The US must cross the Durand Line

The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results – Albert Einstein
I took my revenge in a hundred years and I took it soon – Old Afghan Saying
Beware the venom of a viper and the vengeance of an Afghan – Old Indian saying

It is not a question of whether the US is right or wrong in sending in an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. The real question is whether the US can win the war.

This war is not against the Afghanistan nation – it is against a population and guerilla force that is not based in Afghanistan. Finding the Taliban fighters amidst the mountains of Afghanistan has been difficult enough. Once again, it’s not that armies can’t fight guerillas, but whether the US has the willpower to fight them right.

A defensive operation by USA in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, or Paktika provinces will simply be unable to take out the Taliban fighters, because the Pashtun can wait a hundred years to oust the US who will get weary long before then. Now, all intelligence agencies know fairly squarely that the Taliban are mostly in the NWFP of Pakistan. Thus, the US could stay for a hundred years in Afghanistan, but would never be able to defeat the Taliban, unless they cross boldly into the NWFP in Pakistan.

Frankly, the US has not the mind-set of a Chengiz Khan or Alexander to subdue the Taliban. The Afghans know this, which is why their attacks persist unabatedly. We might also say that the US feels limited in some matters of asymmetrical war. It is thus difficult to understand US thinking owing to its inherent contradictions, and because of this, Afghanistan is beginning to look a lot like Vietnam.

To wit, the US is refusing to send ground troops across the Durand Line, though intelligence points unmistakably to the Taliban having sought refuge there; Quetta and Peshawar are strongholds of the Taliban. Such a situation was similar in Vietnam, where the US knew the address of the North Vietnamese, but where the US refused to cross the 17th parallel on the ground that it had no UN mandate to do so. A war fought without passion is not a war that can be won; a war fought for political posturing is not a war that has a convincing mission to it; and a war fought to show artificially that a nation reacted when it was scared to fight, is not a war in which that nation can seize victory.

While the US may have all the fantastic military technology, they are demonstrating they lack military common sense to win the war. When they went into Vietnam, they raised their troop strength to 500,000, engaged in carpet bombing, and dropped Agent Orange on the “enemy”, but because they did not take the war to its logical and conclusive end by going into enemy territory north of the 17th parallel, they lost the ability to influence the outcome of the war. Wars are not won when you allow the enemy to rearm, regroup, re-form, and re-attack. Once you have the enemy in your cross hairs, you are not fighting if you don’t pull the trigger, no matter what the political and diplomatic rhetoric. Thus, in Afghanistan, the US is making a similar mistake of dodging the need to cross the Durand line. In this regard, the US could bring in another 100,000 troops into Afghanistan, but all that will be chest-thumping if they don’t cross into the NWFP. Like Vietnam, the US could be beaten at the post for not crossing the international border.

No matter what the US does in Kabul, or what puppet government they have at the centre, the war is not going to be over until the Taliban are routed and disarmed. Those who understand the Pashtun understand this. The Kabul situation is similar to South Vietnam where puppet generals towed USA’s line year after year, but where the Vietcong gained supplies from across the border, with the South Vietnamese government able to do little about that. Moreover, Peshawar is a teeming arms bazaar for the Taliban, a stone’s throw from the Durand line, but the US has not attacked it with ground troops and the Pakistan Army has failed to quell the Taliban or squelch their arms pipelines. It is also seen that no amount of nation-building or education inside Afghanistan can turn around the hearts of the Pashtun, the vast numbers of who feel deprived. In this respect, the US has no choice but to be in Afghanistan to prevent another 9/11 from there. But a task started must be finished, and this means taking tough decisions like crossing the Durand line, else the spectre of 9/11 will haunt the USA for a long time to come. To win this war, the US will have to break the will of the Taliban, not win their hearts, remembering they had to break the will of the Japanese to close WWII.

Another restraining factor for the US might be the fear that Pakistan could use the nuclear bomb on US troops should it cross into Pakistan. Now here we find possible subtle nuclear deterrence at work for a threat that has not been applied. All the more reason that the US should roll back this potential threat. However, the US has a doctrine that restrains it from going to war against nuclear-armed nations. But, the issue at hand is whether the US is as brave as its rhetoric, and whether the US, with its superior military capabilities can neutralise the current and future nuclear threat to itself and its allies, from Pakistan, once and for all.

It is also worthwhile pondering what type of war is this that the US is fighting while knowing the opium from Afghanistan is used to fund the Taliban. Why does the US not burn all poppy fields in Afghanistan? War strategy amply advises that one must lay siege on an enemy when possible, that one must cut its supply lines and lifelines when possible, and that one must deny the enemy all resources from which it could nourish and strengthen itself. However, the US continues to give away the farm day after day and then complains of its own casualties. A nation that can neither courageously bear casualties nor can make the appropriate war-fighting decisions, does not appear as a nation going down the right path in this encounter.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).