India�s Stability Instability Paradox and Way Out

The Mumbai incident on 26/11 showed the potential power of asymmetric warfare as a strategy that can paralyse the smooth functioning of a state in an age of time and space compression, with the capability to inflict hurt way beyond what possibly conventional war could not achieve. Its effectiveness is judged by the way it has tied down the powerful conventional forces of the mightiest military power on earth. The Pentagon and its force structure are helpless not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq against this form of indirect warfare. India, which has been the target of asymmetric forces, has dealt with more and more complex situations of this kind for over two decades now.

Asymmetric war is a complex issue. Its complexity only amplifies because of involvement of another state that makes use of it as a policy instrument and potential of this war in precipitating a full-fledged conventional war, with the fear of escalation into an apocalyptic nuclear war. Pakistan has very effectively used this asymmetric warfare as a policy instrument to pressurise India on many policy issues. In fact, if one looks back then one realises how the same strategy forced the superpower Russia out of Afghanistan. The success in Afghanistan has emboldened the Pakistan Army and ISI to relentlessly pursue an asymmetric strategy against India. In this endeavour they have been fully backed by stability-instability paradox because of dyadic nuclear relationship. They know that the possession of nuclear weapons have raised the threshold of their cost effective proxy-war against the Indian State. Under such an ambience, any idea like surgical strikes is fought with escalating dynamics that in the very first place act as deterrent against pursuing such a limited endeavour. One can thus understand the complexity of the problem. The question is why Pakistan is pursuing such a strategy and what is the way out for India.

Motives

First, the militant groups have used similar techniques such as during 26/11 in the Kashmir valley for many years now to force the Government of India into a solution on Kashmir tilted in their favour. But they failed in realising such objectives. The incidents in the Valley did not generate as much public outrage as they did in Mumbai. Thus, the militants fully backed by Pakistani policy planners shifted the theatre of war from the Valley to the plains of India to further put pressure on the Indian government. In fact India having deployed some five to six lakh troops in J&K has been effectively able to contain such incidents in the Valley but that becomes very difficult when the theatre shifts to the mainland because of public pressure. The Pakistani establishment seems to convey to the West: If you do not solve the Kashmir issue the militant groups will again strike India, India in response may go for war against Pakistan and the latter in return might be forced to shift troops from the Western to the Eastern front in the context of the surge against the Taliban in the NWFP and beyond. The West having a high security stake in Afghanistan may force India to bring the Kashmir issue to a close. But, the question that begs an answer, will Pakistan stop this indirect war against India if the Kashmir issue is solved?

Second, many militant organisations perceive India as being part of a Christian-Zionist crusade against Islam. So, launching jihad against India is a religiously ordained duty of Muslims. India’s recent embrace of the US may invite even more deadly attacks. Third motive could be bleeding India through a thousand cuts. Many Pakistani policy planners cannot digest India's emergence as an economic power house and a regional heavyweight. So, by resorting to this cost effective proxy-war, Pakistan can prevent India's rise and subject her to suffer from slow anemia resulting in ultimate collapse.

Way Out

What is the way out for India? If one looks at crises such as Brasstacks (1987), the Kashmir uprising (1990), the Kargil War (1999), the attack on the Parliament (2001), India could not launch a successful conventional military assault, because of the presence of nuclear weapons. Now if this nuclear calculus is removed from their policy calculus then possibly Pakistan might not have undertaken the Kargil misadventure or Parliament attack. So if India can neutralise their nuclear deterrence then possibly continuation of terrorism as Pakistan’s instrument of policy can be neutralised.

The tragedy of the Indian state is that it does not have national security culture, preventing both policy planners and intellectuals in thinking of out of the box solutions. India must replicate Ronald Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI) programme. It is also a test of India's scientific community to give India this missile shield to neutralise Pakistani nuclear deterrence and come out of the stability-instability paradox.

Further India is home to 13-14 million Muslims. But the condition of this huge segment of Indian population is pathetic. Further the sort of divisive politics indulged by Indian politicians aggravate the existing situation. Such a population facing social and economic deprivation manipulated by politicians for votes  is prone to be disaffected and the ideal cannon fodder for militancy. So, if India is to avoid her own population being exploited by outside powers then politicians must stop practicing divisive politics, help in economic empowerment of Muslims and prevent the recurrence of the violent attacks that took place against Muslims in 2002.

South Asia, with its nuclear weapons present in such a communal combustible matrix is truly the most dangerous region of the world.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).