India-China Border Dispute

"We will not give away even one inch of our territory", or calling China the No. 1 enemy, or deliberately exploiting the Tibet issue to embarrass the Chinese are not positive ways to negotiate a border which is ill-defined. This is also not a foreign policy aimed at developing healthy long-term relationships with neighbors. This is also not a step towards reducing defense expenditure, and increasing development expenditure. A similar juvenile approach guides our dealings with Pakistan. But that is another story. Let us get back to the India-China border. Incidentally, among the developed and developing countries India may be the only country surrounded by unresolved boundaries.

India- China border is not defined clearly either historically or geographically. Whatever exists in the form of Macmohan Line or other vague treaties is not good enough to lay unilateral claims to their reliability or acceptance on either side. They, along with the LAC, can at best act as a basis for negotiating a mutually acceptable border. These negotiations do not demand that India and China be good friends, but they demand a minimum level of confidence and cordiality in the public and inter-governmental domains. They demand restraint and maturity in thinking and speaking, particularly when incited by the media to make statements which are diplomatically damaging.

India­-China border dispute is only one facet of a very complex relationship between the two countries. Historically, India and China have never been enemies or competitors. In fact, for centuries, through a complex exchange of ambassadors, pilgrims, and traders, the relationship has been, by and large, one of healthy mutual respect. It all started in the late forties when both countries became independent nations with strong national governments. The border settlement could and should have been pended for a few years if the Tibet issue had not emerged as a trigger for haste. Occupying Tibet became an issue for China somewhat similar to what Kashmir is for us. Their intent was clear from the beginning, and there was nothing that we could do about it then, or can do now. Much to our discomfort, our posture on Tibet led to China siding with Pakistan on Kashmir. The 1962 war not only led to worsening of the relations between the two sides, but resulted in a hardening of the "on the ground" posture by introducing an LAC into the picture.

It is not the intent of this thesis to discuss the rights and wrongs or the how and why of the present status of the border or of the 1962 war. These have been discussed and over-discussed over the last forty years. What is relevant and important is look for and find, if possible, a way forward.

As mentioned earlier, the border dispute is just one facet of the India-China relations. It may be a good idea to look at some other facets of this relationship, particularly those having a bearing on settlement of the dispute. Firstly, it is important to note that both India and China, today, are not the two nations who created the problem about fifty years ago. Both have moved forward by different routes and at different speeds, but they have moved forward. From the poor and hungry struggling nations, they are both emerging economic and military powers at a level quite unthinkable in late fifties and early sixties. China is a permanent member of the Security Council, is a major nuclear power, and a very strong economic and military power. By and large it all these fields it has performed better than India and in the international arena, is ahead of us. Secondly, China has resolved its borders with all its neighbors, including a complex one with the erstwhile USSR. At that time relations between them were at their lowest ebb. Thirdly, the emergence of India and China as the new powers on the world stage has aroused suspicions and a sense of competition between them. This competition and jealousy cannot be wished away. The urge to bring the other down a peg or two cannot be put away. The Tibet issue is a big obstacle between them. It has shades of what Kashmir is for us.

With this background, we need to look forward and find a way towards creating clear and firm borders between us FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY. In most of the sectors, there is no clear or undisputed boundary. In the absence of an agreement, even these clear areas become disputed as bargaining counters. The atmosphere is being continuously vitiated by hostile and meaningless utterances from both sides. This has to stop. We have been trying unsuccessfully a combination of CBMs and demarcating the LAC with both Pakistan and China. It does not, and will not, work in the otherwise hostile activities being carried out.

It appears that we are putting the cart before the horse. The CBMS and delineation of the temporary or permanent boundaries must emerge out of a political settlement, and not the other way round. There are some essential pre-requites to moving forward. Some of these, which come to mind as part of the political settlement are, firstly, the acceptance that no satisfactory border alignment exists between the two nations. In large parts, it has to be drawn for the first time. Secondly, putting the moral or immoral perceptions aside, India needs to accept China's suzerainty over Tibet; in return for which China could accept India's position on Kashmir, and drop all claims in Sikkim and Arunachal. Surprisingly, this seems feasible. Once this broad political settlement is clinched, the path to border settlement, and to much better neighborly relationship, will open. It will be naïve to assume that we can seek morality in Tibet and not where it concerns us.

If this approach is to be given a chance, it is necessary for India to achieve a political consensus in its entire political spectrum. A very tough call! After that it needs to build the desired public opinion to accept the realities of the existing borders, and the broad framework of the likely settlement. In the kind of violent democracy we have, unwittingly, arrived at, no other approach is likely to work. In short, a political consensus within the country followed by a political settlement with China, are essential pre-requisites to a settlement. All actions in their absence appear to be escapist posturing to avoid getting to grips with a tough situation.   

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)