Towards a Credible Deterrence

Iran’s Israel-capable Shahab-3 missile also reaches into NW India and this brings into focus another dimension of our strategic scenario. India’s declared nuclear strategy doctrine is ‘No first-use (NFU) and credible minimum deterrence’. However, our ‘China-specific’ Agni-III missile, which was successfully test-fired a few months back, will still take some years for operationalisation.  The other ‘elements’ of the triad are even further away from readiness. So, 10 years after declaring ourselves a nuclear weapon state (NWS), we are currently well short of credibility, particularly as far as China is concerned.

China exploded its A-bomb in 1964 and H-bomb three years later. Pokaran-I came after a decade while our thermonuclear weapon test occurred 21 years after China’s. Meanwhile, violating its NPT obligations, China clandestinely helped Pakistan with N-technology, thus enabling it to conduct the Chagai tests less than a fortnight after Pokaran-II. Hence, we are the only NWS faced with trilateral complexity of two collusive and inimical nuclear neighbours. This fact has lately been acknowledged even by USA. Hence ‘minimum’ in our context needs careful calibration. ‘Minimum’ against vast and powerful China would be viewed with alarm by Pakistan - even Russia could get concerned! Similarly, the 9-10th July Iranian tests introduce a ‘paplu’ in the strategic pack - since today’s friendly intentions can change with altered situations. It’s the capability which counts. After all, Iran’s on-going N-development has the AQ Khan imprint.

Essential Prerequisites for NFU

NFU is a cardinal tenet of our doctrine, essentially to assuage concerns of non-nuclear states. Also, in confrontation with a NWS, it supposedly inhibits the probability of a hostile first strike. However, a prerequisite of an NFU-policy is a much higher state of overall security preparedness: conventional strength; survivability of key targets and second-strike credibility. First, ‘neighbours’ need to be dissuaded from conventional adventures to obviate escalation into a nuclear situation. Hence we need strong conventional capabilities in all five dimensions: land, sea, air, space and electronic/cyber. Secondly, after the adversary’s first strike, survivability of our second strike and National Command Authority are vital. It is equally crucial to maintain public morale in the wake of widespread devastation. This implies anti-ballistic missile (ABM) rings around key targets, population centres and industrial hubs plus well-trained and equipped civil defence organisations. Some analysts now believe that China may have acquired MIRV capability with her 8000-km, DF31 ICBMs. This renders creation of effective ABM shields even more complex.

Credibility

Nuclear security is based on inherent contradictions: the very purpose of a nuclear arsenal is to prevent, through credible deterrence, the actual employment of these weapons. Hence, nuclear strategy is predicated on moulding the adversary’s perceptions of our capability, intentions and resolve. Consequently, credibility of our second strike is of vital importance. Potential adversaries must be convinced that, in event of their first strike, an unacceptably crippling retaliation will inevitably follow. This is at the heart of ‘peace through deterrence’. Hence a viable triad is essential: SSBMs like Agni-III; air delivered weapons and SLBMs.

The absence of SLBM-capable, N-powered submarines is a glaring deficiency from our triad. China has already deployed her second-generation ‘Jin’ N-subs, probably armed with 12 Ju Lang-2 SLBMs of inter-continental range. The Russian Akula class N-submarine, proposed to be leased, has only conventional weapons. However, it will prepare our crews for trial evaluation of our ATV, which along with SLBM-capable missiles, still remains under development. Therefore, vis-à-vis China, our triad remains well short of reach and residual efficacy after surviving attrition from counter-measures.

A Viable Deterrence Posture

It is believed that in peace-time our nuclear cores remain with scientists and not co-located with the launchers of the armed forces, supposedly to eliminate the risk of rogue launches. If this is indeed so, war-gaming an evolving conflict situation clearly high-lights the grave risks entailed with this posture. At what stage should the cores be moved to launcher sites? If moved well before the adversary’s first strike, he could ‘read’ this as an imminent pre-emptive strike and trigger the nuclear exchange. If left for later, the adversary could be tempted to seize the ‘window of opportunity’ thus proffered, when our second-strike lies unarmed. Worse, if war-head mating is put-off till after the enemy strikes, there is no certainty that a timely, physical move of cores to launchers would at all be possible, given widespread disruption of communications – both surface and electronic. Strategic analysts have come up with a new term to denote India’s unique deterrence posture - not ‘minimum’ but ‘recessed’.

Resolve
 
This brings up the most critical question regarding credibility of our recessed deterrence. In a nuclear crisis, will our national leaders have the resolve to go through with the retaliatory strike? All nuclear powers have demonstrated resolve at various stages in recent history. USSR threatened Western powers during the Suez crisis in 1956, forcing UK and France to back away from seizing the canal. Kennedy compelled USSR to remove its missiles from Cuba, which precipitated Khrushchev’s ouster for failure to hold his nerve. Sadly, India has time and again failed to display the capacity to take hard decisions. We need to demonstrate hard steel in diplomatic and security situations, which alone will bolster our credibility.

Towards Greater Credibility

The failure to energetically address the credibility gap even 10 years after proclaiming NWS status sends out dangerously wrong signals. While some delay in indigenous weapons development may be understandable (not if we are really serious), failure to even commence gearing-up civil defence organisations is incomprehensible. This betrays a lack of seriousness in establishing credibility of our posture, recessed or otherwise. Meanwhile China appears to be exploiting the extended window of strategic weakness to push its agenda on the border-issue. She has constructed dams controlling the flow of our two life-line river-systems, Brahmaputra and Sutlej. We are unlikely to solve this and other issues unless we bolster conventional capability and demonstrate strategic credibility. The urgency of doing both cannot be overstated.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)