Buy Kashmir and Bring Peace: A Proposal

This article proposes a tactic to break the deadlock in Kashmir.  It is of paramount importance that for its security, India severe the land connection between Pakistan and China. Specifically, the Karakorum Highway has been used by China to supply missile components, nuclear material, and armaments to Pakistan. In the reverse direction, I believe the Karakorum Highway has been used by Pakistan to send infiltrators to India via Tibet and Nepal who merge into sleeper cells in India. Thus, the Karakorum Highway, the Khunjerab and Kilik passes, and the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan areas should be denied access to Pakistan and China. The Azad State of J&K — 5,100 square miles — can be left out of the above concern, since it poses no special security risk as it does not share a border with China. Moreover, getting back these lands will allow India a border with Afghanistan, as well as greater access to Central Asian Republics, which is advantageous to India from security and economic perspectives.

In a security climate, where the US has been aiding the Pakistan government with money and arms to fight the Taliban, the US government has a keen interest in ensuring that there is no India-Pakistan conflagration. As usual, India always falls in line. So, the question is, does India have the stomach to address its fears and interests the military way? Also, is India’s military wherewithal lacking? The Gilgit Agency, the land connection between Pakistan and Tibet, remains an important geographical link on which the Pakistan-China strategic relationship thrives. But, how does one take back the Gilgit Agency, Baltistan, and the Khunjerab-Kilik passes without going to war?

The strategy proposed is that India ‘buy’ that area. The area proposed to be bought is Pak Occupied Kashmir (POK) less so-called Azad Kashmir (AK) (= POKLAK), which is 23,000 square miles; include 2,300 square miles of the Trans-Karakorum Tract that Pakistan transferred to China that should come back to India. Large territories have been bought in history. For instance, Russia sold Alaska to USA, where Alaska is 32 times larger than POKLAK. Alaska is 586,000 square miles; undivided J&K is 84,400 square miles, of which Pakistan took 1/3rd. Moreover, the Dogras “bought” Kashmir from the British in 1846. It thus remains to be determined what negotiated price can be agreed for POKLAK. If POKLAK can be bought back for US$45 billion over a five-year period at the inflation rate of interest, for instance, it will be an excellent deal for India, one that India can afford. Recall that India paid Rs 45 crores in 1947 to Pakistan to get Pakistan started in its development. If the inflation rate were taken as a constant average of 5 per cent per year, the annual payments to Pakistan would be US$10.39 billion; for a ten-year agreement, US$5.83 billion.

The real price of the region at individual purchase rates is not central to the issue because (a) the purchase is at bulk rate, and (b) the purchase is a negotiated political arrangement. Actual prices of land for individual sales will have to be put aside. In any case, POK is 1/3 of the total area of Jammu and Kashmir, amounting to 28,100 square miles. Now, exclude 5,100 square miles for AK, which leaves 23,000 square miles for POKLAK. Possibly eighty-percent of POKLAK is mountainous and uninhabitable, carrying little to no economic utility. This leaves agrarian, habitable, and industrial land at varying rates. (Assume mountainous, 80%; agrarian, 13%, city, 5%, industrial, 2%). In addition, Pakistan must bear at least half the cost of the dispute, since it is indubitably implicated. Allowing US$10,000 per acre for agrarian land; US$30,000 per acre for city land; US$20,000 per acre for industrial land; and zero dollars for mountainous land, the total cost to India comes to US$ 24 billion. (Apply fair factor of 50% for Pakistan’s share of the dispute). This is less than the US$45 billion proposed earlier above; however, India can ostensibly afford to be morally and economically gracious. Given Pakistan’s dire need for cash in today’s economic situation, this deal is actually a windfall for Pakistan at the right moment in history.

It should also be noted that Pakistan would realise additional annual savings by not occupying POKLAK. Pakistan currently spends money on roads and other infrastructure there for its military, while getting close to little revenue in return.  This whole deal will put wind to the economic sails of Pakistan.

It can be imagined that the USA will support such a deal. Moreover, India would do well to tempt the USA with a permanent military base in Kashmir that India can lease to USA for about US$10-15 billion per year, much as the USA formerly leased the Clark air base and Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines. The USA needs a permanent base in the Central Asian region, and here is as good an opportunity as any other, if not better. Next, India can further promise USA that it will use those $10-15 billion for purchases from USA, which will further motivate USA to pay that rent. The rent, itself, will be able to offset the expenses India will incur in buying POKLAK. Moreover, having USA in Kashmir will give India security vis-à-vis China and may ensure the survivability of Pakistan. The upsides of this deal are many.

The timing for such a deal presents itself opportunely, now that a new government is in power at the centre in India. It is also favourable that a civilian government is in power in Pakistan. Once the military retakes power in Pakistan, such a deal would become difficult, perhaps impossible. Both sides must aim to reap advantages from this window of opportunity.

One result of this agreement will likely be that India and Pakistan could sign a permanent peace agreement. Pakistan would withdraw its forces from POKLAK in a phased manner over those five/ten years. A proposed Chinese purchase of POKLAK, to the contrary, will not bring peace to the region.

Of course, much negotiation will be required to finalize this deal, but such negotiations should start now. Other issues in the deal might include development of Kashmir and safeguarding of Muslim interests. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs, as usual, will no doubt aim to throw a spanner in the works. They are often under the misguided impression that they are responsible for India’s security. Anyway, once India sets this proposal in motion, let it go where its fate will take it. We might be surprised.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).