Tackling the Sino-Pak axis

Nehruvian India idealised a post-colonial dawn of universal peace and brotherhood, particularly among newly-emerged nations. Chasing this Utopian dream, we forfeited Tibet and supported China’s permanent seat at UNSC in return for the ‘Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai’ mirage. The buffer gone, China was suddenly next door. A millennium of foreign rule in India had left us bereft of statecraft or strategic culture. China, with its experience of the Middle Kingdom being disrupted by European powers during the Opium Wars, was obsessed with consolidating power. Therefore, from inception, Communist-ruled  China aimed at superpower status pursuing it with steadfast determination. In contrast, we failed to enunciate even a single strategic vision paper, thereby emerging as a 20th century under-achiever champion.

While Nehru dreamed of ‘Chindia’ leading Asian resurgence; China understood that ‘one hill cannot have two tigers’. Thus, it was China which adopted the Kautilyan principle of mandala (power-circles): immediate neighbours are natural enemies; those beyond are natural allies. Consequently, Sino-Indian rivalry was inevitable, as we experienced at great cost in 1962. Beijing then balanced India by forging the Sino-Pak axis and utilised it to confine us into the ‘little triangle’ (China-India-Pak), and to exclude us from the larger – US, Russia, China.

No wonder Beijing viewed the Indo-Soviet Treaty with suspicion. Reinforcing Pakistan, China also encouraged the North-east insurgencies. The Sino-Pak-US axis was engineered following the Bangladesh war and Pakistan instigated to launch the ‘war of a thousand cuts’. Hence, when USSR collapsed, India was left isolated in a unipolar world.

 Pokaran-II sought to re-assert our international relevance and regain balance vis-a-vis China. In fact, George Fernandes’ labelled China Adversary No. 1 to proclaim our principal rationale for the tests. But South Bloc was flummoxed by the strident US reaction. Soon however, USA grasped the import of nuclear India on China’s southern borders. The Indo-US strategic partnership ensued, climaxing with the nuclear deal. Though unstated, China perceived its aim of ‘containing’ the Dragon.
In response China escalated border violations; emphasised its claim to Arunachal Pradesh (not just Tawang); reopened the Sikkim issue; and demonstrated its control over two major river systems. She expanded her Indian Ocean string-of-pearls and reinforced her siege from the north – making fresh inroads into Nepal. Her renewed support for internal dissensions, particularly Naxals, may be designed to balkanise India, as advocated by a Chinese think-tank.

Today, recent ‘ally’ USA is reeling from the economic crisis and China has a stranglehold with nearly $900 billion of US Treasury securities. Hence, the Obama Administration has kowtowed to Beijing, stoking her megalomania of a G-2 world order. Then, Obama himself endorsed Beijing’s role in managing South Asia. In a parallel development Afghanistan entered the post-American end-game with Pakistan holding the key for a face-saving US exit. This situation has Sino-Pak holding all the trumps. India’s was excluded from the Af-Pak conference in Istanbul and their advice against engagement with the so-called good Taliban was ignored. This is in line with the Sino-Pak endeavour to exclude India from post-war Afghanistan.

Further, as a reward for its Afghanistan cooperation, USA has pressured us into resuming the Indo-Pak dialogue to end Pakistan’s isolation. No wonder that Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was exultant. Not only did talks go ahead despite the Pune blast, we also facilitated Salman Bashir‘s meeting with Kashmiri separatists, a somersault from the 26/11 declaration. Bashir trumpeted Islamabad’s triumph in the post-talks press conference.

China is preparing to move from G-2 to being the top hegemon in a decade or two and we are at a loss to cope with her asymmetrical national strength. Her economy is already 2½ times India’s. She consumes 576 million tonnes of steel annually – more than US, EU and Japan combined! (India - 63MT). Nobel-laureate Robert Fogel predicts that China’s economy would cross $120 trillion in thirty years and its share of global GDP would be 40 per cent (twice of USA plus Europe). His projections for India are a GDP of $36.5 trillion – less than a third of China’s.

Militarily, the infantry-dominated PLA of 1949 with a rudimentary airforce, is today a modern, formidable fighting force. Chinese Second Artillery is challenging USA’s strategic dominance and she is the only nation to demonstrate anti-satellite capability. Diplomatically, China engages with the world on her own terms. Paying only lip-service to international proliferation concerns, she prefers secure energy supplies from Iran and preventing a spill-over of North Korean discontent.

Meanwhile, our economy is strangulated by rutted roads, outmoded airports, decaying ports and chronic electricity shortages. Productivity of our agricultural workers (two-thirds of the labour force) is only half of China’s. Over 40 per cent of the population remains illiterate and gross secondary school enrolment is less than half of China’s. Therefore, we will be unable to fully exploit our imminent demographic advantage. Any wonder then that Chinese commentators scoff at our notions of impending big-power status.

India’s defence forces are stuck with obsolete weaponry while the bureaucracy aims to score points over the military brass. Our strategic missiles cannot reach mainland China and our second strike is yet to materialise. During diplomatic and domestic crises we usually prefer soft-options, even sacrificing core national interests and dismaying potential allies.

America’s alignment with the Sino-Pak axis poses a grave security threat and we need a four-fold strategy to counter it. First, unfetter the economy, propelling it into double-digit growth. Second, formulate a road-map to synergise military and diplomatic strategies. Third, as George Washington said, if you desire peace, be prepared to wage war. Hence, a convincing second-strike capability is vital for credibility of our no-first-use policy. A three-carrier, blue-water navy is needed to dominate the Indian Ocean and bolster Southeast Asia’s littoral states, all nervous of the Dragon. To complete our dissuasive military posture, the Army must complement its reinforced China-side defences with a clear limited-offensive capability for safeguarding our riparian rights in Tibet.

Finally, rather than seeking confrontation, we should draw the sting out of the Sino-Pak relationship by expanding Sino-Indian cooperation, as in Copenhagen. At the same time more assertive diplomacy regarding our core interests is imperative. We should exploit widespread apprehensions about the Middle Kingdom to outflank the Sino-Pak axis in Russia, Central Asia and Iran while strengthening bonds with Singapore, Vietnam and Japan.

It’s a long haul, entailing overhaul of governance and security management. But, if we are to peacefully regain our strategic space, we cannot falter.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).