China�s Rapid Reaction Forces: A New Challenge

At the end of the Cold War, China entered the unique situation of not facing any direct threat from another nation.  Yet, it continues to invest heavily in its military, particularly in programs designed to improve power projection.  The pace and scope of China’s military build-up has already placed regional military balances at risk.  Current trends in China’s military modernization could provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military operations in Asia well beyond Taiwan, potentially posing a credible threat to modern militaries operating in the region.

The Chinese military doctrine has now progressed from ‘People’s War’ to ‘Local wars under high-tech’ conditions.  This change is the result of their study of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the Gulf Wars.  The Chinese have realized that technology is the engine of change and that, in comparison, their military organizations, war fighting doctrines and weaponry were near obsolete. Hence, the need for restructuring that resulted in the concept of Rapid Reaction Force.

China’s military restructuring is focused on three components: one, the creation of a small high technology force for flexible use in regional contingencies called the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF).  This force is to be capable of responding to all local war scenarios and is akin to both plains and mountain strike corps.  The force is based on modernized elements of the Army, a newly constituted Marine Corps and Special Forces Units; secondly, the institution of large low technology and medium technology forces for internal security and reinforcement in defence. This actually comprises of the balance of the existing army other than those elements earmarked as RRF and is the equivalent of holding formations; and thirdly, modest levels of strategic nuclear forces to maintain viable deterrence against other nuclear powers.

The Chinese undertook their selective modernization after 1995.  Details of Rapid Reaction Forces which came about as a result of that exercise are as under :-

   Rapid Reaction Forces

The Chinese have located the RRF in such a manner that it can react to a num ber of strategic situations:-  

  On examining the earmarking and location of the RRF formations, the following facts emerge:

(a) The bulk of RRF forces including Mechanised Forces are poised for eventualities in Korea, Mongolia and Beijing region.  In fact, the forces stationed in Beijing region can also react quickly in both Korea as well as Mongolia.

(b) 25% of Mechanised Forces and 15% of Infantry poised against Taiwan and Vietnam are RRF.

(c) 2 Mountain divisions and 2 Infantry Divisions have been earmarked against India and Xingjiang.  The plan is to effect speedy induction of forces in the Tibet and Xinjiang regions by air and by road.  Such rapid mobilization would reduce the warning time for India.  

The Chinese military doctrine has always been based on the concept of a Main Force and Regional Forces, with the former available for operations in any area where necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own locations, in co-operation with the local militia.  This concept remains largely operative even today in the ‘local wars under high tech’ scenario.

PLA theory on fighting and winning “local wars under conditions of informationalisation” emphasizes the role of technology, particularly information technology. It is seen as a force-multiplier that would enable PLA forces to conduct relatively limited military operations with precision at greater distances from China’s borders.  However, in practice, the PLA reformers have produced a force capable of meeting the aspirations of its doctrine.  Hence the concept of Rapid Reaction Force has taken centre stage in the Chinese thought process.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.