The Ghost of Kargil: Myth and Reality: A First Person Account

The Tenth Anniversary of the Kargil war was given a lot of prominence by the media. Both print and electronic media were full of visuals, talks, views and interviews on Op Vijay. Amidst a plethora of articles, I read one written by Praveen Swami where he extensively quoted letters written by Brig Surinder Singh, former commander of the Kargil-based 121 Infantry Brigade and Col Pushpinder Oberoi, one of the commanding officers. Both claimed that they had given warning of impending intrusions but no one in the hierarchy took them seriously. I remembered a story done by Outlook magazine during the Kargil war where similar claims were made by Brig Surinder Singh. He had specifically mentioned his briefing of Gen VP Malik, the then Army Chief in the Operations Room of 121 Infantry Brigade on 29 August 1998. He had claimed that he had sent his briefing for approval to his superior Maj Gen VS Budhwar, then GOC 3 Infantry Division as per procedure and I remember the then Congress spokesman quoting that letter number to insinuate that Gen VP Malik had been told of a likelihood of intrusions by Brig Surinder Singh, a full nine months before these actually took place. This is a myth.

The reality is somewhat different. While I have great regard for Praveen Swami as a writer, he has obviously been fed doctored versions by both Brig Surinder Singh and Col Oberoi. I therefore thought of bringing to his and others notice, what really transpired. I, as a Brigadier was Military Assistant to Gen Malik in 1997-98 and therefore had accompanied him to Kargil on 29 August 1998. We flew from Srinagar to Kargil in a helicopter and landed at Kargil around 9 AM. At the helipad, the Chief was received by Lt Gen Krishan Pal GOC 15 Corps, Maj Gen VS Budhwar, GOC 3 Infantry Division and Brig Surinder Singh. Apart from me, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) MC Bhandari from Military Operations Directorate also accompanied the Chief. Gen Malik was thereafter briefed by Brigadier Surinder Singh in the Operations Room of 121 Infantry Brigade. It was a routine briefing with no mention of the possibility of any infiltration or intrusion. Kargil had been a dormant sector for over fifteen years and nothing out of the ordinary was expected there. After the briefing, a copy was handed over to Brig Bhandari for Military Operations Directorate Records.

After the briefing, Brigadier Surinder Singh took the Chief and his entourage around Kargil Garrison. When Chief saw the ammunition dump, he remarked that it was wrongly sited as it was in direct line of fire from Pakistani positions across the Shingo river. In fact it was under their visual observation. The Chief gave directions that it must be shifted at the earliest. It was not done by Brigadier Surinder Singh and it was blown up by Pakistani artillery during the Kargil War.

We thereafter proceeded to Dras where Col Pushpinder Oberoi, commanding officer of Grenadiers battalion briefed the Chief just below the Tololing feature. I remember the Chief asking Col Oberoi if there was any deployment on this feature. There was none. The Pakistanis later occupied this feature which dominates the national highway completely.

I was playing golf on a Saturday morning towards the end of June 1999 when I got a message to meet the Chief immediately in Army House. By then I had finished my tenure with him and was posted in the Perspective Planning Directorate of Army HQ. On reaching the Army house, I found the Chief closeted with Maj Gen SK Sanan, the Judge Advocate General and Maj Gen (later lieutenant general) Arjun Ray, his then media advisor. Chief handed me a copy of Outlook magazine where an article on the Chief’s briefing had been published which quoted Brigadier Surinder Singh claiming that he had brought to the Chief’s notice likelihood of intrusions in the Kargil sector. Chief asked me to check this with the briefing copy in Military Operations Directorate. There was some discussion on the line of action to be taken and legal/security implications if any. I suggested to the Chief that the copy of Brigadier Surinder Singh’s briefing of 29 August 98 be given to Outlook magazine to enable them to see the facts for themselves. Arjun Ray and the Judge Advocate General advised the Chief against making a classified briefing public. I told the Chief that there was nothing classified in the briefing. The Chief then said he would take a decision on Monday.

On Monday morning I went to the office of the Chief’s Military Assistant – Brigadier (later lieutenant general) Ashok Kapur and asked Brigadier Mohan Bhandari to come to the office and bring with him the copy of Brigadier Surinder Singh’s briefing. We compared it with what was published in Outlook. It was obvious that the briefing had been doctored and references to intrusions made in the copy published in the magazine. Brigadier Surinder Singh had at that time denied that he had leaked that briefing to the media who were having a field day blaming the Chief for ignoring the warning. When the Chief came to the office, I, along with Brigadier Bhandari showed him the copy of the original briefing which had no mention of any possibility of infiltration/intrusion in Kargil sector. I also told him that there was nothing classified in the briefing and that it should be given to the media. Chief said he will give it some thought. Unfortunately, the view of Arjun Ray prevailed and the briefing was not given to the media which, to my mind was a mistake. Giving a copy of the briefing to the media would have diffused the situation and saved Gen Malik much adverse and unfair criticism which persists to this day.

Kargil was a failure of all intelligence agencies – military, RAW and IB and field intelligence units of the Army deployed in Kargil Sector. Unfortunately no one was held accountable nor taken to task. It was also a failure of commander and staff and commanding officers of 121 Infantry Brigade who had become lax due to the long dormancy of this Sector. If inter-battalion patrolling of large gaps in the defences had been properly carried out, intrusions would have been detected while they were still in progress and necessary action taken to choke them off.

It must also be mentioned that once intrusions were detected, senior Army hierarchy took energetic action to concentrate forces, specially artillery, isolate the intrusions and eventually evict them. The decision not to cross the Line of Control was a political one and unfortunate. It meant that our troops could not go behind the entrenched enemy lines to cut him off and instead had to launch frontal attacks to evict the enemy resulting in so many casualties. It is to the great credit of the Indian soldier and young officers that no one flinched even in the face of certain death.  So long as we have an Army like this, the nation need not fear anyone.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).