Nixing Naxal Terror

Of all insurgent groups which scourge Mother India, Naxals have a particularly vicious ideology. Feeding on socio-economic neglect, they have afflicted about 183 of our 610 districts. This situation is being maliciously exploited by Pak and China. Government has responded with police repression, which has fuelled even greater anger against the State. Therefore, police measures are at best band-aid solutions. It is necessary to address the root of the problem.

The Naxal movement is rooted in ideology propounded by Majumdar and Sanyal in Calcutta, 1967. Rejecting the Communists’ embrace of parliamentary democracy, it holds that communism can only be attained through violent class struggle, as in classic Marxist-Leninism. In fact, Majumdar even advocated annihilation (read murder) of individual class enemies. After brief success among radical Calcutta students, they were driven out of the city and shifted base to rural Naxalbari. However, even before the few months it took for eradication from W Bengal, they splintered into 30-odd groups. Nagi-Reddy established a strong base in AP’s jungles and Satyanarayan Singh in Bihar.

As these splinters jostled for dominance, the administrations of affected State Governments became complacent. However, from atleast 1999 onwards, police intelligence kept warning of impending unity and growing strength of the Naxals. These were only taken seriously when, in 2000, they brazenly annihilated several police posts and seized large booties of arms and ammunition. By the time the Governments of Bihar and MP got serious, the factions had already united. Then, in 2001, these states were split! Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh, the two off-springs were most Naxal-affected, whereas the parent states had all the Anti-Naxal gen. This set the counter-insurgency (CI) drive back by several years, leaving Naxals firmly in control of a continuous forest-corridor, spanning North AP, Chhatisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand. Adjoining forest tracts in Maharashtra, MP and W Bengal are also affected. Later, pockets were seized in Bihar and UP, connecting the red-sickle with Maoist Nepal and linking it with Bangladesh - thus ensuring foreign support.

What enabled the Naxals to achieve such success? The unvarnished truth is: ruthless exploitation of Tribal populations by rapacious forest contractors; mining mafia and a nexus of actively colluding politicians and officials. Inept, desk-bound district administrations and incompetent policing completes the picture. Helpless Tribals, thus exploited by human hyenas, have no basic amenities. They are destitute and deprived of dignity, even by rural Bharat standards. Naxals fan the Tribals’ anger and focus it into attacks against state-oppressors. They replace a delinquent administration, provide savage justice, ruthless governance and enforce compliance. Tribals are thus caught in a cleft stick.

Now, let’s look at police leadership. In Oct 2006, Jaswinder Singh, DIG Anti-Naxal operations, Orissa was killed by a Naxal blast. Immediately the State Govt nominated a successor, who equally promptly reported sick. The next nominee too evaded the posting; news thereafter was blacked out. Some months back, reliable authorities from Chhatisgarh’s CI school told the author that IPS officers routinely refuse postings to Anti-Naxal operational posts. The brunt is therefore, borne by the support-cadre officers of the state Armed Police battalions. Hopefully things have now improved.

In early July, nearly 60 policemen perished in two Naxal ambushes in Malkangiri and Rayagad districts, including nearly 40 ‘elite’ Greyhounds, which exposes their ignorance of even basic tactics. This impelled MHA to announce a 14-point Anti-Naxal strategy, including police modernisation, setting up CI schools by concerned state governments and ‘targeted’ development of 33 affected districts. Law and order being a state subject, the Centre has compromised on the issue of a unified Anti-Naxal police. As the Naxals get set to move out of the jungles into urban areas, such half measures are doomed to fail. Also, the Nation must utilise every resource at its disposal to defang the Naxal monster now. The serial blasts in Bangalore and Ahmedabad have revived the issue of a Central Anti-Terror force. If it fructifies, it will strengthen the ant-Naxal effort.
 
The keys to effective Anti-Naxal measures are three fold. Foremost is complete restoration of law, order and justice systems. Police modernisation will only work if the force is motivated and effectively led. Sadly, the police have yet to display the capacity to do so. One answer is to induct suitable short-service Army officers (after atleast one 5-year Army tenure) into the IPS cadres of these states. They will be mandated to serve in Anti-Naxal operations for five years, followed thereafter by normal IPS careers. A similar approach for the Anti-terror Force will also be beneficial.

Next, creating a joint intelligence set-up among affected States is essential. Further, this needs to focus on revamping HUMINT capability. The most effective, though most difficult method is to infiltrate Naxal organisations and decapitate their leaderships. This also entails least civilian casualties. Such operations have been successfully executed by the Army in the past; hence this is being advocated through practical knowledge.

Finally, targeted development of all affected districts is vital to liberate Tribals from the Naxal grip. Desk-bound approaches such as was in the news a few days back, will not work. Wheat-stacks from our record harvest in Punjab were photographed rotting in the rain under a partial tarpaulin. When confronted with this picture, the FCI official’s response (in the age of instant communication) was, ‘We will write a letter!’ This encapsulates what’s wrong with our administration. Once he writes the letter, his responsibility is over - wait for reply; file and forget!

The need of the hour is fearless administrators, who will venture into Naxal-infested areas, verify facts and progress on ground and provide people-centric administration. In addition to basic health care and education, Tribals must be freed from exploitation; provided livelihood; taught skills for value-addition of their traditional produce and, above all, have their dignity restored. Once again, it is Army officers who are trained in mission-oriented management, have a hands-on approach and welcome responsibility. In fact, development of remote areas under the British was pioneered by Army-men. Success of current Sadhbhavana initiatives in Kashmir, Kargil and Ladakh are examples of what the Army can achieve with meagre resources - even while manning an active border and fighting militants. With an orientation capsule, selected Army officers (on temporary loan to IAS) will certainly achieve results as DCs of targeted districts. Once the victimised forest-folk get back their dignity, the Naxals will be nixed by being deprived of their base.

(Courtesy Hindustan Times, Chandigarh)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)