overcome other challenges thereby paving the way for more meaningful results being achieved to meet the aspirations of leadership and people on both the sides.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi

Views expressed are personal