Indo-Pakistan Relations: A Reality Check

Indo Pakistan relations for want of a better phrase in the strategic lexicon can be best described as, “mushy mushy.” Like twins separated at birth the two nations continue to fight over legacy of the Indian Sub Continent stretching back to a few millennia. Thus there are intermittent periods of war, coercion, terror, diplomacy and rapprochement. The hawks on both sides would have us believe that the other will inevitably break up while liberals continue to hope for a federation of sorts howsoever unrealistic it may seem. Thus deciphering contemporary developments in Indo Pakistan engagements in the medium to short term is fraught with risks of excess. Never the less a prognostication on current developments is attempted herein.

The build up for Indo Pakistan engagement has been evident over the past year plus with trade being the key driver. Key markers in the recent past have been the so called, ‘private visit,’ of President. Asif Ali Zardari to Ajmer with a halt for lunch in New Delhi, seemingly on an invitation by the Indian Prime Minister, Dr Man Mohan Singh. Zardari’s obeisance at the Dargah of Ajmer Sharief was overdue given the crises he has gone or is going through variously referred to as Memo gate, Swiss gate and so on. So far he has emerged successfully out of the woods that the Establishment [ISI and the Army] supported by the main opposition Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML N) and a Supreme Court with whom he has had a running battle over the past five years wanted to send him. His political skills sharpened over years of fighting the Establishment have come to the fore. Gaining majority in Pakistan Senate elections in March assured Mr Zardari that he will not be impeached at least immediately giving him confidence of the trip to India and one on one with Dr Man Mohan Singh, rest being theatrics.

The second important event has been the statement attributed to a much chastened army chief General Pervez Ashraf Kiyani of intent to resolve all issues with India. The locale was Gyari at the base of Siachen glacier where large number of Pakistani soldiers had perished in an avalanche cum snow slide. That Kiyani was accompanied by the President on a joint visit to the accident side is symbolic for the Army has been hesitant in allowing interaction by Mr Zardari with the uniformed relying more on the Prime Minister Mr Yosaf Raza Gillani to fill the gap.

The trade vector has provided optimism in the near term with possibility of direct banking relations being explored and a final approval for Most Favoured Nation status to India by Islamabad by end of the year.

Underlying the events is also estranged relations between Pakistan and the United States on one hand and emerging cracks in Sino Pakistan, “all weather friendship.” In the Post 9/11 grips of authoritarian army chief and President General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan allowed disabuse of sovereignty to two contrasting forces, Taliban and their ilk including the Al Qaeda escaping from Afghanistan and United States agencies chasing these very rogues.

No efforts were made by both sides to evolve a joint strategy to counter the rebels and Pakistani security forces seemed to have turned observers in their own country until they were shaken out of somnolence by the emergence of the Tehreek e Taliban in 2009. Yet the innate challenges to the relationship resulted in a break up as a culmination of a series of events to include the Raymond Davis affair, Osama Bin Laden’s targeting by US Seals and more recent Mehran post operations by NATO which led to the death of 26 Pak soldiers.

China irked by Pakistan’s inability to control elements operating in Xinjiang has become vocal in public of late with Xinhua the official news agency indicating that groups operating from terrorist camps located in Pakistan carried out disruptive activities in the province. This may well be an attempt to externalize China’s own debility in handling Xinjiang flare up, but there are signs of tension.

An important factor forcing Pakistan on the back foot is the economy. It is the only laggard growing at sub 3 percent in South Asia in 2011 which is increasingly seen as a growth engine with countries as Bangladesh likely to hit 7 percent while post conflict Sri Lanka having already clocked 8 percent plus for the past few years. Power cuts are endemic, urban sprawls as Karachi are increasingly becoming feral hubs of commercial mafia, resource rich Balochistan sees daily mayhem of assassinations and missing persons while sectarian violence is rife spreading to Gilgit Baltistan areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir recently.

 Lacking the will to meet these challenges head on, Pakistani political and military establishment hopes to gain some dividends on the Indian front. Whether it seeks to turn this into military goodwill to tackle the emergency like situation on the internal security front in the country, which may conflagrate further in case there is an implosion in Afghanistan post 2014 is not clear so far.

Underlying the rapprochement is also a shift in Pakistan’s strategic deterrence posture vis a vis India. With increase in the number of nuclear warheads, a tactical nuclear missile Nasr, development of a cruise missile to defeat the Indian BMD shield and possible attempts to miniaturise nuclear warheads for use in heavy caliber artillery guns with swarming strikes, Pakistan has enhanced nuclear deterrence envelope to cover preemptive conventional Cold Start option for India. This in turn may reduce the constraints on proxy war for the ISI in a post 2014 melt down in Afghanistan having build up a solid core of insurance of sorts.

India must therefore seek guarantees from the Rawalpindi Establishment that the Pakistan army will not redirect Af Pak spill over to the East in addition to export of terror before the Prime Minister, “walks the talk,” to Islamabad any time in the future. For in General’s Kiyani’s own words, intents could shift overnight.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi

Views expressed are personal