The Philosophy of Air Power: Think Doctrine, not Hardware

Most democracies periodically undertake Strategic Defence Reviews or issue defence White Papers which clearly highlight national interests, identify vital goals and objectives, and undertake an appraisal of the security environment. A deliberate exercise of this nature serves two purposes. It sensitizes the tax-payer to national security issues and takes him into confidence about how defence allocations are likely to be spent.

It also helps visualize the kind of armed forces the country needs, and pin points the specific capabilities they must field. India, for all its fiscal constraintsand competing demands on scarce resources, is one of the few countries which neither undertakes such introspection, nor generates security doctrines. In the absence of an effective higher defence organization, Parliament dispenses funds to inefficient staff-structures which spend them thoughtlessly without enhancing our combat-effectiveness.

Linking the defence budget to national aims, a security doctrine and the acquisition of mission-oriented capabilities will not only ensure cost-effective public expenditure and enhance combat readiness, but will also reassure the military as well as citizenry. However, the itinerant MoD bureaucracy has neither the expertise nor the time or inclination to call for professional studies regarding national security issues. Therefore no critical examination of the continuing relevance of many weapon-systems stridently demanded by the Services, or the cost-benefit analysis between competing options is ever undertaken. Therefore all wish-lists from the Services become sacrosanct and, eventually, receive MoD approval. In such a scenario air power offers an interesting case-study; not only because it cuts across Service boundaries, but is also the most costly security investment.

The past hundred years have seen air power becoming progressively more lethal, pervasive and omnipotent. Almost any target, anywhere, once detected and identified, can bedestroyed from the air, with precision munitions. The dominant role played bythe Allied air-offensive in Operation Desert Storm led to a quantum leap in the perceived effectiveness of air power. It is against this backdrop that western military analysts and policy makers have been evolving arguments about apportioning operational roles and budget shares among the armed forces at a time of uncertain challenges & severe fiscal constraints.

Air power has been the cause of fierce controversies and debates over resources, roles and missions as well as institutional boundaries, ever since the first decade of the last century. The question before us is this: should we blindly adopt the western definitions of air power along with their paradigms and philosophies for its employment? Or does India’s unique strategic environment and past experience call for a fresh discourse, and the evolution of an India-specific approach to air power?

The idea of strategic bombing, as a self-contained strategy, arose from the mindless slaughter witnessed on the battlefields of World War I. It took root due, mainly, to the efforts of two individuals, Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard in Britain and Brigadier Guilio Douhet in Italy. Trenchard believed that strategic, bombing could work in two ways; directly by severely disrupting the enemy’s production, transportation and organization; and indirectly by destroying morale of the populace. Due largely to the endeavours of Trenchard and Douhet, as WW II approached, the idea of strategic bombing as a means of destroying enemy industrial potential and breaking civilian morale became firmly entrenched in the military mind.

Notwithstanding thefact that such theories failed to deliver their promised rewards during WW II,the idea that strategic bombing, alone, was the path to victory has endured inmodern warfare. A continued belief in the decisiveness of strategic bombing wasthe hallmark of the US Air Force approach to both the Korean and Vietnam Wars with huge aircraft losses, and uncertain results.

In the post-Cold War era, a number of military interventions by western powers have given airpower a new aura and profile. Discussions regarding air power have become increasingly complex and confusing due to continuing technological transformation, as well as changes in the strategic environment. New terminology like “strategic paralysis”, “shock and awe” and “air dominance” has come to be associated with the aggressive and imaginative deployment of airpower.

We seem to have come full circle; and an emerging dogma today echoes Douhet’s 90-year old prophesies. It says that air power, by itself, making use of strategic bombing and counter-air operations can be the primary means of achieving political and military objectives. Once air-dominance has been achieved the war is virtually won and, therefore, in this paradigm close support of surface forces receives low priority. Modern air power, it is now increasingly being said, may have rendered heavy ground forces obsolete, and quick military victories can be won from the air at little or no cost in lives.

However, in the midst of all this euphoria there are two aspects generally down played or ignored. Firstly; all the recent conflicts involving the US, NATO and Israeli air forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon and now Libya; have been asymmetric. They have involved, on one hand, forces which had the full benefits  of advanced technology; and on the other hand, adversaries whose weaponry and tactics were outdated, and who were so lacking in motivation that they failed to get airborne, even when they possessed air forces. More importantly; in none of these conflicts has victory been swift, decisive or cheap.

To quote British MPGeorge Galloway from an article written on the eve of US withdrawal from Iraq:“With shock and awe the Empire soon dominated the skies over Iraq. But the Americans never controlled a single street in the country.”

India, on the other hand, is faced with well equipped, motivated and technologically competent adversaries. The PAF, although numerically inferior, is fast catching up ontechnology, with China’s help, and can match the IAF in combat skills. The PLAAF vastly outnumbers the IAF and has the advantage of indigenously developed advanced technology. In our calculus, therefore, we cannot afford to bank uponthe advantage of asymmetry in numbers, skills, motivation and technology thathas led US and NATO air forces to claim easy victories.

At the same time,all three Services, whether they seek to place “boots on the ground”, attain “sea control” or “air dominance” must be prepared face the brunt of sophisticated enemy air power. It is said that one of the lessons that emerged from 20th century conflicts was, that wars are won and lost neither at sea by navies, nor in the air by air forces, but on the ground by armies. We need to contemplate on the validity of this thesis.

Air power has, unquestionably, become intrinsic to every form of military operations; on land,at sea or in the air. A big complication in this context is the description ofair power as “indivisible”. While “indivisibility of air power” may be a good hypothetical construct, the question that begs an answer is this; how is air power to be deployed or shared to fulfil the vital operational needs of the army, navy and air force?

The British Air Doctrine, acknowledging that a precise definition is difficult, describes airpower as: “The ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events…” adding that “…air power is inherently joint and drawn from all three Services.” If that is so, should we, in India, be surprised that the ability to project power from the air is eagerly sought by all three Services.

The Indian Army has often stated its ambition to make aviation “an integral resource to provide means of aerial combat fire-power, air assault and combat support…” This thorny issue has not only been discussed in South Block files for many years, but often crops up in the media. The Indian Navy’s (IN) half-century long struggle to establish self-reliance in tactical air power at sea has clearly shown that a single aircraft-carrier (or even two) cannot be everywhere all the time, and shore-based air support will certainly be required by naval forces from time to time.

Recognition and acceptance of the fact that tactical air support plays a vital role in the operations of all three Services is a necessary first step toward a proper understanding of air power’s changing role in future warfare. However, pre-conceived mindsets are an impediment, and a number of questions hang in the air. Should attainment of air dominance be an end in itself which replaces military and maritime strategies? Or should air power be seen as merely a powerful instrumentality to gain operational objectives on land, sea and air? Or is there a via-media which can maximise the synergy and combat effectiveness of all the three Services?

For too long have we treated the demarcation of aviation roles and missions as a “holy cow” and shirked from free and frank discussion at a high enough level. Beneath the facade of inter-Service bonhomie hides this germ of discord, which no one wantsto talk about. A brief glimpse into recent history would help us acquire abetter  understanding of the reasons for this reticence.

In the 1971 war two Pakistani submarines audaciously penetrated Indian waters, undetected; revealing a major chink in our maritime defences. PNS Ghazi sailed over 5000km, in search of INS Vikrant, but sank outside Visakhapatnam harbour, while PNS Hungor lay in wait off the Gujarat coast for many days to torpedo the Indian frigate Khukri with heavy loss of life.

In the navy’s post-war analysis this lapse was, amongst other factors, attributed to ineffective maritime reconnaissance (MR) undertaken by non-naval air crew. In those days, MR assets were owned and operated by the IAF, and this triggered off a feud between the two Services for ownership of the MR role. The Government, finally, intervened and the sagacity of the two incumbent Service Chiefs finally settled this unseemly row. The MR role along with the aircraft was handed over to the navy in 1976.

Exactly a decade later, in 1986, the Indian Army took over the Air Observation Post (AOP) units from the IAF and absorbed them into the newly raised Army Aviation Corps.Therefore the IAF has seen, on two occasions, sister Services appropriating itsroles and assets. Understandably the Service is somewhat insecure about the future, and extremely wary about any further talk of changing roles.

Even after making allowances for the sensitivities of the IAF the answer lies, not in maintaining a stony silence on the issue of aviation roles & missions but, in discussing it in a professional and dispassionate manner; bi-laterally and even tri-laterally. Once they can arrive at an equitable and operationally viable formulation, the pall of suspicion that hangs over inter-Service relations will lift; with instant benefits for Jointness.

The Services must bear in mind that if they do not come to a mutually acceptable modus vivendi, for the optimal utilization, or sharing of precious air power, a bureaucratic decision may be thrust on them through political fiat. The recent offer of theRaksha Mantri to mediate in the Army-IAF dispute over tactical air power is a clear portent.

The IAF must takere assurance from the fact that it is the other two Services which need its support and not the other way round. The putative “Cold Start Doctrine” contemplated by the Indian Army is a good example. Apart from armour accompanied by self-propelled artillery for striking rapidly into enemy territory, the implementation of this doctrine would require large numbers of helicopters for mobility and the liberal availability of close air support by the IAF. Similarly, in the near future, the IN has to face the stark reality of the Chinese PLA Navy’s Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) strategy at sea. Essentially designed to counter the US Navy with a formidable ballistic and cruise-missile threat the A2AD strategy poses an equally menacing threat forthe IN.

With its force ofover 300 Sukhoi-30 and perhaps 200 MMRCAs supported by aerial tankers and AWACS the IAF is a powerful ally whose cooperation both the Indian Army and IN must actively seek. Instead of squabbling over hardware, the armed forces must rise to the doctrinal and strategic levels of thinking.

This is the time for the Indian armed forces to evolve Air-Land Battle and Air-Sea Battle Doctrines which will harness their synergy. The hardware “bun fights” might just vanish.

Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) is former Chief of Naval Staff

Courtesy: Defence Watch, January 2012