Does China Need to Attack India?

Bharat Verma, Editor, Indian Defence Review, recently postulated that China will attack India before 2012. He believes that, “There are multiple reasons for a desperate Beijing to teach India the final lesson, thereby ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century.” Another reason proffered is the growing social unrest in China due to the economic downturn and diminishing exports. Since wars cannot be undertaken lightly in the 21st century; the risk of a Chinese war-threat within three years needs to be seriously evaluated – the perceived gains versus the hazards and international opprobrium.

First, how serious is India’s economic challenge in the mid-term? JP Morgan AMC’s MD, Adam Matthews, estimates that, despite an exports slowdown, which contributes 30 per cent of its GDP, China is slated to grow over 8 per cent this year. India may achieve 7 per cent growth on half the GDP base. In 2008 China’s GDP was $8 trillion (in PPP terms) with 9 per cent growth, while India’s was $3.4 trillion with growth at 6.7 per cent. Our ‘high’ household savings were only 38 per cent of GDP against China’s 72 per cent. Take power capacity – 793 high watts compared to only 172 (about a fifth).

In India, investment in roads, a 15-year old flagship programme, is only 11 per cent of China’s $101 billion. China is also using the current recession to create renewable energy assets, ready to exploit the resources when the economic crisis has been dealt with. It could well exceed 15 per cent energy through renewables by 2020. This farsighted commitment contrasts with our homeopathic approach.

Consequent to China's dramatically successful economic and financial reform spanning three decades, its current account surplus now constitutes the most significant global macro-economic imbalance. By September 2008, China’s holdings of US-Treasury securities were over 20 per cent of their total foreign ownership. Any major Chinese attempt at offloading these has enormous implications for global and US economic stability.

In sharp contrast, our economy is riven by disparities and plagued by delivery failures. While the top 30 per cent enjoy enviable living standards with high consumer-spend, the number of poor have doubled over our total population at independence. This segment’s human development indices vie shamefully with nations like Burkina Faso, ideal conditions for the Naxals to thrive in the Andhra- Bihar corridor linking Nepal. Over and above, Naxalism and Northeast insurgencies are also fuelled by Chinese surrogates creating an India beleaguered by Chinese-supported internal social strife.

Strategically too, China’s stranglehold over India is comprehensive and lethal. It has firmly secured its grip over Tibet, resolutely connected it by railway to mainland China – being extended now through the Himalayas to Nepal, increasingly turning to China diplomatically and militarily.  The doggedness and skill in pursuing such strategically important projects contrasts with our Kashmir rail-link effort. Further, a road connects Xinxiang (through Pakistan) to Gwadar, which dominates the Persian Gulf, while a new road is being illegally made through POK. India can only wring its hands helplessly.

Even more helpless are we in confronting China’s endeavours to control major Indian rivers originating in Tibet. Zangmu Hydropower Station will harness the River Brahmaputra waters with five planned dams. The Sutlej has been dammed at Parechu and Indus at Senge-Ali. India has an MoU with China for sharing hydrological information only during monsoons. Should the Chinese divert waters during lean periods and release surplus flows in monsoons, North India will face havoc. The August-2000 Sutlej floods were simply a foretaste.

Similarly, China’s ‘string-of-pearls’ control its vital energy transit routes through the Indian Ocean. Its navy now confidently deploys in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations, proclaiming its global reach. In contrast, our bureaucracy took years to clear the Indian Navy’s proposal for similar operations. The stark disparity in declining fortunes of our once-dominant Navy and PLA Navy was conspicuous at its Golden Jubilee fleet review in Qingdao on 23 April 2009. The centre-piece was China’s second-generation, Type 094 nuclear submarine.

China has stepped forward its India-targeted missiles to Tibet, minimising our reaction time for detection of launch and for taking defensive measures. In response, our retaliatory second strike, if at all it can be launched, cannot reach even close to China’s heartland. Though sea trials of our nuclear submarine will begin shortly, its final induction with SLBMs is still years away. India’s response of raising two mountain divisions and stationing a depleted Su-30 squadron in Tezpur, is a diffident defensive measure, which is unlikely to cut ice when dealing with substantive issues like border-dispute resolution, river-water security and intrusion of Chinese roads into POK/Northern Areas.

China’s newly-revealed pugnacity in its India dealings is based on its unassailable chakravhyu around and within us. It is also triggered by worry over the Bush administration’s attempt, in conjunction with other powers, to prop India up as a possible counterweight against it and for breaking us out of nuclear apartheid. With the largest foreign holdings of US treasury securities, China enjoys unprecedented economic leverage. Besides, the West is critically dependant on Chinese enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea. Thus, Clinton’s statement that Sino-US ties are the “most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century” gratifyingly signals an unambiguous reversal of the Bush-era tilt towards Delhi.

On the other hand, even if not overtly stated, India remains hyphenated with Af-Pak. Our Sharm-el-Sheikh muddle exemplifies the systemic limitations bedeviling vital national security issues.

In recent months Chinese state-controlled press has carried derisive articles, scoffing Indian attempts at ‘catching up with China’; heaping scorn on Maharashtra CM’s statement of making Mumbai like Shanghai. Frankly, our government systems, ‘blessed’ with the lowest-rated bureaucracy and abysmal politicians, are no match to China’s.

It is thus clear that India is no threat to the Middle Kingdom, economically, militarily or strategically. With the bureaucracy’s tortuous decision-making, lacking both strategic vision and commitment, we cannot hope to break out of the Chinese knot any time soon. Therefore, Beijing has no need at all to attack us.

If the nation perceives the need to revamp its security management, we must take the way of the new National Identity Card project in India and appoint professionals such as Nandan Nilekani. Above all, the armed forces need to be part of Government decision-making in the context of security matters. Meanwhile, Parliament too must reserve seats for strategy-specialists, to enable it to exercise due oversight over strategic management.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).