The Battle for Pakistan's Anatomy

Let's start with the Hearts and Minds.

The US could win them with little effort. At the cost of a drone mission, many of us, even if not exactly enamoured by the Americans, were bowled over. And this was only the collateral benefit. Baitullah Mahsud had to be eliminated. That is the fate of all rogues when they have served their purpose. And, for those who work for the sole surviving superpower, it is pre-ordained. “It is dangerous to be our foe, but fatal to be our friend”; it needed a Kissinger to remind us.

The problem is that America is not in the H&M business. Big powers usually are not. American soldiers are indoctrinated to “kill the enemies of the United States”. Soldiers, everywhere else, are trained to defend their country. Petraeus can propound his COIN doctrine, his soldiers would still call for an air-strike on a mere hunch. No wonder, hardly anyone believes that the US’ professed, exalted aims are for real. A country used to grab more than its pound of flesh (ever heard of American “exceptionalism”!), does not go around building nations. We have other reasons, too, to be sceptical. “To ensure that never again would the US be attacked from Af-Pak soil” is too open-ended an objective. How would one know if it had been achieved? Some measures have indeed been spelled out to accomplish this mission. Creation of an Afghan security force – initially a hundred thousand plus, twice or thrice that number in the meantime – is one of them. In a country where security can only be ensured if the regions and tribes were on board, this force whenever employed against the Taliban, would either be decimated, or more likely join them.

Yet another undertaking, eradicating drugs from Afghanistan, must have in the meantime perforce, been abandoned. Annually, $350 million used to be spent for this purpose; lately more than double that amount. The increase every year has ranged from 50 to 100 per cent. Other than the Taliban and the three million Afghans who survive from this product, the government in Kabul too cannot do without it. It is half the country’s GDP.

There is however one goal that is not only becoming more desirable, but is also achievable: to get out of this “graveyard of empires”. Obama has already mentioned the need to have an exit strategy. The “surge” could well be a part of it. It cannot defeat the insurgency, but in sync with all the right manoeuvres – a “credible” election, some local deals (all politics in Afghanistan is local and all Taliban “reconcilable”), and help from the neighbouring countries – it can create the right environment. That may sound like the Iraqi model, but then so do all exit strategies.

I do not know how long it will take the Americans to work out the mechanics, or the Taliban to convince them that “all other options had been exhausted”, but one has an eerie feeling that the US is not leaving the region any time soon. It is not only because of the upcoming Alamo in Islamabad, or because of the Al Qaeda, the other rogue but nebulous superpower, believed to have found its new haven in Pakistan.

Afghans do not take too kindly to the presence of foreign forces in their country, but the Pakistanis have traditionally been more hospitable. The elites, always game for a deal, can be relied upon to sell their soul even to the devil. The masses may be a pinprick of trouble, but in due course can be conditioned. After some sound and fury over the drones “violating their territory, sovereignty and any remaining national dignity”, they did not create much fuss. In the meantime, the Predators have become benevolent: they only take out the militants and spare the innocent! Time may therefore be ripe to desensitise the Pakistanis a bit more.

Over issues like the foreign bases in Baluchistan, training teams (there is one not too far from Kahuta), and lately over the fortress in Islamabad, the anguish lasts only till the next crisis. With an avalanche of them hitting the common man in quick succession, it is thinkable that instead of mobilising against this “creeping occupation”, the people would start looking for relief from the US’ largesse, so blatantly being dangled in front of them! Little do we know that in the American system, the trickle down is merely “ten per cent”.

The stage seems set for more complications in Pakistan’s journey as a nation, sandwiched between the agendas of the powerful elites who rule the country and the desires of the sole superpower, the US, in their continuing war on terrorism The traditional graveyard was not large enough for the mightiest military alliance the world has ever known. Af-Pak may after all turn out to be a unified battleground.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).