Taliban Spring Offensive: An Assessment

A series of events in Afghanistan in the recent past have impacted negatively on US operations in the war torn country and eroded support amongst the American public for the ongoing conflict. The incineration of a pile of Korans in end February 2012 led to violent protests across the country leaving more than 30 people dead. The Korans, taken from a prison in Bagram Air Force Base were ostensibly confiscated as the prisoners were writing messages on them and using them for communicating with each other. Using the Koran in such manner is however tantamount to sacrilege and the US forces perhaps missed out on a good opportunity to present the terrorists as defilers. By burning the books, the security forces exhibited a lack of cultural and religious sensitivity and successfully inflicted a self goal. A few weeks later, in a macabre incident in March, a US soldier ran amok and shot 17 civilians dead, many of them women and children, in a night-time shooting spree in southern Afghanistan. This, coming soon after the burning of the Koran’s added fuel to an already inflamed public opinion making the situation in Afghanistan even more volatile. While the above can be construed as individual aberrations, it undeniably affects the image of the ISAF and provides to the Taliban increased legitimacy in their operations against the ‘foreigners’. It also raises doubts on the effectiveness and role of the US in the region. The recent coordinated attack by the Taliban all across Afghanistan has to be viewed in this context as also in the backdrop of the proposed drawdown of US Forces in 2014.

The Taliban spring offensive began on 15 April 2012, with Taliban suicide bombers and gunmen attacking Kabul, focusing on the diplomatic quarter and Afghanistan’s Parliament. The US, British, German and Iranian embassies were struck along with the Kabul Star hotel. Simultaneously, three eastern provinces, Nangarhar, Logar and Paktia were also struck indicating a very high degree of sophistication in planning and executing such a complex operation. The results achieved were however pedestrian and can in no way be construed as a game changer in the present situation in Afghanistan. When the smoke had settled a day later, life was back to normal with 39 of the attackers killed, 16 of them in Kabul alone. Considering the scale and ferocity of the attacks, the civilian casualties were minimal with 8 Afghan soldiers and five civilians killed and about 25 civilians injured. The attack however has thrown up some interesting perspectives.

The first of these pertain to the effectiveness of the Afghan Military, Afghan National Police, and National Directorate of Security (Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency). Many analysts are inclined to the view that post the drawdown of US forces in 2014, Afghanistan’s security forces will crumble in the face of determined assaults by the Taliban. This view now stands challenged considering the resoluteness with which these forces responded to the attacks. As per Western and Afghan officials, the Afghans managed the response almost entirely on their own, with Western support limited to a small number of embedded training teams and helicopter support. For the Taliban, it is vital that they keep Kabul under siege through repeated attacks to retain relevance in the state. In face of a retreating coalition army and waning international interest, the insurgents are indeed well poised to carry out such attacks in future. However, if this was the best that the Taliban could achieve then evidently the Afghan security forces can be construed by their response to having the upper hand. Even earlier, in the Najibullah regime post the Soviet withdrawal from the region, the Afghan Defence Forces had stood their ground, inflicting heavy casualties to the Mujahideen in the Battle of Jalalabad. Their resistance only crumbled when Russian military and economic assistance ceased. To prevent a similar recurrence, the maintenance of Afghanistan’s security apparatus has to be ensured. Estimated external financial assistance required to sustain the force would be in the region of 4 billion dollars annually which is a small price to pay considering the consequences and potential costs which could accrue to the West if the Taliban were to assume power.

Another aspect bandied about is that of ‘intelligence failure’. The Taliban operation had been planned for over two months and its execution involved the movement of well armed and trained groups to their designated targets. It is a fact that total surprise was achieved by the Taliban but secretive and highly centralised organisations will always achieve such levels of surprise. Their failure to do so can only take place when elements amongst the senior most leadership stand compromised. As such, too much should not be read into any perceived intelligence failure. However, the fact that the insurgents could slip into Kabul, evading several security check points with a huge stockpile of weapons and penetrate the most secure inner circle of Kabul's ring of steel – the Wazir Akbar Khan district would remain a matter of concern.

A more worrying aspect remains the role of Pakistan in the above incident.  A lone suspected attacker captured by Afghan forces reportedly confessed that Taliban assailants who waged the coordinated attacks across Afghanistan were part of a 200-member suicide squad trained in Pakistan. Afghanistan’s President also pointed fingers at the Haqqani network based in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The role of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies has not been established but their links with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network are well known. And therein lies the larger danger. Adequate indications exist that Pakistan will continue to hold on to their strategic assets to influence the intended outcome in Afghanistan. Pakistan had been sidelined in the earlier peace talks and had opted to stay away from the Bonn Conference hosted by Germany in December 2011. They are however taking part in the upcoming Chicago summit and would like to be seen as key players in the region. Pakistan’s desire to maintain its strategic assets indicates a degree of collusion between the Pakistani establishment and these groups. Within Pakistan’s security establishment, therefore, will exist a large body of people who are sympathetic to the terrorists and their agenda. Could such elements have been involved in the jail break which took place on the same day?

The Central Jail at Bannu in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was stormed by Taliban militants on the same day that the Taliban launched their offensive in Afghanistan. It would be naïve to view this as a coincidence. A total of 384 prisoners including 21 prisoners on death row escaped along with Adnan Rashid, a former junior technician of the Pakistan Air Force awarded the death sentence for an attempt to assassinate Pervez Musharraf when the latter was President. The guards inside the prison did not resist and obeyed the orders of the attackers to stand aside and police reinforcements arrived only after the attackers had withdrawn. The incident points to great levels of incompetence or certain collusion. In either case, Pakistan’s security establishment stands indicted. The larger danger then is in Pakistan, where the security establishment stands compromised.

India needs to critically review its policy and commitment to Afghanistan. Options range from military deployment to thwart the Taliban to one of non intervention. While military deployment may not be a good idea, comprehensive support for training of the ANSF through Indian training teams is doable. India must club its hard power with soft power to make its efforts and commitment more viable in spirit of the October 2011 strategic partnership signed between heads of governments of Afghanistan and India. We have a stake in stability too.

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, CLAWS

Views expressed are personal