Quick Military Surface Transport

In July 1919, after World War I, a young Captain Dwight Eisenhower was in an army contingent that travelled by road from Washington DC to San Francisco. It took the expedition 62 days for the convoy to traverse 3,251 miles, at an amazing average of 58.1 miles per day and 6.07 miles per hour, with transports getting bogged down by weather and terrain, losing nine vehicles, and making soldiers sick while injuring yet others. This was obviously not the preferred modus operandi for military movement if the US Army had to move divisions from coast to coast in an emergency.

After the Germans developed the autobahn in 1935, making military transport easy between Germany’s eastern and western flanks during World War II, which was undoubtedly a war of movement and motor transport, and Eisenhower, a General by then, saw first-hand what high-speed roads could do for military movement in Germany, he carried forward the initiative to create USA’s freeway system after becoming US President in 1952. This freeway system essentially crisscrossed USA with 42,000 miles of freeways and ushered in the age of the automobile besides contributing to immense and unprecedented economic development.

At that time, Eisenhower led the passage of the freeway bill by saying "The obsolescence of the nation's highways presents an appalling problem of waste, danger and death. Next to the manufacture of the most modern implements of war as a guarantee of peace through strength, a network of modern roads is as necessary to defense as it is to our national economy and personal safety.” In fact, the freeways were also made to provide rapid evacuation in time of nuclear attack, keeping the Soviet Union in mind, besides providing rapid movement of military equipment. Now, equipment for frigates could go overland from the Atlantic naval base in Norfolk, Virginia to the Pacific naval base in San Diego, California within four days rather than take three weeks around the Panama Canal. A renaissance in military mobilisation and support had been ushered.

Seventy-five years later, India has only about 35 miles of uninterrupted freeways. When troops are often transferred from the Eastern states to Kashmir and vice-versa, one can only imagine the time it takes to move those troops at a 30 mph convoy speed. At a time of war where hours make the difference between capture and loss of strategic objectives that can take months or years to recapture, adequate military mobilisation at high speed is fundamental to military execution and success. The difference between moving troops from cantonments in Chennai to Udhampur on high-speed freeways versus low-speed highways that are shared by bullock carts, pedestrians, and cattle is about 30 hours, I estimate. This amount of time can be too much in a serious emergency. Inherently, a military on the move needs no interruption by cattle, pedestrians, and donkeys, as happens all the time on Indian highways. When a mule cart blocked a bridge during the Sicilian campaign in World War II, Gen George Patton himself shot the stubborn mule. Obviously, no objective-oriented General can afford his military column to be held up by slow traffic, and be strafed in the impasse, as well. Damn the torpedoes—bash on regardless is more the battle cry for an army on the warpath.

The difficulty of moving troops from cantonments to the Western Sector was bared during Operation Parakram. The delay was so excessive that by the time the army reached its destinations, momentum had petered down, international pressure had been brought to bear on India, and the public was emotionally exhausted. When Pakistan should have been given an upper cut and right hook, it was left off the hook. The ability to implement cold start is enormously contingent upon movement flexibility. As much as quick turnaround is a fundamental precept in flexible manufacturing, quick turnaround is necessary in warfighting. Moreover, to “be prepared,” a scout’s motto, is necessary but not enough: the military has to follow up by striking the enemy unawares. Freeways are fundamental to implementing quick delivery for such military doctrine.

The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has provided sterling service to the nation . But, they have had the mandate only for border roads. It is indeed time to step up freeway construction on a war-footing, and create a quasi-military agency for internal roads development to parallel the BRO. There are quite a few needs of the hour in military development in India, and this is definitely one of them.  Unfortunately, the National Highway Authority (NHA) has not been able to deliver the type of freeways that modern nations posses.

India has also been ineffective in exploiting the great potential it has in navigating its great rivers and using them for military movement. In USA, all rivers are controlled by the US Army Corps’ of Engineers, who are charged with river navigation, river discharges, construction of river ports, flood control, and river use and regulations. Developing the River Ganges for military navigation will give a fillip to the Central Command, of importance especially after strong Chinese statements on Nepal. Having multiple choices for troop, equipment, and vehicle movement from Ganganagar to Imphal, for instance, only adds to movement flexibility, essential for quickly sending resources by various routes to where the need is most. This, again, calls for the creation of a military or quasi-military agency to develop rivers for military navigation. In all likelihood, this will create an opportunity to clean up India’s rivers, and, in the bargain, give a boost to flood control measures that devastate India frequently and for which the military is often called out for rehabilitation efforts.

It is time to harness 21st century technology for military transport. If the military would like to move on high-speed freeways at 65 miles an hour from Chennai to Udhampur rather than at 30 mph or less on the current highways, would it not like to move at 250 mph? Magnetically levitated (Maglev) trains do just that, and can carry heavy equipment and battle tanks to boot. Thus, Maglev trains are recommended that crisscross India: it is, basically, time for India to come up to speed with engineering applications, and not miss the train on this, rather than lagging 75 years behind. Everyone should realise that real economic development is engineering development, and engineering development is military development.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).