The Tale of the Asian Twin Tigers: China�s Quest for Regional Dominance in the India-China Context

India and China, with radically diverse political ideologies, have similar aspirations to emerge as a leading power centre in the Asian security scenario. By virtue of being the two most significant players in Asia, New Delhi and Beijing display a peculiar mix of both competition and cooperation.

The complexities of Sino-Indian geopolitics demonstrate both a convergence of interests as well as strategic divergences. India and China have exhibited a coordinated approach in international affairs by cooperating in various international fora e.g.: the Doha round of talks in the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the recent climate change negotiations at Copenhagen; counter-terrorism cooperation; and mutual energy security. Both nations could also undertake collaboration towards stabilising the collapsing global markets with their foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, it should be recalled that India supported China’s entry into the UN and expects China to support India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

The economic synergy between New Delhi and Beijing is mounting with Sino-Indian trade growing by 33 per cent in 2008 to nearly $52 billion. Bilateral trade is tipped to reach $60 billion by 2010. However, the existing strategic divergences are numerous, encompassing the territorial and boundary dispute, Sino-Pak nuclear and missile nexus, China’s quest for increasing its influence in the Indian Ocean Region, and China’s pursuance of an ‘encirclement strategy’ towards India.

Significantly, even as the world recognises and accepts India's prowess as a nuclear weapons power, China still refuses to confirm that status. Beijing insists that India must abide by UNSC Resolution 1172 and give up its nuclear weapons and consequently sign the NPT. In September 2008, China attempted to foil the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meet, regardless of earlier assurances provided by the Chinese leadership that Beijing would not block the emergence of a consensus at the NSG.

The Chinese leadership believes that “China’s security situation has improved steadily,” although China is still confronted with “long-term, complicated and diverse security threats and challenges.” The 2008 Chinese White Paper on National Defence cautions the Chinese people that it is facing “the superiority of the developed countries in economy, science and technology as well as military affairs… and faces strategic manoeuvres and containment from the outside.” In line with this prevailing sentiment within the PRC, the active pursuance of an ‘encirclement strategy’ towards India in order to gain a long-term strategic advantage in the region is comprehensible.

This critically includes Beijing’s efforts at making inroads into India’s neighbourhood including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka as part of its strategy to ‘contain’ India. The signs are there for all to see. China is developing ports and naval bases in Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Besides, the new Chinese naval base at Sanya, on Hainan Island, could house a large fleet of surface warships and also serve as an underwater naval base for submarines. The completion of the Sanya base will allow China to extend its influence in the South China Sea and command superior naval presence closer to important sea-lanes. Eventually, the PLA Navy will be able to operate and sustain itself in the northern Indian Ocean region by about 2015.

The territorial and boundary dispute continues to feature as the most complex and contentious issue between the two countries. China physically occupies large areas of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. In Ladakh (Aksai Chin), China occupies 38,000 sq kms of Indian territory. Besides this, Shaksgam Valley (5,180 sq kms) was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China in March 1963. It should be noted that the Karakoram highway was built close to this tract. Beijing also continues to claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is more than 90,000 sq kms of Indian Territory. Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi reiterated this claim on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006. Since 1962, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not yet been physically demarcated/delineated on ground and in military maps despite the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) of 1993, CBMs in Military Field of 1996 and numerous meetings of the Joint Working Group.

Nevertheless, a well absorbed fact is that China’s growing power and influence in Asia poses a strategic challenge to India. The Chinese armed forces are well ahead of their Indian counterparts in many areas of defence modernisation and the gap is slowly becoming unbridgeable.

Although, China continues to reiterate that its defence policy is purely defensive in nature, Beijing has openly argued that it is working towards implementing a “military strategy of active defence.” While formulating its military strategy of active defence for the 21st century, China is focusing on four crucial components: emphasising the prevention and deterrence of crises and wars; building hi-tech military capabilities to win local wars in conditions of ‘informationisation’; enhancing the ability to counter various security threats; and, improving its military mobilisation and logistics mechanism.

Even though China has resolved its territorial and boundary dispute with the Central Asian Republics, Russia and Vietnam, the border dispute with India appears to be becoming interminable. With indications galore that the boundary dispute will eventually become a key impediment and play the role of a spoiler in Sino-Indian ties in future, it is about time that it be addressed with utmost sincerity and urgency.

According to an ancient Chinese proverb, one mountain can house just one tiger. However, in the given context, the Asian mountain surely appears to be getting ready so as to accommodate two tigers i.e., India and China. Although, both Beijing and New Delhi desire improvements in bilateral relations, ties have constantly been stymied as China’s image of asserting its presence and projecting a more dominating role for itself in Asia looms large.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).